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Abstract 
This thesis investigated children’s selective trust in contexts that extend beyond a 
direct comparison of a distinctly accurate labeller with a distinctly inaccurate labeller in the 
domain of artifacts. In the existing selective trust literature, it has been well-established that 
children from about the age of three consider informants who accurately label artifacts to be 
more trustworthy than informants who inaccurately label artifacts. In order to expand on the 
existing research and present children with situations that are more likely be more 
representative of what they encounter in real life, there were three main aims in this thesis. 
First, children were presented with informants who provided information about objects from 
the human body to examine whether children’s evaluations of informant trustworthiness is 
similar across the biological domain and the domain of artifacts. Second, an informant who 
provided novel labels for body parts was introduced to investigate how children interpret 
novel labellers when compared to accurate and inaccurate labellers. Finally, children were 
presented with informants who provided functional or surface information for objects from 
the human body to determine whether they could differentiate informants on qualitative 
grounds, and prefer learning from informants who provided functional explanations. 
Across five experiments, children aged between three and eight years of age (N = 
379) were tested. The main findings of this thesis were as follows: (a) 4- and 5-year-olds 
knew more about external body parts (e.g., hand) than internal organs, and some internal 
organs (e.g., brain) were better known to them than others (e.g., pancreas); (b) five-year-olds 
began to appreciate that speakers offering novel information were more trustworthy than 
those offering inaccurate information; (c) four- to eight-year-olds had difficulty with 
distinguishing between informants who provided either functional explanations or superficial 
descriptions for highly unfamiliar organs (e.g., pancreas); (d) however, when presented with 
informants who provided either functional or superficial information for highly familiar body 
parts (e.g., eye), eight-year-olds (and to some extent, five-year-olds) showed better recall of 
which informant provided a particular type of explanation, but they did not consider either 
informant to be a more trustworthy source for learning labels for unfamiliar organs. 
These findings indicate that children demonstrate selective trust in the biological 
domain, as well as in contexts that go beyond comparing accurate and inaccurate labellers. It 
is apparent that children are balanced in their evaluations of informants who provide new 
information, as well as those provide information that varies in explanatory depth. However, 
they are yet to fully consider functional explanations to be superior to superficial 
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descriptions. Further research is required to examine the contexts in which children might 
trust an informant who provides functional or surface information, and how they come to 
decide that certain kinds of explanation should be privileged. 
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Chapter 1 
How do Children Learn About the World? 
 
Much of our knowledge depends on what a person or group of persons has told us. 
Our belief in many things is based on the say-so of other people and we are largely inclined 
to go along with what has been said to us. In a discussion of philosophical ideas of testimony, 
Australian philosopher, Tony Coady (1992), provided an illustrative example which 
demonstrates our reliance on what other people say. He states that his knowledge of many 
things, even things about himself, are known only via testimony. For instance, he notes that 
the only way he knows about his age and date of birth is because that is what he has been 
told. Upon arriving at an unfamiliar airport, he can only rely on the crew‘s word, and other 
cues, that he has indeed arrived in Amsterdam. While reading a history book about Napoleon 
Bonaparte, he asserts that neither he nor the writer is able to personally verify the claims in 
the book. This example shows the extent to which we humans are receptive to information 
provided by other people and, in most cases, we accept that information to be true. 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the extant literature on the nature of children‘s 
epistemic trust – how children decide that other people are trustworthy sources to acquire 
knowledge from. The experiments presented in this thesis investigate the extent to which 
children trust people who make claims that can be considered reliable or unreliable. Much of 
the existing literature has focused on presenting children with informants who provide either 
accurate or inaccurate labels for common objects (i.e., artifacts) using a methodology known 
as the selective trust paradigm, and it has been well-established that children from the age of 
three consider previously accurate labellers to be more trustworthy than inaccurate labellers. 
This thesis presents a series of experiments that modify aspects of the selective trust 
paradigm in order to create contexts that more closely resemble what children are likely to 
encounter in the real world. Before such studies can be presented, however, the four 
introductory chapters of this thesis serve to highlight the importance of studying children‘s 
capacity to evaluate the trustworthiness of what other people say. In this chapter, I introduce 
the theoretical background of children‘s epistemic trust, and focus on the notion that children 
heavily depend on information provided by others, even though they acquire much 
knowledge via firsthand observation or experience. Further, it is discussed that culture has 
key influences on what knowledge is privileged and transmitted within a society. However, 
children do not blindly accept everything that they are told. Instead, children become 
increasingly balanced between credulity and scepticism, such that become more capable of 
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evaluating the claims they hear in light of their existing knowledge, as well as the people that 
provide them. 
Chapter 2 introduces the details of the experimental procedure – the selective trust 
paradigm – which has been widely used to examine how children evaluate the trustworthiness 
of others, and will serve as the basis for the experiments presented in this thesis. After 
discussing key findings from the existing literature, I provide critiques of the selective 
paradigm and note three ways in which the limitations of the paradigm will be addressed in 
the experiments. In particular, in Chapter 2, I note that the contrast between accurate and 
inaccurate labellers does not necessarily reflect what children encounter in real life, and argue 
that it may be useful to examine how children evaluate informants who provide new labels 
relative to informants who provide distinctly accurate or inaccurate labels. In Chapter 3, I 
outline findings that show that children rely on cues, other than accuracy of labelling, when 
determining the trustworthiness of informants. Further, I point out that the information 
children receive in real life is not limited to the labels of objects, but that they receive other 
types of information. Of particular note, is that children receive explanations about objects or 
events, so they might be inclined to evaluate the trustworthiness of informants who provide 
such claims, in a similar way to how they evaluate informants who are accurate or inaccurate. 
In Chapter 4, I attempt to bring the arguments of the preceding chapters together under a key 
approach. Specifically, I argue that the existing literature has emphasised presenting children 
with informants who provide information about artifacts, and that it may be fruitful to 
examine children‘s selective trust in other domains. In this thesis, I focus on the biological 
domain, particularly on children‘s understanding of the body, given that their knowledge of it 
has been shown to increase from about the age of four, and that there are many things which 
they must depend on others to learn about. Further, given the complexity of objects within 
this domain, it is argued that the biological domain serves as a useful basis on which to 
investigate children‘s construal of new information (i.e., labels), as well as their evaluation of 
different types of claims. To sum, this thesis presents a novel approach to examining 
children‘s selective trust, and it is anticipated that it will serve to contribute new findings to 
the existing research on how children determine the trustworthiness of others. 
 
  
3 
Children Rely on the Testimony of Others 
It is perhaps surprising that interest in when and how children‘s receptivity to 
testimony emerges has only grown within the last decade. This delay is likely due to the 
emphasis that has been placed on children‘s cognitive development via first-hand experience 
and exploration (Harris, 2012). In other words, children are considered autodidacts, who 
observe and come to conclusions about the world by themselves. For instance, 18
th
 Century 
philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762/1969), asserted that children should not be told 
the answers to their questions; instead, they should be left to figure out the answers for 
themselves in order to gain greater understanding and autonomy. Following the spirit of 
Rousseau, Piaget (trans. 1954) viewed children as active seekers of information, who 
discover the true state of the world for themselves via exploration. With the renewed interest 
in testimony, there is ongoing philosophical debate in epistemology between two camps of 
thought as to the status of testimony (McMyler, 2011; Sperber et al., 2010). To put simply, 
the reductionist camp (e.g., Hume, 1748/2007) surmises that, through inductive inference, we 
come to accept testimony because our previous experiences have shown testimony to be 
reliable. In other words, we are justified in believing other people‘s testimony because we 
have previously been able to determine its veracity via other means, such as through our own 
observations. On the other hand, the non-reductionist camp (e.g., Reid, 1764/1997) argues 
against the notion that our justifications for believing testimony come about through 
inductive inferences, claiming instead that we are predisposed to accept testimony, and that 
our reasons for believing in other people‘s testimony are analogous to our reasons for 
believing in our own senses. 
  Even though young children can, and do, form their own conclusions about many 
things (e.g., properties of objects, causal relations, theory of mind, naive biology), they 
quickly come to be knowledgeable about things they would never be able to personally 
observe or verify for themselves (Harris, 2002; 2007). For example, children believe that the 
world is round, not flat; that there are unobservable things called germs which can make you 
sick; and that we breathe oxygen to stay alive (Harris & Koenig, 2006). Children also believe 
that certain historical figures lived during specific eras and performed certain deeds, despite 
having never met or seen them. In addition, children even entertain the idea that fictional 
(e.g., the Tooth Fairy, Santa Claus, mermaids) or metaphysical beings (e.g., God) might exist. 
Of course, it is not the case that children readily accept the existence of all these different 
types of entities just because they have heard about them. Harris (2002) noted that children‘s 
beliefs in the existence of different types of entities depend on the type of discourse they have 
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encountered. For instance, because people often refer to entities that can be seen in the world 
and also to scientific entities in ways that do not question or assert their existence but take it 
for granted, children are likely to categorise observable and scientific entities in the same 
way; that they do exist. In contrast, for fictional entities, which are generally presented in the 
context of a fantasy world, and for metaphysical beings, whose existence may be debated 
depending on the religiosity of certain societies, children are likely to show more doubt in 
their existence. 
The fact that children come to believe in things that are not necessarily a truer 
reflection of the world, such as believing in the existence of God or the afterlife, goes against 
the classical notion in cognitive development that children strive to construct a truer 
representation of the world. As shown by Legare, Evans, Rosengren, and Harris (2012), 
children, and even adults, can hold conflicting natural and supernatural beliefs about the same 
phenomenon (e.g., the origin of the species, illness, or death). Further, children‘s use of 
correct natural explanations does not fully replace or outgrow their supernatural explanations. 
Given that children can hold such conflicting views, have knowledge of things they would 
never be able to personally observe, and do not always adopt accurate representations of the 
true state of the world, they clearly depend on the information provided by other people  
Children‘s reliance on testimony suggests that they come into the world ready to 
receive information from others. The Vygotskian perspective emphasises the role played by 
knowledgeable others in providing information and structuring children‘s learning within a 
sociocultural context. Through various means, such as modelling, explanation, prompts, and 
joint engagement, the more knowledgeable person is able to guide the child through the zone 
of proximal development; the distance between what the child can do on his or her own and 
what the child can do with the assistance of the knowledgeable person (Vygotsky, 1978). In 
addition, children are taught the things which will allow them to survive and prosper in their 
respective culture. In some cultures, these things may be hunting or careful observation, 
whereas in other cultures, reading or knowing how to use a computer are more valuable to 
learn. Overall, children absorb the culture in which they live, adopting the ideas and beliefs 
widely held by their community, and they rely on knowledgeable others to provide them with 
the necessary information. 
While culture is argued to be what sets the human species apart from others, some 
have argued that non-human primate species show indications of cultural transmission. For 
example, studies of chimpanzees‘ foraging behaviour have revealed that, when using a tool to 
retrieve food from an apparatus, chimpanzees engaged in the same instrumental actions they 
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had observed a trained conspecific engage in (Horner & de Waal, 2009). Thus, it appears that 
certain behaviours can be passed on between chimpanzees via observation and social 
learning. However, despite such evidence, there is still a clear distinction in the means of 
‗cultural transmission‘ between both species. As indicated by Tomasello (1999), humans 
demonstrate a ratchet effect, where there is a progressive increase in tool complexity, so that 
modern tools eventually come to replace older ones. On the other hand, non-human primates 
demonstrate no signs of creating more advanced tools over time. Further, the knowledge 
transferred within a non-human primate society is largely aimed at the attainment of basic 
needs, such as acquiring food. In contrast, humans engage in activities which might serve no 
obvious adaptive functions (e.g., rituals, customs) but, nevertheless, still proliferate within a 
society. 
One explanation of why cultural knowledge readily spreads in humans but not in non-
human primates lies in the distinct imitative behaviours of each species. In an investigation of 
what young chimpanzees and three- to four-year-old human children attend to when watching 
a model perform actions, Horner and Whiten (2005) showed that young chimpanzees 
imitated causally opaque irrelevant actions, but emulated when the irrelevant actions were 
causally transparent. In other words, chimpanzees recognised that certain actions performed 
by the model were not relevant to the goal of retrieving a reward from a specially designed 
box and they omitted such irrelevant actions when retrieving the reward. On the other hand, 
three- to four-year-old human children more often imitated the model‘s actions, and included 
the irrelevant actions even though they served no instrumental purpose in retrieving the 
reward. This tendency to over-imitate (Lyons et al., 2007) shows that children are equipped 
to readily absorb important aspects of their culture; they view the model as intentionally 
communicating something to them and that his or her actions should be followed. Children 
are inclined to act in accordance with the norms of the culture they live in rather than solely 
seek the causally most effective solution or seek to uncover the underlying causal 
mechanisms of all actions (which may often be opaque). In this way, the practices and 
customs of a society are likely to be passed on to the next generation, even if they do not 
necessarily have functional utility. Further, children rely on more knowledgeable others to 
provide them with information on how they should behave. 
Along similar lines, Csibra and Gergely (2009; 2011) put forward a theory of natural 
pedagogy, which argues that human communication specifically evolved in a way that allows 
for the effective transmission of cultural knowledge; in particular, to children. Under this 
natural pedagogy system, children do not have to rely solely on statistical or trial-and-error 
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learning to gather information about the world, especially when particular artifacts or 
instrumental actions may be too complex to learn about using these methods alone. This 
natural pedagogy system capitalises on infants‘ early recognition of ostensive cues (e.g., 
direct eye gaze, infant-directed speech) as referring to some object or event in the world, as 
well as their recognition that the information communicated in ostensive-referential contexts 
is likely to be generalisable to other contexts. Further, the benefit of natural pedagogy is that 
the transmission of cultural information extends beyond the parent-child relationship. Adults 
willingly teach children who are not their own, and children readily consider other adults to 
be reliable sources of information. To sum, Csibra and Gergeley concluded that natural 
pedagogy enables practical and cultural knowledge to proliferate within a community and to 
be communicated to subsequent generations, thus preserving the foundation of diverse human 
cultures. 
Indeed, the processes and mechanisms put forward by natural pedagogy have been 
shown to be universal across distinctive human groups (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; 2011). 
However, that does not necessarily imply that the means by which cultural knowledge is 
transmitted is identical across cultures. For example, in most Western societies, children are 
provided with explicit instruction and explanation within formal educational institutions. On 
the other hand, in certain non-Western societies, where there is little direct teaching in the 
form of educational institutions, knowledge might be transferred via other means, such as 
through modelling and demonstration. Within different cultures, there is a set of specific tools 
(e.g., language, artifacts, beliefs, routines, values, etc.) which allow people to successfully 
navigate their surroundings. Such cultural tools may in fact, to some extent, influence how 
the people in that culture think. In other words, the means by which knowledge is passed on 
might affect what particular modes of thought are dominant within a culture and, 
subsequently, might mean that children are better able to reason with particular types of 
information or come to privilege certain types of information. The findings of Luria (1976), 
presented below, provide a profound example of how particular modes of thought might be 
influenced by how knowledge is transmitted. 
Luria (1976) examined the differences in logical reasoning ability between illiterate 
peasant farmers with no formal schooling and collective farmers who had been provided with 
one to two years of formal schooling as a result of Soviet reforms. Both groups performed 
equally well when asked about propositions that matched their personal experiences. For 
instance, when asked, ―Cotton grows well where it is hot and dry. England is cold and damp. 
Can cotton grow there or not?‖ members of both groups, who were well aware of the 
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necessity of a hot and dry climate for optimal cotton-growing, made the appropriate inference 
that cotton would not grow in England. However, when presented with propositions that did 
not fit with their experiences (e.g., ―In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears are white. 
Novaya Zemlya is in the Far North. What colour are bears there?‖), only the educated 
farmers inferred that bears would be white. In contrast, the illiterate peasant farmers were 
reluctant to provide an answer, often stating that they would not know what colours the bears 
were because they had never seen them before. Hence, it can be seen that formal education 
facilitates the emergence of particular modes of thought; in this case, the tendency to draw a 
(logical) inference from premises that are beyond personal experience. Such results have 
implications for children‘s receptivity to testimony. For instance, it is likely that formal 
education strengthens children‘s capacity to consider objects and events that are beyond the 
here and now. Indeed, Harris and Richert (2008) argued that this ability to conceive of events 
or objects that are not bound to the current situation (i.e., including things that cannot be 
observed) is necessary for making sense of other people‘s testimony. Therefore, it is plausible 
that, in societies which utilise formal education systems, which consistently require children 
to imaginatively reconstruct events, circumstances, and conditions, children are more able to 
learn from testimony. 
The research outlined above highlights how important the information provided by 
other people is for children‘s learning. Although a great deal of research has previously 
focused on how children gain knowledge through independent exploration, at present there is 
growing interest in how children learn from what other people say. Indeed, the testimony of 
others serves as a valuable source of information, providing not only information about things 
that children can personally observe for themselves, but also information about things which 
they will never observe or experience in their lives. In addition, many of the things children 
learn are embedded within a culture. For instance, it is culture that supplies the system for 
how objects should be classified, labelled, or used; and, as stated earlier, to some extent, 
structures how children should think about and perceive their environment. 
In summary, rather than working exclusively towards a more objective and rational 
understanding of the world, a deep assumption of Piaget‘s genetic psychology, children 
absorb the culture they grow up in. They adhere to the norms of their culture, including its 
language, and acquire knowledge via observing others and relying on those they trust for 
information (Harris, 2012). However, that is not to say that children readily accept everything 
they are told, nor do they fail to evaluate for themselves what they have been told. Indeed, 
Gelman (2009) has argued that the testimony of others and the child‘s capacity to assess the 
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testimony which they receive are equally important for their conceptual development. In the 
following section, I will discuss children‘s early learning from others as well as evidence that 
they are not credulous with respect to all the information they receive. 
 
Children Accept Information They Hear at an Early Age, But Not Everything. 
Given that testimony involves the transfer of verbal information, it could be thought 
that children‘s receptivity to testimony only emerges when they are fully capable of 
understanding language. As a result, learning from testimony might be thought of as rare 
during infancy. However, it is apparent that the foundations for learning from testimony are 
present from a young age. In a review of the social referencing literature, Baldwin and Moses 
(1996) pointed out that infants from 12 months of age are capable of making sense of the 
information received from others (e.g., emotional expression, actions, utterances) and they 
appreciate the referential quality of communication; that people provide information which 
refers to specific objects or events. Similarly, Harris and Lane (2013) reviewed evidence 
which shows that infants are receptive to the emotional signals of others, and that they 
recognise, by the age of two, that information is shared within a bi-directional communicative 
exchange. 
In addition to emotional signals, non-verbal gestures, such as pointing, can serve as a 
type of testimony. It is now fairly well established that infants use and interpret pointing 
behaviour in systematic ways (Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007). For example, 
Behne, Liszkowski, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2012) showed that 12-month-olds 
successfully searched a container for a hidden toy when the experimenter had pointed to that 
specific container. Although infants‘ ability to orient towards the direction of another 
person‘s pointing may appear trivial, infants have to be able to infer why a pointer is directing 
them in order to fully understand that the pointer is intentionally providing information. Thus, 
infants may consider how the pointing is relevant to the situation and whether the pointer is a 
helpful source of information. Behne et al. also showed that infants who were better able to 
follow the experimenter‘s pointing were more likely to point to the correct container when 
the experimenter was searching for a hidden object. Hence, infants appear to understand that 
they can receive information from other people‘s pointing and also that they can use pointing 
as a way to provide information for others. 
From the studies presented above, infants demonstrate behaviours that are proposed to 
be the early foundations for learning from testimony (Harris & Lane, 2013). For example, 
infants‘ ability to engage in social referencing suggests that they are receptive to information 
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from others and can modify their behaviour based on the information they receive (e.g., in 
response to positive or negative facial expressions). Further, infants‘ sensitivity to pointing 
gestures, as well as their own use of such gestures, indicates that they recognise that 
information can be exchanged bi-directionally. In addition to this emerging ability to modify 
their behaviour in response to information provided by others and understanding the bi-
directional nature of communication, there is growing evidence that very young children 
respond appropriately to the information provided by reliable or unreliable informants. For 
instance, 14-month-olds are more likely to imitate the novel actions presented by previously 
reliable models than of previously unreliable models (Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Polonia, 
2011; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010). In studies with younger children, 12-
month-olds have been shown to behave in accordance with the emotional signals provided by 
previously reliable informants rather than previously unreliable informants within a social 
referencing paradigm (Stenberg, 2013). In addition, using an eye-tracking paradigm, even 8-
month-olds have been found to systematically search locations that are repeatedly cued by 
reliable human faces rather than unreliable human faces (Tummeltshammer, Wu, Sobel, & 
Kirkham, 2014). Hence, it appears that children from a very young age are sensitive to the 
nonverbal reliability of informants and they can use such information to regulate their 
subsequent behaviours. Further, it is likely that these capacities contribute to their developing 
sensitivity to the reliability of verbal testimony. 
Drawing parallels to how a child learns from spoken testimony, the child has to be 
able to decode the information they hear, and to understand that the information is being 
intentionally communicated and is about specific objects or events in the world. As a result of 
the testimony, there will likely be a change in the child‘s state, wherein they might modify 
their behaviour appropriately, or gain knowledge about something they were previously 
ignorant of. In addition, the child recognises that others may be more knowledgeable than 
they are themselves and should be attended to. Conversely, the child is able to provide 
information to a less knowledgeable conversational partner. Overall, it can be seen that the 
building blocks for children‘s ability to learn from verbal testimony emerges early in infancy, 
in which they are receptive to information from others, even though it is not verbal 
information. 
Despite such early capacities, however, it is not until children have passed their 
second birthday that they have been shown to reliably modify their behaviour exclusively in 
response to verbal testimony. In a study by Ganea and Harris (2010), 30-month-olds, but not 
23-month-olds searched a toy‘s new hiding location in response to being told by an 
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experimenter where the toy had been moved. On the other hand, 23-month-olds tended to 
make perseverative errors and searched in the toy‘s initial hiding location, which 
corresponded with their first hand experience (i.e., they had seen the toy in that location), 
even though the experimenter had stated where the toy had been moved to. Similarly, 
Baldwin and Moses (1996) argued that children‘s ability to appreciate others as informative 
sources, as well as their ability to successfully elicit information from others, does not fully 
develop until about the age of three, which coincides with their nascent understanding of the 
distinction between knowledge and ignorance. Hence, it appears that it is not until about 30 
months of age that children begin to appreciate that verbal testimony can be as informative as 
direct observation. In social referencing research, the information provided about the referent 
is, of course, confounded with children‘s direct observations. However, with testimony, the 
information provided about the referent is often not within children‘s direct experience. 
Children‘s receptivity to verbal testimony offers them opportunities to acquire 
knowledge of things they are unlikely to observe or experience for themselves, which 
suggests that, in order to maximise learning, children should treat information obtained via 
testimony in the same way that they treat information obtained via direct experience. Indeed, 
there is evidence in support of this notion. For example, cognitive biases, such as the curse of 
knowledge, emerge when children acquire knowledge through direct observation as well as 
when they acquire knowledge through testimony. The curse of knowledge occurs when a 
person is biased by his or her own knowledge when attempting to judge what a less 
knowledgeable other person is likely to know or do. Bhandari and Barth (2010) showed that 
three- and four-year-olds displayed the curse of knowledge in response to verbal testimony. 
Specifically, after being told by an experimenter about the contents of a toy box, three- and 
four-year-olds stated that a puppet, who admitted that he had not seen the toys before, would 
know about the identity of the toys inside the box. Hence, it appears that children place 
similar emphasis on the epistemic nature of knowledge obtained from both direct observation 
and via testimony. 
Although it may seem surprising that children place such faith in testimony, they have 
been shown to be quite deferential to the testimony of others in certain contexts. Jaswal, 
Croft, Setia, and Cole (2010) found that three-year-olds were continually misled by an 
informant who provided incorrect verbal testimony about the location of a hidden sticker. 
These young children persisted in choosing the location stated by the informant even though 
it was repeatedly revealed that there was no sticker to be found at that location. In contrast, 
children who watched the informant place an arrow over the wrong location more quickly 
11 
realised that the arrow was not a reliable marker of the sticker‘s location. Hence, from about 
the age of three, children have a strong bias to trust direct verbal testimony. A study by 
Jaswal (2010) also revealed that 30-month-olds deferred to an experimenter‘s testimony, even 
if it conflicted with their understanding of the physical world (i.e., the trajectory of a ball 
through a tube). However, children were not excessively deferential. If children could see 
where the ball was, or if they were given the chance to closely examine how the tubes were 
aligned, they more often dismissed the experimenter‘s testimony in favour of what they 
knew. Therefore, when claims are not easily verifiable or children are uncertain, they are 
credulous to what other people say. However, if such claims appear implausible or strongly 
conflict with their existing knowledge, they dismiss them in favour of their own observations 
or knowledge.  
The research outlined above suggests that, while children generally accept what they 
are told, especially when they are uncertain or lack knowledge, children are not irrationally 
credulous. Children disregard what they have been told when claims are clearly inconsistent 
with what they can observe (Ma & Ganea, 2010). Further, children‘s dismissal of conflicting 
testimony is not isolated to specific communicative exchanges. From the age of three, they 
expect that a person who initially provides blatantly misleading testimony will be unlikely to 
provide reliable testimony in a future situation. For instance, Ganea, Koenig, and Millett 
(2011) showed that 36-month-olds were more likely to follow an experimenter‘s statements if 
she was previously reliable in reporting where a toy had been moved than if she was 
previously unreliable, whereas 30-month-olds still deferred to the experimenter‘s 
suggestions, even if she had been unreliable. Hence, just as infants are sensitive to the 
reliability of nonverbal information provided by other people (as discussed earlier), children 
from the age of three are initially credulous to verbal testimony but quickly become sceptical 
of informants who provide false testimony that flatly contradicts what they have seen or 
experienced. Furthermore, they make use of an informant‘s history of accuracy, if it is 
available, to appropriately decide whether they should trust that informant‘s claims in future 
situations. 
In a systematic investigation of how children simultaneously consider informants‘ 
history of accuracy and whether the testimony strongly contradicts with children‘s personal 
observations, Clément, Koenig and Harris (2004) showed that children from a young age do 
not simply trust everything other people say. Instead, they consistently monitor the 
information they are exposed to in light of informants‘ prior reliability as well as their own 
observations. From three years of age, children give priority to their own observations and do 
12 
not endorse false testimony, even from an informant who was previously reliable. Further, 
there is evidence of a developmental transition between the ages of three and four wherein 
children become more discerning about whom to trust and are wary of informants who have 
proven unreliable in the past, particularly in situations where they are unable to check an 
informant‘s testimony against their own observations. That is, from four years of age, 
children predict that a previously reliable informant will continue to make accurate 
statements and that a previously unreliable informant will continue to make inaccurate 
statements. In addition, they prefer a reliable informant‘s testimony in circumstances when 
they cannot determine the answer for themselves via direct observation. Three-year-olds, on 
the other hand, are more likely to predict that both previously reliable and unreliable 
informants will provide accurate statements, and they display indiscriminate trust and are 
likely to agree with the statements provided by both informants. Hence, given that children 
are monitoring the reliability of informants, it appears that they are forming an impression of 
that informant as a potential future source of information. In keeping with this notion, in the 
next section I argue that children do not only evaluate the claims they hear, they also make 
evaluations of the informants who provide them. 
 
Children need to be able to Evaluate who is a Trustworthy Source of Information 
Under most circumstances, children readily accept the information they receive from 
others unless there are good reasons not to, such as if the informant has made statements that 
strongly contradict children‘s knowledge or experience, or if he or she has a history of 
inaccuracy. In addition, children consider the epistemic value of information obtained via 
testimony to be comparable to the epistemic value of information obtained via direct 
observation or experience. Testimony does not serve only to supplement children‘s 
knowledge (Harris, 2012). In other words, once children hear a piece of testimony, they do 
not have to search for observable evidence to verify the truth of the statement and decide 
whether the informant should be trusted. If children engaged in such a strategy of empirically 
confirming everything they hear, this would be ineffective for two reasons. First, children are 
unlikely to have adequate time and resources to figure out for themselves the veracity of 
statements (Sperber et al. 2010). Indeed, in some instances, it might be dangerous to do so 
(e.g., if a child is told that a stove should not be touched because it is hot). Second, as 
discussed throughout this chapter, there are many things which children will never be able to 
see or experience for themselves (Harris, 2007), so it will be impossible to determine the 
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truth of what they hear. Therefore, children‘s willingness to trust what other people say by 
default is a strategy which allows them to effectively acquire knowledge of the world.  
Of course, because children are not always able to check the truthfulness of a 
statement by comparing it with what they have observed or experienced for themselves, 
children need to rely on other means to decide if an informant should be trusted. As 
suggested by Harris (2007), even if an informant provided accurate testimony in one 
particular situation, which a child is able to check against his or her own experience, it is not 
necessarily a good indicator that the informant‘s testimony is accurate in future situations 
where the child is unable to check the testimony against his or her own knowledge. Hence, 
rather than solely monitor the correspondence between an informant‘s statement and their 
own experience (i.e., the content of the message), children also need to monitor who provides 
such statements. That is, informants who are construed as reliable are more likely to provide 
accurate information in a particular instance as well as in future instances. Indeed, various 
researchers argue that children place great emphasis on who the statement is coming from 
(Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Koenig, 2010). Children infer that informants who were reliable 
in the past are likely to be reliable in the future. In addition, when exposed to an informant 
who provides incorrect information, children brand that informant as an untrustworthy 
source. Indeed, Harris (2007) proposed that children from an early age create a global 
impression or profile of an informant based on a wide range of cues, such as an informant‘s 
history of accuracy, demonstrated knowledge, degree of confidence, the reactions of others, 
and so on. As a result, children see some informants to be more epistemically trustworthy 
than others and are selective about whom they trust; in other words, they are balanced 
between credulity and sceptism. 
By being both accepting and cautious toward the wealth of information they receive, 
children are in a good position to accept reliable claims and dismiss unreliable claims. Such 
an ability is important given that, while most interlocutors are likely to provide reliable 
information, there are instances where children may be exposed to misinformation as a result 
of an informant‘s ignorance, lack of expertise, or an intention to deceive (Sperber et al., 
2010). In addition, children may receive contradictory information and need to decide which 
informant to accept and keep track of in the future. Hence, active epistemic vigilance is 
required, and Sperber et al. argued that it serves as the foundation for trust in others‘ claims. 
We adjust our degree of vigilance in a number of ways, by attending to the content and to the 
source of the information. In most cases, we expect interlocutors to be honest so that our 
vigilance is low, but it is this vigilance which allows us to trust others and provides us with 
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reasons not to when necessary. On a similar note, Koenig (2010) argued that children are 
selective in whom they trust and are competent in finding reasons for accepting or dismissing 
the claims they hear. When evaluating the truth of statements, children can assess the 
statement itself; for instance, by examining whether the statement matches with what they 
have experienced. In addition, children can reflect on the speech act and the context in which 
the informant expresses his or her statements (e.g., whether there are signs of humour, 
confidence, an imaginative setting, etc.). Finally, children can evaluate characteristics of the 
informant to determine whether the statements he or she makes can be trusted; for instance, 
whether the informant has a track record of reliability or appears knowledgeable (to be 
further discussed in the next chapter). 
It is important to note that even when children have found an informant trustworthy or 
untrustworthy, they do not necessarily accept or reject all the testimony from that specific 
informant. In fact, children are capable of deciding whom to seek information from and 
whom to approach for certain kinds of information. For example, they might consider an 
informant to be knowledgeable when providing information from one domain (e.g., cooking), 
but ignorant when providing information from another domain (e.g., computers). Research by 
Keil and colleagues has investigated how children recognise expertise in the minds of other 
people, and suggests that children from about the age of three have a nascent understanding 
that knowledge is clustered in others‘ minds in ways that reflect a person‘s experiences, 
interests and environments (Danovitch & Keil, 2004; Lutz and Keil, 2006). Keil (2006) 
argued that this division of cognitive labour is necessary for human survival as no single 
person could possibly acquire all the knowledge of the world. The findings of Keil, Stein, 
Webb, Billings, and Rozenblit (2008) revealed that children from about the age of five are 
starting to cluster knowledge in ways that are partly consistent with the academic disciplines. 
Remarkably, despite having no formal instruction as to how academic disciplines are 
grouped, children are skilled at distinguishing between specific types of knowledge and 
appropriately matching them with the appropriate discipline, such as the natural or social 
sciences. To sum, children‘s understanding of the division of cognitive labour enables them 
to decide from whom they should seek information as well as to evaluate the quality of the 
information provided. Children from three years of age have some sense, albeit fragile, of 
who might be a more credible source than others for certain topics; and this understanding 
plays an integral role in how they decide whether to trust an informant. 
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Summary 
This chapter has discussed children‘s strong reliance on others‘ testimony from an 
early age and shown that children are neither entirely credulous nor entirely sceptical. 
Instead, they balance their evaluations of the claims of other people and such evaluations are 
made in light of their existing knowledge. In the next chapter, I present an experimental 
paradigm which has been extensively used to examine children‘s selective trust, and will 
serve as the primary methodology of the studies presented in this thesis. In addition, I 
highlight existing limitations of the paradigm as well as my attempts to address them. 
Specifically, in Chapter 2, I argue that existing studies of children‘s selective trust heavily 
emphasise the contrast between accurate and inaccurate informants, but are yet to adequately 
investigate what children do with informants who provide new information, which is 
arguably more representative of what children encounter in the real world. In Chapter 3, I 
note that many studies on selective trust present informants who provide information in the 
form of labels for objects. However, I argue that children also receive many other types of 
information, including explanations about objects. Specifically, it is plausible that children‘s 
precocious capacity to discern accurate from inaccurate labellers extends to other verbal 
information that can, arguably, distinguish someone who is knowledgeable, and therefore 
epistemically trustworthy, from someone who is unlikely to be a good source of information. 
In Chapter 4, I argue that the selective trust literature largely comprises informants who 
provide information about artifacts. However, because children‘s understanding of the body 
burgeons between the ages of four and eight, and much of what they know about the body is 
learnt through what they hear from others, I argue that that the biological domain would be a 
fertile one in which to further investigate how children evaluate the trustworthiness of 
informants. 
  
16 
Chapter 2 
The Selective Trust Paradigm 
 
Key Findings 
 The selective trust paradigm, devised by Koenig, Clément, and Harris (2004), is used 
to examine whether children differentiate reliable informants from unreliable informants, and 
whether they selectively prefer learning from a reliable informant. The first phase of the 
paradigm is a familiarisation phase, in which children watch two informants repeatedly 
provide accurate or inaccurate labels for familiar objects (e.g., ball, doll). In a subsequent test 
phase, children are required to learn about the labels for unfamiliar objects, and are asked to 
decide which informant they would prefer to learn from. Because information about the 
accuracy of labels for the unfamiliar objects is unavailable in test trials, children need to rely 
on the information they obtained about each informant‘s reliability in the preceding 
familiarisation trials. Each test trial typically consists of an ask question, where children 
select one of the informants for help with the labels for unfamiliar objects; an endorse 
question, where children decide which of the informant's labels are correct; and an explicit 
judgement question, where children categorise each informant as "very good", "not very 
good", and "better" at labelling objects. 
 Studies that have used the selective trust paradigm typically contrast an accurate 
labeller with an inaccurate labeller, and have established that children between the ages of 
three and four are sensitive to the differential reliability of such labellers. Earlier studies 
(Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005) indicated that four-year-olds are more 
systematic than three-year-olds in their preferences for the previously accurate labeller. 
However, if provided with more evidence of the informants' reliability (i.e., with additional 
familiarisation trials), three-year-olds also show a systematic preference to learn from 
previously accurate labellers (Corriveau & Harris, 2009a; Corriveau, Meints, & Harris, 
2009). So, when learning labels for unfamiliar objects, children from the age of three prefer 
to seek and endorse the labels provided by a previously accurate labeller, rather than a 
previously inaccurate labeller. Further, in the explicit judgement questions, children provide 
more favourable assessments of the previously accurate labeller (stating that she was "very 
good" and "better" at labelling the objects) than of the previously inaccurate labeller. To sum, 
with repeated exposure to informants who consistently provide accurate or inaccurate 
information, children from the age of three are sensitive to such differences and are more 
likely to trust informants who had provided accurate information. 
17 
 Although it is apparent that children can track the accuracy of informants' labelling, it 
is also important to examine whether their selective trust is bound only to the situation in 
which the brief paradigm is presented, or whether it extends over a longer period of time. In 
real life, for instance, it would be detrimental to children's learning if they were unable to 
recall an informant's previous unreliability during a subsequent encounter. Corriveau and 
Harris (2009a) confirmed the persistence of children‘s selective trust after a time delay. Their 
results showed that three- and four-year-olds continued to display selective trust in the 
previously accurate labeller in a subsequent testing session conducted either one day, four 
days, or one week after an initial testing session. Further, even when explicit judgement 
questions were removed from the initial testing session, children continued show a systematic 
preference for the previously accurate labeller either four days or one week later. Therefore, 
from the age of three, children require only a minimal amount of information about the 
differential accuracy of informants to show a systematic preference for learning from 
accurate informants. Such results suggest that children maintain their evaluations of the 
trustworthiness of informants over an extended period of time; that it is not situation-bound, 
but can be retained for later referral. 
As well as establishing whether children's selective trust persists over time, the scope 
of children's selective trust is also necessary to consider. For example, as children encounter 
others who are knowledgeable of a specific subject (e.g., labels for objects), it may be 
beneficial to also attend to the information those informants provide about other closely-
relevant subjects (e.g., how objects can be used). At the same time, children need to ensure 
that they do not overgeneralise their trust and accept information about things that extend too 
far from the informant's area of expertise. In a study by Koenig and Harris (2005), three- and 
four-year-olds were familiarised with an informant, who provided accurate labels for familiar 
objects and another informant, who claimed ignorance (e.g., "I don't know what that's 
called"). When children were required to seek information from the informants about a 
different subject, the functions of unfamiliar objects (i.e., how they are used), both three- and 
four-year-olds preferred to seek and endorse object functions from the previously accurate 
labeller rather than from the previously ignorant informant. In other words, children expect 
accurate labellers of objects to be trustworthy sources when learning about other 
characteristics of objects; in this case, nonverbal information about how objects are used. 
 Children generalise their selective trust in accurate labellers, not only when learning 
novel object functions, but also when learning novel morphological forms (e.g., irregular past 
tense or plural forms). For instance, the findings of Corriveau, Pickard, and Harris (2010) 
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showed that, when familiarised with informants who either differed in accuracy of labelling 
or differed in accuracy of morphology (i.e., used correct or incorrect plural forms), four-year-
olds systematically preferred the previously accurate labeller over the previously inaccurate 
labeller, and the previously accurate morphologist over the previously inaccurate 
morphologist, when learning novel labels and, more importantly, when learning novel 
irregular past tense forms. Further research by Sobel and Macris (2013) demonstrated that 
four-year-olds are better able to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate labellers when 
learning about novel irregular plural forms than novel irregular past tense forms, which 
suggests that there are nuances in how children generalise their trust. Summarising across 
these studies, children conceive of accurate labellers as being knowledgeable about other 
object- or word-related topics. Such results also suggest that children demonstrate a halo 
effect, in which they over-attribute positive characteristics to the accurate informant. 
However, as outlined below, it is unlikely that children consider an accurate informant to be 
knowledgeable about things that are beyond his or her area of expertise. 
In a study of whether children demonstrate a halo effect when evaluating informants‘ 
trustworthiness, Brosseau-Liard and Birch (2010) showed that five-year-olds, but not four-
year-olds, decided that a previously accurate labeller would have greater knowledge of words 
and facts (e.g., "who knows that cats can see at night?") and would also be more prosocial. 
Therefore, Brosseau-Liard and Birch concluded that five-year-olds consider an informant‘s 
prior accuracy to be indicative of broader knowledge, and that five-year-olds‘ construal of the 
previously accurate labeller as being more prosocial was evidence of a halo effect because 
prosociality is distinct from knowledge of labels. However, in arguing against this 
conclusion, it is important to note that children‘s expectations that the accurate labeller would 
be more prosocial are hardly surprising. That is to say, the accurate informant was inherently 
more prosocial because she had provided relevant information when labelling the familiar 
objects, whereas the inaccurate informant had not. In addition, when asked to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of informants in unrelated subject areas, such as deciding which informant 
had more talents (e.g., " who can draw pretty pictures"), possessions (e.g., ―who has a cat?‖), 
or situation-specific knowledge (e.g., ―who knows where I put my books?‖), five-year-olds 
did not favour the previously accurate labeller. To sum, children extended their trust in the 
accurate labeller when asked who would know more about closely related subject areas (e.g., 
knowledge of words and facts), but not about irrelevant subject areas, and they reasonably 
concluded that the accurate labeller was more helpful. When the results of Brosseau-Liard 
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and Birch are interpreted in a different light, it appears that children do not demonstrate a 
halo effect when evaluating the trustworthiness of informants who differ in accuracy. 
In further investigations of whether the lack of a halo affect is specific to children‘s 
evaluations of informants‘ accuracy, Fusaro, Corriveau and Harris (2011) showed that three- 
to five-year-olds were prone to a halo effect when presented with informants who differed in 
strength, but not when presented with informants who differed in accuracy. For example, 
when presented with an informant who successfully lifted heavy objects and an informant 
who failed to lift heavy objects, children decided that the strong informant would be more 
knowledgeable of novel labels for unfamiliar objects, and rated this informant as stronger, 
smarter and nicer. In contrast, when presented with informants who differed in their accuracy 
of labelling, children decided that the accurate labeller would be more knowledgeable of 
novel labels for unfamiliar objects and rated this informant as smarter, but not stronger or 
nicer. Hence, children evaluated informants who differed in accuracy on aspects which were 
relevant to knowledge (i.e., smartness) and future labelling behaviours, but not to unrelated 
abilities such as strength. Children are sensitive to differences in the accuracy of others, and 
they make relevant and specific evaluations of such people. Additional studies (Brosseau-
Liard & Birch, 2011) have shown that children from the age of four also distinguish between 
person-specific knowledge, in which a person's knowledge generalises across contexts (e.g., 
prior accuracy, knowledge of words and facts), and situation-specific knowledge, which is 
limited to information a person obtains within a specific context (e.g., whether a person had 
visual access). When all these studies are considered, even though children might generalise 
their trust across subject areas, children are remarkably specific when determining the 
trustworthiness of others in particular contexts. 
 
Children’s Strategies for Selective Trust 
 The research reviewed above shows that children from the age of three likely consider 
an informant‘s accuracy to be a largely stable person-specific trait. Children prefer learning 
from those who have been shown to be reliable in the past and, in certain contexts, generalise 
their preference for reliable informants when learning about things that are within informants‘ 
area of expertise. With such consistent findings, another direction the existing research has 
taken is to clarify the nature of the strategy children use when evaluating the trustworthiness 
of informants. There are two potential strategies children could use when deciding who is a 
trustworthy source of information. The first strategy is that children increase their trust in the 
reliable informant whenever he or she makes an accurate or knowledgeable statement. The 
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second strategy is that children reassess, and thereafter reduce, their trust in the unreliable 
informant whenever he or she makes an inaccurate or ignorant statement. Of course, such 
strategies are not mutually exclusive; children could simultaneously utilise both. Existing 
studies indicate that children younger than the age of four primarily use the second strategy, 
in which they are sensitive to inaccuracy and are unforgiving, even when a largely reliable 
informant makes a single error (Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). After the age 
four, however, children begin to privilege accuracy (Corriveau et al., 2009). For example, 
four-year-olds, but not three-year-olds, preferred learning from a previously accurate 
informant over a previously neutral informant; that is, an informant who made neutral 
remarks to draw attention to objects (e.g., ―Let me take a look at that‖). 
 Given the apparent differences between three- and four-year-olds‘ selective trust, the 
age-related change has been proposed to be due to children‘s developing Theory of Mind 
(ToM), their ability to construe an individual‘s actions in terms of internal psychological 
states such as intentions, desires, beliefs and emotions (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 
Research on ToM has particularly emphasised the development of children‘s understanding 
of false beliefs, the understanding that other people hold beliefs about the world which may 
contradict the true state of the world. It has been well established that this ability emerges at 
about the age of four. In relation to selective trust, Koenig and Harris (2005b) suggested that 
three-year-olds might have difficulty in evaluating the trustworthiness of informants because 
they fail to grasp why an unreliable informant (i.e., the one who supplies inaccurate labels) 
would make statements that are in conflict with reality. On the other hand, four-year-olds are 
perhaps able to recognise that an informant‘s unreliable statements are a result of his or her 
erroneous beliefs, and they may then become sceptical of any future statements he or she 
makes. Fusaro and Harris (2008) also suggested that more advanced ToM may be indicative 
of children's ability to treat the knowledge or ignorance of potential informants as an 
enduring trait, rather than limited to a specific instance. 
Despite the developmental advances that occur between the ages of three and four 
with regards to ToM and selective trust, results of several studies that have sought to establish 
a link between these two abilities have been mixed (Diyanni, Ninim Rheel, & Licelli, 2012). 
For instance, in addition to examining how three- and four-year-olds monitor the relative 
accuracy of informants, Pasquini et al. (2007) included a measure of children‘s false belief, 
an unexpected contents task, in which children were shown a crayon box that contained 
candles rather than crayons. After children confirmed that there were candles inside the 
crayon box, they were asked what another person, who has never seen the contents of the 
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box, would think was inside. To demonstrate appropriate false belief understanding, children 
had to recognise that a less informed person would mistakenly believe that there were 
crayons inside. Overall, the findings of Pasquini et al. did not establish that children who had 
higher false belief understanding were more likely to demonstrate selective trust in accurate 
labellers. 
In one of the few studies that have found a link between children‘s ToM and their 
selective trust, Fusaro and Harris (2008) used a battery of ToM tasks, which assessed 
understanding of diverse desires, diverse beliefs, perceptual access and knowledge, false 
beliefs, and hidden emotions. Results revealed that children who were higher in ToM 
systematically favoured an informant, whose labelling elicited cues of assent (e.g., nods and 
smiles) from two bystanders, over another informant, whose labels elicited cues of dissent 
(e.g., headshakes and frowns) from the bystanders. On the other hand, children who were low 
in ToM were less systematic in differentiating between the informants. Hence, even though 
an informant‘s reliability was determined by the nonverbal reactions of bystanders rather than 
through the direct accurate or inaccurate labelling of familiar objects, the results of Fusaro 
and Harris suggested that there is a possible link between individual differences in children‘s 
selective trust and their understanding of other people‘s minds. Such results also indicate that 
it is necessary to assess other aspects of children‘s ToM, rather than be limited to assessing 
false belief understanding only. 
Further evidence suggests that the link between ToM and selective trust might differ 
across cultures. Lucas, Lewis, Pala, Wong, and Berridge (2013) presented three- and four-
year-old Turkish, Chinese and English children with a flexible trust task, a modified version 
of the selective trust paradigm featuring two informants, a toy expert and a food expert. In the 
first phase, children watched the informants provide labels for familiar toys, with the toy 
expert providing correct labels and the food expert providing incorrect labels, and were asked 
which informant they would prefer when learning about novel toys. In the second phase, the 
informants provided labels for familiar foods; this time, the food expert was more reliable 
than the toy expert. Children then had to decide which informant they would prefer when 
learning about novel foods. In the final phase, the flexible trust component, children were 
presented with both novel toys and foods and asked which informant they would prefer 
learning from. The purpose of this final phase was to determine whether children could 
flexibly switch their preferences between informants, depending on the type of novel object 
that was presented. It was expected that children would prefer the toy expert when learning 
about novel toys, but would prefer the food expert when learning about novel foods. 
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Measures of children‘s false belief understanding and executive function skills were also 
taken. Lucas et al. predicted that children‘s executive function skills might play a role in how 
well children would be able to inhibit and switch their preferences between the informants in 
the flexible trust task. 
Findings revealed that, while the executive function skills of Chinese children were 
superior to English and Turkish children‘s, false belief understanding for Turkish children 
was superior to that of Chinese and English children. In the first two phases of the task, when 
the novel toys and foods were presented separately, children across all cultural backgrounds 
preferred learning about novel toys from the toy expert, and preferred learning about novel 
foods from the food expert. However, in the flexible trust component, when both novel toys 
and foods were presented within the same task, only the Turkish children were better able to 
flexibly switch their preferences between the toy and food expert in response to the type of 
object presented. Lucas et al. (2013) suggested that the superiority of the Turkish children‘s 
performance may be due to the fact that certain languages comprise evidential markers which 
allow speakers to explicitly state how he or she came to know something. For instance, the 
Turkish language, unlike English and Chinese, differentiates between information which is 
acquired via observation, inference, or testimony. Hence, the Turkish children‘s ability to 
systematically prefer the appropriate informant when learning about specific types of objects 
might be a result of the early exposure they have to such evidential markers. Of course, it 
remains to be seen whether similar associations between children‘s ToM and selective trust 
also emerge in other cultural groups which utilise evidential markers in their language. 
Nevertheless, the results of this study provide evidence of a link between children‘s selective 
trust and false belief understanding, and suggest that children‘s preference for the more 
reliable informant appears to be driven by their understanding of others as sources of 
knowledge, rather than a result of an increase in general cognitive ability (given that no 
relations were found between executive function and selective trust). 
To sum, the various findings presented above have been informative in establishing 
the nature of children‘s selective trust. However, in the next section, I argue that the labels 
provided by inaccurate informants in existing studies are problematic, and that this gap in the 
literature can be addressed by the introduction of an informant who provides novel labels. 
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The Problem with Inaccurate Labelling 
 From the studies reviewed so far, the defining feature of the typical selective trust 
paradigm is the differential accuracy of labels presented by the informants. The reliable 
informant provides labels for objects which children know to be the accepted labels, and are 
likely to be the same labels that children would themselves use. In contrast, the unreliable 
informant offers labels which are blatantly inaccurate and strongly conflict with children's 
pre-existing knowledge. Such sensitivity to inaccurate labels is present early, even from 
infancy. For instance, a study by Koenig and Echols (2003) showed that 16-month-olds gazed 
longer at a speaker who provided incorrect labels for familiar objects than at a speaker who 
provided the correct labels, as if to express their surprise at the false labels. Several infants 
also protested against the inaccurate labels and attempted to correct the speaker by pointing to 
a correct referent (e.g., infants pointed to their own shoes if the object had been mislabelled 
as a ―shoe‖). 
The provision of inaccurate labels also violates the Gricean maxim of quality (Grice, 
1982), which states that an interlocutor should aim to provide information which is truthful. 
In an investigation of children‘s sensitivity to violations of Gricean maxims, Eskritt, Whalen, 
and Lee (2008) found that from about the age of three, children become increasingly aware of 
such violations. For instance, in a task where they had to locate a sticker under a cup, three-
year-olds dismissed information from an informant who violated the quality maxim by stating 
the incorrect location. Similarly, children dismissed information from an informant who 
flouted the relation maxim by making comments that were irrelevant to the goal of locating 
the sticker (e.g., ―I like these cups‖). However, three-year-olds had difficulty with 
interpreting an informant who flouted the quantity maxim by providing insufficient 
information (e.g., ―It‘s under a cup‖ without stating which coloured cup), suggesting that 
there is fragility in younger children‘s construal of violators of particular maxims. Therefore, 
given children‘s sensitivity to violators of Gricean maxims, it is likely that children conceive 
of an inaccurate labeller in the selective trust paradigm not only as an erroneous source of 
information, but more broadly as someone who does not conform to conversational 
expectations. In the real world, children are unlikely to encounter informants who continually 
provide inaccurate information, unless in the context of pretence or humour. Indeed, Hoicka 
and Akhtar (2012) showed that at the age of three, children begin producing novel humorous 
acts which are label-based (e.g., holding a cat and saying, ―here‘s a fish‖). Hence, given that 
children find inaccurate object-labelling to be funny, it is plausible that children consider 
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inaccurate informants in selective trust paradigms to be an unhelpful and non-genuine source 
of information. 
Interestingly, in contrast to the findings of Hoicka and Akhtar (2012), when children 
are presented with in the selective trust paradigm, featuring informants who differ in 
accuracy, and are asked to explain why the inaccurate labeller was ―not good at answering 
questions‖, children seldom state that the labeller was ―pretending‖ or ―being silly‖. Instead, 
they more often state that the labeller was ignorant and ―didn‘t know‖ the answers (Koenig & 
Harris, 2005a). It is plausible that the contrasting results are due to the manner in which the 
informants make statements. In the context of humour, an informant‘s statements are 
typically accompanied by special facial expressions and vocal cues which signal that the 
informant is intentionally providing incorrect information. On the other hand, in selective 
trust paradigms, such facial expressions and vocal cues are absent, and both informants 
provide labels in a serious manner, so children might be more inclined to infer that the 
inaccurate labeller is ignorant. In the presence of such serious and non-humorous informants, 
several studies have examined how children treat information offered by informants who are 
ignorant. Sabbagh, Wdowiak, and Ottaway (2003) proposed that children may simply block 
learning from ignorant informants by refusing to encode the incorrect word-referent link. On 
the other hand, children may encode the word-referent link but mark it as originating from an 
erroneous source. The results of Sabbagh and Shafman (2009) lend support to the latter 
encoding-and-marking strategy. Four- and five-year-olds accurately recalled what an ignorant 
informant had said. That is, when asked, ―Which one did I say is the modi?‖ children 
remembered which toy the informant had labelled as ―modi‖.  However, children did not 
maintain a strong semantic representation of the word-referent link because they were less 
able to select the target toy when later asked, ―Which one of these things is the modi?‖. 
Hence, it can be seen that children not only dismiss information from an unreliable source, 
they also note that the source was unreliable. 
Of course, despite children‘s dismissal of unreliable informants, their evaluations of 
such informants are not in absolute terms. In examining how children‘s evaluations differ as a 
function of whether an inaccurate informant is the only source of information available to 
children, Vanderbilt, Heyman, and Liu (2014) showed that three- and four-year-olds rated an 
informant negatively if she provided inaccurate information in the presence of an accurate 
informant. However, if the informant provided inaccurate information on her own (i.e., if 
there was no conflicting testimony to be compared with), children‘s ratings of this informant 
were more positive. In addition, regardless of whether the inaccurate informant was presented 
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alone or with another informant, children stated that the inaccurate informant would be a 
good source of information when learning about new objects in the future. Hence, children‘s 
evaluations of inaccurate informants are not absolute. They evaluate inaccurate informants in 
light of other available information, such as another informant who provides conflicting 
testimony, and they do not entirely distrust such informants. Further, children are forgiving of 
informants who have appropriate reasons for being inaccurate. Against this notion, however, 
Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009) argued that the odd context of the selective trust paradigm 
leads children to only consider the output of the informants and not engage in any mentalistic 
reasoning about the informants‘ knowledge or ignorance. That is, children only learn that one 
informant gives correct answers, whereas the other informant gives incorrect answers, and 
they make no appeal to any specific mentalistic reasons as to why the informants differ in 
accuracy. In their study, three- to seven-year-olds were shown to be similarly distrustful of 
two informants who provided inaccurate labels, even though one of the informants was 
blindfolded and, hence, had reasons for being inaccurate. In a subsequent study, Robinson 
and Nurmsoo (2009) proposed that children‘s tendency to engage in mentalistic reasoning 
may vary depending on the type of information presented. For example, they suggested that 
children may be more wary of accepting inaccurate information that is person-specific and 
hence, generalisable across situations (e.g. object labels), than information which is situation-
specific (e.g., object identity or location). Indeed, in their subsequent study, Robinson and 
Nurmsoo demonstrated that three- to five-year-olds were more forgiving of an informant who 
made errors of object identity due to inadequate perceptual access (e.g., by stating the 
incorrect colour of a toy only after touching it), and they were more distrustful of an 
informant who made errors despite having adequate perceptual access (e.g., by stating the 
incorrect colour of a toy even after looking it). Hence, children are capable of engaging in 
mentalistic reasoning; rather than simply dismiss inaccurate informants, they appeal to 
reasons for their inaccuracy. 
In addition to considering reasons as to why informants are inaccurate, children also 
consider the degree of plausibility of inaccurate statements. For example, since tigers and 
lions share similar perceptual features and belong to the same category of ―big cats‖, an 
informant who labels a tiger as a ―lion‖ could be seen as less inaccurate than an informant 
who labels it as an entirely unrelated object, such as a ―clock‖. In exploring children‘s 
sensitivity to this magnitude of error, Einav and Robinson (2010) found that six- to seven-
year-olds, but not four- to five-year-olds, preferred learning labels for unfamiliar animals 
from informants who made smaller errors rather than from informants who made larger 
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errors. Even though both age groups were capable of appropriately grouping perceptually and 
categorically similar animals, only six- to seven-year-olds utilised this information when 
deciding which informant to trust. Therefore, it appears that the ability to differentiate 
between magnitudes of error does not emerge until much later in development, at least when 
the information pertains to object labels. 
However, a study by Kondrad and Jaswal (2012) demonstrated that four- and five-
year-olds were able to consider the magnitude of error when deciding which inaccurate 
informant to trust so long as there was a plausible reason for forgiving the informant who 
made smaller errors. Specifically, when objects were partially obscured so that the objects 
could not be easily identified, children were more forgiving of an informant who made 
smaller errors (e.g., by calling a comb a ―brush‖) than of an informant who made larger errors 
(e.g., by calling a comb a ―thunderstorm‖). On the other hand, if the view of the objects was 
unambiguous such that the identity of the objects was obvious, children were then unwilling 
to trust either informant, even if one of them had made smaller errors. 
To sum, children from about the age of four or five are able to consider magnitude of 
error as a cue to reliability and endorse inaccurate labellers in particular contexts; they do not 
immediately distrust them. However, in order to trust an informant who has provided 
inaccurate labels in the past, children require the informant to provide labels that are closely 
related to the correct labels, as well as a plausible explanation for the errors. Informants who 
offer blatantly incorrect and implausible labels for no specific reasons are not given credence. 
 
Moving Beyond the Accurate and Inaccurate Labelling of Objects: Novel Labels 
Much of the early papers on children‘s selective trust have focused on the contrast 
between accurate and inaccurate labellers. However, within the last decade, there has been a 
proliferation of studies that have varied characteristics of the contrasting informants, as well 
as the form of information they provide; such variations are discussed in the next chapter. 
Hence, it is apparent that the selective trust paradigm has enormous flexibility in its use 
within research and it has demonstrated children‘s sensitivity to a broad range of differences 
between informants. Further, as discussed above, for the researchers who continue to focus 
on the contrast between accurate and inaccurate labelling, many have highlighted the 
ambiguity inherent in informants who make overt mistakes and, hence, have directed efforts 
to clarify the nature of children‘s distrust of such speakers. Children dismiss inaccurate 
informants, not only because she provides incorrect information, but also because her 
contributions are seen as non-genuine and unhelpful. In addition to being implausible and 
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non-genuine, overtly inaccurate labellers are not frequently encountered in children‘s 
everyday experience. In contrast to the misinformation provided by inaccurate labellers, in 
real life, children are continually exposed to new information (whether accurate or 
inaccurate), which they will need to make sense of in light of their existing knowledge. For 
instance, children eventually realise that a cup can also be called a mug, or that the epidermis 
also refers to the skin. Certainly, when learning a new language, children must accept that 
referents can have different labels, and it has been shown that even 19-month-olds are 
capable of doing so (Bhagwat & Casasola, 2014). However, there has been little focus on 
children's interpretation of novel labels in selective trust research. 
The few studies that have featured novel labels examined how children consider novel 
labels for familiar objects which are provided by informants who have a history of reliability 
or unreliability. For example, using a single informant paradigm, Koenig and Woodward 
(2010) found that 24-month-olds were sensitive to the prior accuracy of a labeller when 
learning novel labels. After being familiarised with an accurate labeller, who then assigned a 
novel label to a target object, children were more likely to appropriately recall the target 
object in a subsequent test phase. However, after being familiarised with an inaccurate 
labeller, who then assigned a novel label to a target object, children were less likely to recall 
the target object in the test phase. Similarly, using a similar single informant paradigm, 
Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2012) showed that, when learning novel labels, 24-month-olds 
more often selected the appropriate target object if they had been taught the novel label by an 
informant who was either accurate, knowledgeable (i.e., who said, ―I know what that is!‖), or 
uninformative (i.e., who said, ―look at that‖). In contrast, when an informant was either 
inaccurate or ignorant (i.e., who said, ―I don‘t know what that is‖), children were less likely 
to select the target object. Overall, it appears that reliable labelling overrides mutual 
exclusivity, children‘s tendency to assume that whole objects have only one category label. 
Further, children have a ‗default trust‘ in which they expect adults to be reliable labellers 
unless they are shown to be inaccurate or ignorant. Hence, children are likely to entertain an 
alternate label for an object they already have an existing label for, so long as the informant 
who provided the alternate label was not erroneous in the past. 
Older children are similar in their interpretations of novel labels provided by 
informants who have a history of accuracy or inaccuracy. Sobel, Sedivy, Buchanan, and 
Hennessy (2012) showed that, when presented with three objects – two of which were 
familiar to children, and one of which was novel – children were more likely to select the 
novel object when a previously accurate labeller requested for an object using the novel label 
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in comparison to when a previously inaccurate labeller made the request. In addition, children 
showed better recall of the novel label used by the accurate labeller than the inaccurate 
labeller. Such findings suggest that the reliability of speakers generates different pragmatic 
environments. When the previously accurate labeller used a novel label, children likely 
expected that she already knew the labels for the two familiar objects, so her novel label must 
have been directed to the novel object. On the other hand, when the previously inaccurate 
labeller used a novel label, children perhaps inferred that she was not knowledgeable of 
object labels and, as a result, concluded that she was referring to any of the objects. Overall, 
the findings reviewed so far show that children from a young age are capable of interpreting 
novel labels for objects for which they have pre-existing labels, and that such interpretations 
are influenced by the previous reliability of the labeller. 
However, no studies have directly examined how children interpret informants who 
provide novel labels from the outset, and whether such novel labellers are treated differently 
from accurate or inaccurate labellers. In the study described in Chapter 5, therefore, 
children‘s trust in informants who provide new information was compared to their trust in 
informants who provide straightforwardly accurate or inaccurate information. It was 
predicted that informants providing novel labels for familiar objects (i.e., new information) 
would appear more credible to children than informants providing inaccurate information 
about objects. It was also reasoned that informants providing novel information would more 
closely approximate what children encounter in the real world. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter outlined the selective trust paradigm that has been used to examine how 
children evaluate the trustworthiness of informants. The results of the studies presented above 
show that, from the age of three, children trust informants who provide accurate information. 
They prefer learning labels for unfamiliar objects from informants who have a history of 
accurate labelling than from informants who have a history of inaccurate labelling. Their trust 
in such informants is also not limited to the specific instance in which the informants provide 
the labels. They continue to trust accurate labellers after a brief time delay, and generalise 
their trust in such labellers when learning about closely-related concepts, including the 
functions of objects as well as novel morphological forms. In addition, although children‘s 
selective trust emerges from the age of three, there are age-related changes between the ages 
of three and four, in that older children begin to privilege accuracy whereas younger children 
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are more sensitive to inaccuracy. Attempts have been made to link this age-related change to 
children‘s developing ToM but the evidence so far has been mixed. 
In the latter half of this chapter, it was argued that there are limitations to the typical 
selective trust paradigm. In particular, although existing studies have emphasised the contrast 
between accurate and inaccurate labellers, the inaccurate labels provided by informants have 
been problematic in that children might have difficulty interpreting an informant who has no 
clear reasons for providing blatantly incorrect labels. Further, the provision of inaccurate 
labels by informants who appear serious is not necessarily representative of what children 
encounter in real life. In order to present a more ecologically valid context for children to 
evaluate the trustworthiness of informants, it was argued that presenting an informant who 
provides new information (in the form of novel labels) would be a suitable approach. This 
empirical question is addressed in Chapter 5. 
In the next chapter, I argue that another limitation of the existing selective trust 
research is that it has heavily focused on what children do with informants who provide 
information in the form of labels. However, in real life, children rely on other cues to 
determine the trustworthiness of informants, and they also receive other types of information, 
such as explanations. As a result, children might also evaluate the trustworthiness of 
informants who supply such explanations in order to learn from those who are more 
knowledgeable. That is to say, just as children differentiate between accurate and inaccurate 
labellers, they may also be sensitive to the differences between informants who provide 
explanations that differ in quality. 
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Chapter 3 
Moving Beyond Accurate and Inaccurate Labelling 
 
In Chapter 2, it was established that from about the age of three, children are 
discerning of informants who provide accurate labels for objects when compared to 
informants who provide inaccurate labels for objects. It was also established that children 
consider a previously accurate labeller to be a more trustworthy source of information when 
learning labels for unfamiliar objects. The wealth of studies that have utilised the selective 
trust paradigm show that it has been a valuable methodology in revealing the extent to which 
young children evaluate the trustworthiness of informants based on accuracy. However, 
although existing findings have been informative in establishing the scope and nature of 
children‘s selective trust, there are some limitations. One of these limitations, as argued in 
Chapter 2, is that the presence of the inaccurate labeller does not adequately reflect what 
children encounter in real life. Hence, to create a more true-to-life context for children, it was 
proposed that they could be introduced to an informant who provides new information in the 
form of novel labels, and it could be examined how children construe such an informant in 
comparison to informants who provide labels that are distinctly accurate or inaccurate. This 
question is examined in Chapter 5. 
Another limitation to the existing studies of children‘s selective trust is that it has 
largely focused on examining how children evaluate informants who offer information in the 
form of labels. Of course, in real life, there are a range of other cues children can use to 
decide whether to trust an informant. Further, informants can provide other types of 
information about objects (e.g., descriptions, functions, explanations, properties, locations), 
that are likely to be accurate and relevant to the communicative exchange. Therefore, 
children will need to rely on cues other than accuracy to decide whether to trust informants 
who provide such information. In this chapter, I briefly outline evidence of children‘s ability 
to use other cues when determining the trustworthiness of informants. This is followed by a 
discussion of how children determine the trustworthiness of informants who provide 
information that differs in quality, with an emphasis on how children consider different types 
of explanations. In the latter half of this chapter, I argue that it is possible that children might 
trust informants who provide explanations about the functions of objects, who are arguably 
more competent than informants who provide obvious descriptions for objects. 
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Children’s Use of Cues, Other than Accuracy, to Evaluate Informants’ Trustworthiness 
Much of the selective trust research has focused on presenting children with 
informants who differ in the accuracy of labelling. However, there is much evidence to show 
that children use other cues when evaluating the trustworthiness of informants. Such cues 
may pertain to attributes of the informant. For instance, it has been shown that children 
generally prefer testimony from attractive informants over unattractive informants 
(Bascandziev & Harris, 2013), from informants described as kind over informants described 
as mean (Lane, Wellman, & Gelman, 2013; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009), from familiar 
informants over unfamiliar informants (Corriveau & Harris, 2009b; Reyes-Jaquez & Echols, 
2013), from native-accented informants over foreign-accented informants (Kinzler, 
Corriveau, & Harris, 2011) and, depending on the topic of interest, even from children over 
adults (Jaswal & Neely, 2006; VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). Further, children also consider 
the manner by which informants provide information. For example, children as young as two 
are sensitive to other people‘s non-verbal markers of uncertainty, such as puzzled facial 
expressions and shoulder shrugging, and they prefer to imitate the actions of a model who 
expresses more confidence (Birch, Akmal, & Frampton, 2010). Additionally, verbal markers 
can signal to a listener that the speaker is not confident in the accuracy of the information he 
or she provides. In studies which examine whether young children are receptive to the 
confidence of a speaker‘s labelling (Jaswal & Malone, 2007; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001), 
children from the age of three prefer, and show better memory for, labels offered by 
informants who express confidence (e.g., ―This is a spoon‖, ―This one‘s a blicket‖) than 
informants who express uncertainty (e.g., ―I think this is a spoon‖, ―Maybe this one‘s a 
blicket‖).  
In addition to expressing uncertainty, informants can express their intentions through 
their reactions to particular outcomes. Liu, Vanderbilt, and Heyman (2013) examined 
children‘s sensitivity to the intentions and outcomes of informants‘ testimony. Five- and six-
year-olds first watched an informant provide information about the location of a sticker to a 
confederate. The informant with positive intentions expressed joy when the confederate 
found the sticker, or expressed disappointment when the confederate failed to find the sticker. 
Conversely, the informant with negative intentions expressed disappointment when the 
confederate found the sticker, or expressed joy when the confederate failed to find the sticker. 
Children were sensitive to the intentions of the informant; when asked whether the informant 
wanted the confederate to find the sticker, children accurately stated that the informant with 
positive intentions wanted the confederate to find the sticker, and that the informant with 
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negative intentions did not want the confederate to find the sticker. However, when children 
were asked to locate the sticker for themselves in response to the informant‘s testimony about 
its location, they weighed information about both intentions and outcomes, but they placed 
greater emphasis on outcome. That is, they were more likely to follow the directions of an 
informant who previously provided correct information to the confederate, regardless of 
whether the informant had positive or negative intentions. For children, such a strategy might 
be optimal given that the outcomes of an informant‘s testimony may be easier to discern than 
his or her underlying motives. 
Overall, the research outlined above involves cues which can be thought of as social 
cues, in which judgements of trustworthiness are dependent on evaluating the attributes of the 
informant or the manner by which they convey information. Indeed, there have been many 
such studies that attempt to isolate the social cues that children attend to and use to make 
judgements. The studies presented in this thesis, however, will focus on how children 
evaluate the trustworthiness of informants based solely on the nature of their claims; in 
particular, their evaluation of different types of explanations. In other words, in this thesis, 
informant attributes and manner will be carefully controlled such that the only difference 
between informants is in the type of explanations they provide. In the next section, I outline 
evidence on children‘s production and receptivity to different types of explanations. 
 
Children’s Production and Evaluation of Different Types of Explanation 
In moving away from examining whether children differentiate between informants 
who are accurate or inaccurate in labelling, the next step can be to examine what children do 
with informants who offer other types of information. In real life, children receive other types 
of information about objects (e.g., how they work, why they do certain things, what they look 
like, where they are found). In addition, just as inaccurate claims can differ in their magnitude 
of error (Einav & Robinson, 2010), accurate claims can differ in their magnitude of accuracy; 
specifically, in how much they demonstrate an informant‘s underlying knowledge or 
expertise. For example, Einav and Robinson (2011) showed that children from the age of four 
consider the reasons for the accuracy of informants. Specifically, children recognised that 
accurate information provided through the assistance of another person was not indicative of 
trustworthiness in the future, and that an informant who provided accurate information 
without assistance was likely to be more knowledgeable in future situations. Hence, while 
both informants, in all respects, provided accurate and relevant information, the unassisted 
informant had an advantage in terms of knowledge. In the following section, I review 
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children‘s receptivity to other types of information, beginning with the possibility that the 
types of questions they ask others reveals what information they are seeking. 
 
Children’s questions.  It has been argued that children use questions as a cognitive 
tool by which they can gather information when there is a gap in their knowledge (Mills, 
Legare, Bills, & Mejias, 2010). Hence, the types of question that children ask may indicate 
what kind of information they privilege. Of course, children ask questions which may not be 
for the purposes of information-seeking, such as to clarify (e.g., ―what did you say?‖), seek 
permission (e.g., ―Can I do this?‖), or seek attention (e.g., ―Mum?‖). In a comprehensive 
monograph, Chouinard (2007) examined the nature of children‘s spontaneous questions 
between the ages of two and five. In general, the majority of children‘s questions were fact-
seeking or explanation-seeking, and the prevalence of the other aforementioned types of 
questions was lower. Fact-seeking questions, defined as a piece of information which had no 
causal component, were more prominent before the age of 2½ years, especially with respect 
to requests for labels (e.g., ―what‘s that?‖). On the other hand, the quantity of explanation-
seeking questions (e.g., ―why is ___?‖, ―how come ___?‖, "how do you ___?") peaked 
shortly before the age of four. In addition, many of children‘s follow-up questions in an 
exchange tended to be explanation-seeking. That is, after establishing a fact, such as a label, 
children sought explanatory information in subsequent questions. The types of questions that 
were most frequent related to function (e.g., ―what does it do?‖), activities (e.g., ―what is he 
doing?‖), psychological states and motives (i.e., ―do you want my milk?‖) and temporary 
states (i.e., ―is it broken?‖). Questions were less frequently asked about external properties, 
such as appearance (e.g., ―what colour is it?‖), property (e.g., ―what is it made of?‖), part 
(e.g., ―is that the donkey‘s ear?‖), count (e.g., ―how many ___?‖), possession, hierarchy and 
generalisation. One interpretation of these results is that the shift to explanation-seeking 
questions is indicative of children‘s recognition that adults are useful sources for increasing 
their understanding of the world, particularly in relation to causal relations they are unable to 
establish through observation alone. In keeping with this view (Harris, 2012), children‘s 
asking of questions is an important ability they use for gathering information they need to fill 
the gaps in their knowledge. 
Experimental studies of children‘s questions complement the findings of Chouinard 
(2007) and demonstrate that children‘s questions become increasingly effective in obtaining 
information and solving problems (Mills, Danovitch, Grant, & Elashi, 2012; Mills, Legare, 
Grant, & Landrum, 2011). For instance, in a problem-solving task in which children had to 
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direct questions to an expert in order to find out which key would open a locked box, Mills et 
al. (2010) showed that four- and five-year-olds, but not three-year-olds, more often directed 
questions to an appropriate expert than to an inappropriate expert. Further, the relative 
proportion of ineffective questions in comparison to effective questions changed with age. 
Ineffective questions were questions that were considered irrelevant to the task of identifying 
the correct key (e.g., ―is your dad a fireman?‖) or vague (e.g., ―is it this one?‖). In contrast, 
effective questions were questions that referred to specific dimensions of the correct key 
(e.g., ―which shape/colour [key] is it?‖, ―is it [specific colour/shape]?‖). Three-year-olds‘ 
questions were largely ineffective, four-year-olds asked similar amounts of ineffective and 
effective questions, whereas five-year-olds asked more effective questions than ineffective 
questions. Finally, regardless of age, the children who asked a sufficient amount of effective 
questions were more often able to solve the problem, demonstrating that children can 
successfully utilise the answers they are supplied with. Hence, children use questions as a 
tool to solve problems and it appears that they are first able to discern who to direct a 
question to before they can generate an effective question.  
The developmental shifts that occur in children‘s production of effective questions 
can be interpreted as the  result of their increased competence in determining what 
information is required to solve a problem or fill a gap in knowledge. However, since 
children at the age of five still ask ineffective questions, it suggests that their ability to 
generate effective questions is not fully established. Further, as shown in the study above, 
children are better able to grapple with whom to ask before they appreciate what they should 
ask. It is plausible that the difficulties children encounter when generating effective questions 
are because they are yet to explicitly understand that certain questions bring about certain 
types of responses. For example, in reference to the findings of Chouinard (2007) presented 
earlier, it might be premature to conclude that children use explanation-seeking questions 
(e.g., ―how/why is ___?‖) because they expect to get explanations in return. Of course, it is 
possible that the development of children‘s questions is driven by increasing knowledge. 
However, such a notion is not incompatible with the possibility that the formulation of 
children‘s questions is still not fully defined at younger ages. 
In addition to studies of whom children direct questions to as well as what questions 
they ask, Kemler Nelson, Egan, and Holt (2004) investigated whether children‘s questions 
differ depending on the type of object they are asking about. The findings of Kemler Nelson, 
et al. also support the notion that children are not explicitly aware of the correspondence 
between specific types of questions and specific types of answers. In their study, two-, three-, 
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and four-year-olds were presented with a series of unfamiliar artifacts, and it was found that 
they initially asked an experimenter a general question (e.g., ―what‘s this?‖). When the 
experimenter responded by providing a label for the artifact, children were more likely to ask 
a follow-up question. In contrast, when the experimenter responded by demonstrating how 
the artifact could be used (i.e., its function), children were less likely to ask a follow-up 
question. However, when the experimenter continually provided labels in response to 
children‘s general questions, three- and four-year-olds began asking more specific questions 
about artifact function (e.g., ―what does this do?‖). That is to say, children were more 
interested in knowing about the functions of the artifacts, rather than simply the names of 
them. Hence, it appears that preschoolers‘ largely construe artifacts in terms of their intended 
functions. In contrast, when presented with familiar or unfamiliar animals, children‘s specific 
questions were more often about biologically-relevant properties, such as food choices, 
reproduction, habitat, and category membership (Chouinard, 2007; Greif, Kemler Nelson, 
Keil, & Gutierrez, 2006). Such findings imply that children have different notions about the 
type of information they should seek when learning about objects from different domains, 
despite the fact that they have difficulty in explicitly stating how artifacts and living things 
differ in terms of their underlying explanatory structure. 
The evidence presented above shows that children more often ask questions that elicit 
explanatory information (e.g., how objects work), and that they cease asking questions once 
they receive such information, although it is unclear whether they are fully aware that 
explanation-seeking questions elicit explanatory information. Nevertheless, it has been shown 
that it is not sufficient to simply supply any type of information in response to their questions. 
Frazier, Gelman, and Wellman (2009) examined preschoolers‘ causal questions (i.e., 
comprising how or why questions) and their reactions to an adult‘s answer in both a 
naturalistic and an experimental context. In both contexts, if children asked a question (e.g., 
―Why does this [hat] have a hole in it?‖) and received an explanatory answer (e.g., ―It‘s to put 
a ponytail through‖), children generally agreed with the answer and asked a relevant follow-
up question. However, if they received a non-explanatory answer (e.g., ―Hats don‘t usually 
have holes in them‖), children more often asked the original question again or generated their 
own explanations. In other words, children‘s reactions depended on the availability (or lack) 
of explanatory information.  
Summarising across this work on children‘s questions, it is clear that children do not 
simply seek to prolong a conversation by repeatedly asking questions; they appear to use 
causal questions as a means to gather explanatory information and they are satisfied once 
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they obtain explanations. In the next section, I review evidence that children are discerning of 
different types of explanations. 
 
Sensitivity to different types of explanations.  In real life, children are exposed to a 
wealth of information provided by well-intentioned interlocutors. Indeed, at a young age, it is 
perhaps an optimal strategy to remain receptive to informants who provide information which 
appears earnest and relevant. However, with age, it is likely that they come to realise that 
certain types of information signal an informant‘s underlying knowledge or expertise and, 
hence, in future instances, it would be beneficial to seek information from informants who 
appear more knowledgeable. In keeping with this interpretation, the studies reviewed above 
show that children prefer asking explanation-seeking questions (i.e., answers to ―how‖ and 
―why‖ questions) after they acquire answers to fact-seeking questions (i.e., answers to ―what‖ 
and ―where‖ questions), which might suggest that children eventually come to privilege 
explanations which refer to causal relations between objects or events. According to Keil and 
Wilson (2000), explanations can be used as a means of placing phenomena within a coherent 
causal framework in order to better understand the world. However, it remains to be seen 
how children‘s ability to seek and privilege certain types of explanations emerges during 
development. 
It is possible that children‘s ability to discern different types of explanations is present 
from an early age, and that they are able to distinguish such explanations in the same way 
they are able to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate claims. Alternatively, 
children‘s abilities to evaluate certain kinds of explanations might only come about through 
formal instruction; such evaluations may turn, to some degree at least, on socio-cultural 
educational practices. Such a possibility would be in accordance with the findings of Luria 
(1976), presented in Chapter 1, in which cultural influences impact the development of 
particular modes of thought in a society. Luria showed that, with formal education, 
previously illiterate farmers were able to demonstrate logical reasoning with premises beyond 
their personal experience, whereas illiterate farmers who did not receive formal education 
were less able to do so. Hence, it may be the case that it is only through formal education that 
children learn to privilege specific types of explanations over others. 
Along similar lines, Brewer, Chinn, and Samarapungavan (1998) argued that, like 
scientists and laypersons, children use a range of criteria to evaluate the quality of everyday 
or scientific explanations. However, unlike scientists, there are certain criteria that children 
do not readily use to evaluate explanations. Samarapungavan (1992) showed that children 
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from the age of seven privileged scientific explanations that had empirical support over 
explanations that lacked empirical support. Further, children demonstrated some evidence of 
evaluating scientific explanations for logical consistency, so long as the explanations did not 
strongly violate their existing beliefs. Hence, it appears that children‘s production and 
evaluation of explanations is not markedly dissimilar to that of adult non-scientists‘. 
However, it is only through formal classroom instruction that children are taught how to 
evaluate scientific explanations using other criteria, criteria that have arisen with the 
establishment of science as a modern discipline (Brewer et al., 1998). Such criteria include 
determining whether a scientific explanation generates precise and testable predictions, 
whether it can be expressed in formal or mathematical terms, and whether it paves the way 
for further research to be conducted. Thus, it seems plausible that children will demonstrate 
some early capacities to distinguish between informants based on the quality of the 
explanations they provide, but with formal education, they may begin to focus on additional 
aspects that make certain explanations better than others. Below, I outline several studies that 
have examined young children‘s sensitivity to different types of explanations; such 
sensitivities are likely to be present prior to schooling. 
One such cue that children can use to determine the trustworthiness of an informant‘s 
claims is to consider how the informant explains how he or she came to know about 
something. In a study by Koenig (2012), three-, four-, and five-year-olds reliably 
distinguished between good and bad reasons for knowing something (i.e., what was inside a 
box), and preferred learning from an informant who provided good reasons. Good reasons 
included justifications that the informant knew what was inside the box because they had 
heard it from a teacher, had previously looked inside the box, or inferred that there were 
cookies inside the box because it was a cookie jar. Bad reasons included justifications that the 
informant had a desire for a particular object to be inside, was pretending that a particular 
object was inside, or was guessing that a particular object was inside. Hence, children 
consider the quality of the explanations for how informants are knowledgeable. 
Explanations can also be evaluated in terms of whether they provide a sufficient 
amount of information. In a study by Gillis and Nilsen (2013), four- to five-year-olds 
(preschoolers) and six- to seven-year-olds (school-aged children) were introduced to 
informants who provided sufficient, insufficient or inaccurate information. The sufficient 
informant provided appropriate information to assist children in locating a target object (e.g., 
in an array of red stickers of different shapes, this informant said, ―it‘s under the triangle 
one‖). The insufficient informant provided information which was accurate, but was 
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inadequate for locating the target (e.g., in an array of red stickers of different shapes, this 
informant said, ―it‘s under the red one‖). Finally, the inaccurate informant provided incorrect 
information for the target‘s location (e.g., ―it‘s under the circle one‖ when the target was not). 
In some instances, children were given feedback and were allowed to observe the outcome of 
their choices; when they selected a location in response to the informant‘s testimony, it was 
revealed whether the target was in the chosen location. In other instances, children were not 
given feedback, so they could not observe the outcome of their choices. Unsurprisingly, 
children preferred the directions of the sufficient informant over the inaccurate informant. 
However, while both preschools and school-aged children preferred the directions of the 
sufficient informant over the insufficient informant, younger children had greater difficulty 
differentiating between the informants when they were not given feedback (i.e., when they 
were not able to see whether the target was in the location they selected). To sum, it appears 
that children have a developing ability to evaluate claims in terms of whether they provide a 
sufficient amount of information. 
Children from about the age of three also consider the quality of explanations based 
on whether they refer to some causal element. Even children as young as four years of age 
show a preference for statements that simply feature the causal connective, ―because‖. In a 
study by Bernard, Mercier, & Clemént (2012), three-, four-, and five-year-olds were 
introduced to two speakers who gave contradicting statements about the location of an object, 
but gave similar reasons for their beliefs. One speaker used the connective, ―because‖, in her 
statement (e.g., ―the ball is in the blue box because Camille always puts her ball in the blue 
box‖), whereas the other speaker did not use the connective (e.g., ―the ball is in the green 
box, Camille always puts her ball in the green box‖). Findings showed that four- and five-
year-olds, but not three-year-olds, systematically preferred the statements of the speaker who 
had used the connective, ―because‖. Such results suggest that young children do not initially 
privilege causal explanations when it is indicated using the connective, ―because‖, and that it 
is not until later that children become attuned to the use of ―because‖ in arguments and 
interpret the word to imply some causal relation. 
Other studies have featured more elaborate explanations in the form of circular and 
non-circular arguments and have revealed children‘s ability to evaluate arguments to develop 
from about four years and onwards (see Mercier, Bernard, & Clément, in press). In one such 
study, Baum, Danovitch, and Keil (2008) investigated children‘s sensitivity to explanations 
which differ in circularity. Five- to ten-year-olds were required to select which of three 
informants was the ―smartest‖, according to distinct explanations they provided about a 
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phenomenon (e.g., why polar bears have white fur). One informant provided a short circular 
explanation, which was very brief and failed to provide new information (e.g., ―They have 
white fur because their fur is always white‖). Another informant provided a long circular 
explanation, which contained more words, but also failed to provide new information (e.g., 
―They have white fur because the colour in their fur is white, not black or another colour. All 
polar bears are white; you will not see one that is a different colour‖). The final informant, 
however, provided a noncircular explanation that contained an actual causal explanation (e.g., 
―They have white fur because they live in snowy places. Since the snow is white, it‘s hard for 
the bear‘s enemies to find it and hurt it. So, the white bears live longer, and they make more 
white bears‖). Results showed that by about five or six years of age, children demonstrate a 
preference, albeit fragile, for non-circular explanations. 
Using a simpler procedure, Kurkul and Corriveau (2014) presented only two opposing 
informants to three- and five-year-olds in a selective trust paradigm. One informant provided 
circular explanations (e.g., when asked why it rains, this informant said, ―sometimes it rains 
because it is wet and cloudy outside, and water falls from the sky. When water falls from the 
sky it is called rain and it gets us all wet‖), whereas the other informant provided non-circular 
explanations (e.g., ―sometimes it rains because there are clouds in the sky that are filled with 
water. When there is too much water in the clouds it falls to the ground and gets us all wet‖). 
Results revealed that, when the informant provided novel explanations for unfamiliar objects 
in test trials, both three- and five-year-olds endorsed the novel explanations provided by the 
informant who had provided noncircular explanations. However, five-year-olds were more 
advanced in that they generalised their trust in the informant who had provided noncircular 
explanations to the learning of novel labels for unfamiliar objects, and they systematically 
judged this informant as ―very good‖ and ―better‖ at explaining about the objects. In contrast, 
three-year-olds did not generalise their trust in the informant who had provided noncircular 
explanations during the novel label test trials, and they did not systematically favour her in 
the explicit judgement questions. These results were still evident even after the explanations 
in the training trials were simplified, suggesting that three-year-olds‘ lack of systematic 
performance in the novel label trials was not due to cognitive demands. In other words, it is 
only at about the age of five that children consider informants who provide noncircular 
explanations to be more knowledgeable, and that they are likely to be a good source of 
explanations as well as labels. 
So far, the evidence presented above indicates that four- to five-year-olds are 
beginning to discern different types of explanations, and they prefer explanations which 
40 
contain causal elements over explanations which do not. In addition to their preference for 
causal explanations, children also prefer certain types of causal explanations. For example, 
Kelemen (2003) demonstrated that children have a bias for teleological-functional 
explanations, in which they assume that the existence of an object or event is for a specific 
purpose; that an object or events exists because it is designed to do X. Kelemen proposed the 
notion of promiscuous teleology to explain the origin of such biases, whereby children have 
tendencies to attribute teleological properties to objects, both living and non-living, and such 
tendencies originate from their early intentional reasoning and their understanding of goal-
directed and object-centred behaviour. Kelemen argued that, with age, as well as exposure to 
formal scientific and causal explanations, children come to be more selective in what they 
apply the teleological stance to. In other words, young children have a default bias to view 
objects in terms of their purpose. 
Evidence for children‘s teleological reasoning is presented by Kelemen (1999a), who 
showed four- to five-year-olds, and adults, various objects; such as whole living things (e.g., 
tiger), artifacts (e.g., clock), natural objects (e.g., mountain), as well as parts of living things 
(e.g., hand), artifacts (e.g., pocket) and natural objects (e.g., cloud trail). In response to being 
asked what each object was ―for‖, preschoolers assigned functions to all types of objects, 
whereas adults were more selective in which objects they ascribed functions to (i.e., whole 
artifacts, parts of artifacts, and parts of living things). Further, while four- to five-year-olds 
have been shown to produce teleological explanations and demonstrate a preference for 
explanations which invoke the notion of purposeful design over explanations which simply 
refer to how an object can be used, Kelemen (1999b) showed that children, before the age of 
ten, prefer specific forms of teleological explanations over physical-reductionistic 
explanations when talking about biological or behavioural properties of animals as well as 
properties of nonliving natural kinds (e.g., rocks). For example, when presented with a 
phenomena (e.g., why rocks were so pointy), seven- to eight-year-olds endorsed a 
teleological explanation (e.g., ―so that animals wouldn‘t sit on them and smash them‖) over a 
more scientifically-appropriate physical explanation (e.g., ―because little bits of stuff piled up 
on top of one another over a long time‖). Hence, it appears that, from a young age, children 
are biased to view objects and events, both living and nonliving, in teleological terms. It is 
only from about the age of ten, and perhaps with exposure to formal scientific education, that 
children‘s conceptions begin to resemble those of adults. 
Given children‘s emerging ability to distinguish between informants‘ explanations on 
a number of dimensions, and their preference for causal (in particular, teleological-
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functional) explanations, children might show a similar preference for explanations which are 
about the functions of objects over other types of explanations which do not contain causal 
elements. Existing studies provide evidence of children‘s early capacities in distinguishing 
between informants on other attributes, such as confidence, honesty, and even the circularity 
of explanations. However, in keeping with the arguments raised in Chapter 2, where it was 
argued that inaccurate labels are not necessarily representative of what children encounter in 
real life, (sententially) circular arguments are also not commonplace. Instead, what children 
are more likely to encounter are informants who provide non-causal descriptions for objects 
that refer to the clearly visible properties. Along these lines, in the section below, I outline 
evidence that children are sensitive to the differences between informants who provide 
information about either non-visible or clearly visible properties. I also argue that, with 
increasing age, children may also show a similar sensitivity to the difference between 
explanations which refer to non-visible functional elements and explanations which only 
refer to visible and obvious (surface) elements. Given that children are readily discerning of 
informants who differ in accuracy and are distrusting of inaccurate labellers from the age of 
three, it remains to be seen whether children are similarly discerning when evaluating 
explanations that differ in depth (i.e., whether such explanations provide functional or surface 
information), and whether they recognise that certain explanations reveal something about an 
informants‘ knowledge or lack thereof. 
 
Children’s differentiation of visible and non-visible properties.  As argued earlier, 
it is possible that formal education might influence the readiness by which children decide 
that informants who provide causal explanations are preferable when compared to informants 
who provide non-causal explanations. Indeed, scientific education largely focuses on 
establishing causal relations within a coherent framework (e.g., how things work, underlying 
processes or mechanisms, scientific principles). For children, science education begins in the 
fifth or sixth grade, when they are about ten years old. As a result, it is possible that it is only 
by the age of ten that children readily privilege causal explanations over others. At this age, 
they may recognise that informants who provide causal (or functional explanations) for 
objects are more competent than informants who merely describe, for instance, the outward 
appearance of objects. For adults, the intuition that functional explanations are superior is 
perhaps easier to grasp given that most are likely to have undergone formal schooling, 
obtained qualifications, or taken on careers that privilege causal knowledge. As adults, we 
may conceive of a person who talks about what an object is used for and how it works as 
42 
being more informative and knowledgeable than a person who merely describes the outward 
appearance of the object. 
However, against such notions (i.e., that children can only evaluate explanations once 
they have undergone a significant amount of schooling), it has been established above that 
children are able to generate, seek, and prefer explanations that consist of causal information 
(Kelemen, 1999b). In most instances, children are not necessarily able to acquire the causal 
information solely via observation or experience. Hence, they have to rely on others to 
provide such information and, as a result, they might consider functional explanations to be 
indicative of an informant‘s deep level of understanding. Further, as argued by Brewer et al. 
(1998), children as young as seven are able to evaluate everyday and scientific explanations 
on the basis of certain criteria (e.g., empirical and logical consistency), even though they 
probably have not received formal instruction as yet. In the existing literature, however, the 
question of whether children willingly differentiate between informants who provide 
functional or surface explanations has not been investigated. Further, there is little research 
that has examined when children begin to possess adult-like intuitions that functional 
explanations are more informative than surface explanations. The studies presented below 
attempt to draw some distinction between different levels of explanation; particularly in 
relation to whether the information is about internal or external features of objects. 
Research by Fitneva, Lam and Dunfield (2013) demonstrated that children develop an 
understanding of how certain ways of gathering information are more effective for visible 
properties compared to non-visible properties. In their study, four- and six-year-olds were 
shown a series of novel creatures, referred to as ―moozles‖, and had to decide whether to ask 
a moozle expert for help or have a look for themselves when finding out particular 
characteristics of the moozle. Some of the characteristics were visible (e.g., ―what colour is 
the moozle‘s hair?‖) and could be easily identified if children looked for themselves, whereas 
other characteristics were non-visible (e.g., ―do moozles like pizza?‖) and could only be 
determined if children asked the expert for help. While most children preferred to look at the 
moozle when finding out visible properties, four-year-olds were more likely to have a look 
for themselves, even for non-visible properties. In contrast, six-year-olds more often 
appropriately chose to ask the expert when learning about non-visible properties. Hence, 
older children were more capable of judging the optimal method by which to determine 
visible and non-visible properties. Such results indicate that older children recognise that 
other people are good sources of information about things they cannot easily experience or 
observe by themselves. In light of the research questions raised in this chapter, it is possible 
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that children might consider informants who can provide information about non-visible 
properties, consisting of functional information, to be more knowledgeable and competent 
than informants who provide information about visible properties that children can easily 
determine by themselves. 
Given that children distinguish between ways to acquire knowledge of visible or non-
visible properties, Sobel and Corriveau (2010) investigated whether children were more 
likely to prefer learning information from informants who were knowledgeable about non-
visible properties. Three- and four-year-olds were asked to decide which informant they 
would prefer to learn object labels from. The two informants differed in how knowledgeable 
they were about objects‘ ―insides‖. One informant was a ―green expert‖, who knew all about 
objects which had green insides, and the other informant was a ―red expert‖, who knew all 
about objects which had red insides. Results showed that four-year-olds, but not three-year-
olds, sought and endorsed the green expert when learning labels for objects which had green 
insides and, conversely, they relied on the red expert when learning labels for objects which 
had red insides. Interestingly, when the green expert was said to know all about objects which 
had green outsides (as indicated by a green sticker) and the red expert was said to know all 
about objects which had red outsides (as indicated by a red sticker), four-year-olds were less 
systematic in preferring one expert over the other. Such findings suggest that children from 
the age of four are sensitive to informants‘ knowledge of object properties in a specific 
manner; they prefer to learn labels from informants who are knowledgeable of objects‘ 
internal characteristics rather than external characteristics. Therefore, in reference to the 
arguments outlined in this chapter, children might consider informants who know about non-
visible properties (i.e., by providing functional explanations) to be better sources of 
information when compared to informants who know about immediately visible properties 
(i.e., by providing descriptions of surface properties). 
In extending the research beyond differentiating between informants who are 
knowledgeable about visible or non-visible properties of objects, Kushnir, Vredenburgh, and 
Schneider (2013) presented three- and four-year-olds with informants who differed in their 
causal knowledge. Specifically, one informant (the labeller) only knew labels for tools but 
not how to use them to fix a toy, whereas the other informant (the fixer) only knew how to 
use the tools to fix a toy but not the labels for them. Four-year-olds (and to a lesser extent, 
three-year-olds) appropriately asked the fixer for help with fixing broken toys and the labeller 
for help with learning labels for novel objects. In addition, four-year-olds did not 
overgeneralise their preference for the fixer when learning about conventional functions of 
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novel objects, indicating the degree of specificity with which they attribute knowledge to 
informants. In other words, children did not consider a person who can fix toys would also 
know about how novel objects could be used. In addition, when four-year-olds were 
introduced to two other informants – a fixer, who was able to successfully fix a broken toy, 
and a non-fixer, who was unable to fix a broken toy – children preferred to ask the fixer to fix 
broken toys but, again, they did not generalise their preference for the fixer when learning 
about labels for novel objects. That is to say, it seems that children‘s inferences about 
informants‘ knowledge are domain-specific and differ between word labels and causal 
knowledge for objects. However, when the two informants offered different causal 
explanations as to why the toy was not working (e.g., ―the motor has stopped moving‖ or ―it 
is out of batteries‖), children were more likely to endorse the causal explanations offered by 
the fixer. To summarise, children from the age of about four are sensitive to differences in 
informants‘ causal knowledge and they favour informants who have greater causal 
knowledge when learning other causal information.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined evidence that children are receptive to cues about informant 
trustworthiness that are not limited to the accuracy or inaccuracy of labelling, such as the 
attributes of informants as well as the manner by which informants make claims. In addition, 
in solely focusing on how children evaluate the nature of claims made by informants, it can 
be seen that children are discerning of certain types of claims. Indeed, in real life, children 
receive information about objects that extends beyond labels, such as how and why objects 
work, as well as descriptions of what objects look like. The focus of this chapter was on how 
children make sense of different types of claims, with an emphasis on their receptivity to 
explanations. 
Based on the findings of independent research into the nature of children's questions, 
children begin to ask explanation-seeking questions, which contain causal elements, at about 
the age of four. Various researchers have proposed that children use questions as a cognitive 
tool that allows them to fill a gap in their knowledge. Indeed, it is likely the case that the 
increasing sophistication of children's questions is due to their developing knowledge. 
However, as argued above, it may be premature to assume that children's question asking 
behaviour implies a wish for causal explanation per se. Therefore, children's use of questions 
may represent only a fragile understanding of the usefulness of questions in filling the gaps in 
their knowledge, and it is possible that children do not initially assume that explanation-
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seeking questions beget explanatory information, counter-intuitive though that may seem. 
Nevertheless, it does appear that children appear satisfied once they receive explanatory 
information. 
Research that examines children's ability to distinguish different types of explanations 
was outlined, with a focus on their receptivity to causal explanations. In a discussion of 
whether children are able to make such discernments in the same way that they can evaluate 
informants' claims for accuracy from a young age, evidence suggests that children's 
preference for specific types of explanations (e.g., scientific, physical-reductionist) likely 
only comes about with scientific education which largely emphasises causal explanations. 
However, it is possible that children might privilege causal explanations when compared to 
explanations that are less informative (e.g., those that do not contain causal elements). In 
keeping with what children are likely to hear in real life, it was proposed that children might 
consider an informant who can provide causal information, in the form of functional 
explanations, to be more trustworthy than an informant who only describes obvious (surface) 
characteristics of objects that are highly visible. Indeed, the evidence shows that children 
recognise the differences between informants who are knowledgeable about non-visible 
features of objects as compared to informants who are knowledgeable about externally visible 
features of objects. However, no studies have directly tested whether children differentially 
trust informants who differ in the depth of their explanations, and whether they consider 
informants who provide functional explanations to be more trustworthy than informants who 
provide surface explanations. Therefore, the studies described in Chapter 7, 8, and 9 present 
informants who both provide accurate and relevant information. However, the question of 
interest is whether children consider an informant who provides explanations for the 
functions of objects to be more competent and trustworthy than an informant who merely 
provides descriptions of obvious (surface) characteristics of objects. This research question is 
interesting because it suggests that children might have an early-emerging capacity to 
evaluate the depth of explanations, as well as a tendency to prefer functional explanations at 
an age where they are yet to be explicitly taught the value of causal explanations. 
In the next chapter, I propose that the biological domain is useful for examining the 
research questions presented in this thesis. In particular, given that children‘s knowledge of 
the body increased from about the age of four, they are likely to be receptive to informants 
who provide information about the body. Such information will pertain to new labels for 
parts of the body when compared to distinctly accurate or inaccurate labels (Chapter 6), as 
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well as functional explanations for parts of the body when compared to surface explanations 
for parts of the body (Chapters 7 to 9). 
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Chapter 4 
The Biological Domain and the Current Approach 
 
As outlined in the preceding chapters, the studies presented in this thesis investigate 
how children interpret informants who provide new information about objects, as well as 
whether they are sensitive to informants who differ in explanatory adequacy. In this chapter, I 
argue that the biological domain of the human body is well suited to introduce children to 
informants who provide novel labels or different types of explanations because it is one in 
which much of children‘s knowledge, despite their first hand experience, is derived via 
testimony. Up to this point, existing studies of children‘s selective trust typically present 
informants who provide information about artifacts, and few studies have presented 
informants who provide information about objects from other domains. Objects from the 
human body, particularly organs and internal processes, are distinct in that they are typically 
unobservable, even though children have indirect experience of their processes (e.g., feeling 
the heart beat, the sensation of breathing). Hence, children must heavily rely on testimony to 
learn about them. Indeed, in science education, emphasis is placed on the processes of 
different parts of the body and their necessity in maintaining life and well-being. While there 
is no reason to expect that children‘s selective trust in the biological domain will differ 
markedly from their selective trust in the domain of artifacts, the complexity of objects from 
the human body, and the relevance of body knowledge for growing children, presents a 
suitable domain in which to examine children‘s trust in situations that extend beyond accurate 
and inaccurate labelling. In the next section, I present evidence that children‘s knowledge of 
the body rapidly develops from about the age of four. Further, several studies described 
below are indicative of children‘s sensitivity to causal explanations for parts of the human 
body. I end by summarising the approach and the content of the ensuing empirical chapters. 
 
Children’s Understanding of the Biological Domain Burgeons at Fours Years of Age 
Children‘s knowledge of the biological domain undergoes extensive conceptual 
change from about the age of four onwards. Keil (1992) outlined that, between the ages of 
three and ten, children become increasingly aware of many biological notions, such as 
recognising that biological objects have particular internal properties which are essential for 
their functioning and are likely to be heritable, and that biological objects have specific 
pathways or patterns of growth which differ from that of artifacts. Keil argued that the 
development of children‘s biological understanding likely stems from an early bias to 
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perceive biological objects differently from other objects (but cf. Kelemen, 1999b). In other 
words, from an early age, children recognise the biological domain as distinct and different 
from other domains. Indeed, Erickson, Keil, and Lockhart (2010) showed that five-year-olds 
appropriately paired biological statements with other biological statements and treated such 
statements as distinct from psychological statements. Further, children appropriately 
attributed biological mechanisms when questioned about the cause of specific biological 
changes (e.g., that ingesting a pill or undergoing an operation can bring about a biological 
change), and they appropriately attributed psychological mechanisms when questioned about 
the cause of specific psychological changes (e.g., that taking a class or undergoing training 
can bring about a psychological change). Such a finding suggests that children have a sense 
that there is a fundamental distinction between the causal mechanisms in these respective 
domains, and that the underlying processes within a domain are fundamentally similar. 
In outlining the nature of children‘s naive biology, Inagaki and Hatano (2002; 2006) 
termed children‘s underlying causal explanatory framework as a vitalistic causality, an 
intermediary framework used to reliably explain and predict biological phenomena from 
about the age of four. Within this framework, bodily processes are attributed to the functions 
of a vital power (i.e., some unspecified substance or energy) which maintains and enhances 
life. Specifically, children believe that vital power is taken in from outside sources, such as 
food and water, and utilised by the body‘s organs in order to sustain life and enable the 
organism to grow. Conceptually, the notion of vitalistic causality is situated between an 
intentional causality framework (i.e., that a person‘s intentions cause a phenomenon) and a 
mechanical causality framework (i.e., that physiological mechanisms cause a phenomenon). 
When explaining bodily functions, rather than attribute intentions to the person who 
possesses the organ, children use the notion of vitalistic causality when they are not 
knowledgeable about the underlying physiological mechanisms. Children attribute some form 
of agency to the bodily organ and believe that there is a transfer of vital power which allows 
the function to occur, as discussed in the findings below. 
To investigate whether children demonstrate preferences for such vitalistic 
explanations, Inagaki and Hatano (2002) first obtained open-ended explanations from six-
year-olds on different biological phenomena (e.g., ―why do we eat food every day?‖) and 
then asked them to endorse one of three types of causal explanations: intentional (e.g., 
―because we want to eat tasty food‖), vitalistic (e.g., ―because our tummy takes in vital power 
from the food‖), or mechanical (e.g., ―because we take the food into our body after its form is 
changed in the stomach and bowels‖). Left to their own devices, six-year-olds failed to 
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generate vitalistic explanations, instead providing non-biological explanations (e.g., ―because 
we eat food every day to grow bigger‖) or claimed that they did not know the answer. 
However, when presented with the three alternative explanations, children favoured the 
vitalistic explanation over the mechanical and intentional explanations. Using a similar 
methodology, but in a sample of Australian children, Morris, Taplin, and Gelman (2000) 
investigated children‘s preferences for vitalistic explanations and distinguished between the 
notion of organ agency and energy transfer. Results showed that five-year-olds largely 
favoured vitalistic explanations. For example, when asked, ―Why do we breathe and take in 
air?‖ children preferred a vitalistic explanation, ―Because our chest takes in energy from the 
air we breathe‖, over a physiological explanation, ―Because our lungs take in oxygen and 
change it into carbon dioxide that we have no use for‖ or an intentional explanation, 
―Because we want to make ourselves feel fresh again‖. In addition, while children generally 
favoured vitalistic explanations involving organ agency or energy transfer, they showed a 
stronger preference for explanations about energy transfer. Such a finding suggests that the 
transfer of energy or life force is emphasised in children‘s understanding of biology. Overall, 
vitalistic causality functions as a transitional phase of children‘s naive biology prior to their 
knowledge of precise mechanistic explanations. 
Inagaki and Hatano (2004; 2006) also argued that, in addition to vitalistic causality, 
children use teleological causality when understanding biological phenomena. Teleological 
causality, as mentioned in Chapter 3, refers to the idea that an entity exists or is designed for 
a purpose. Indeed, Keil (1992) showed that five- and seven-year-olds preferred teleological 
explanations (e.g., [plants are green] ―because it is better for plants to be green and it helps 
there be more plants‖) over reductionist explanations (e.g., [plants are green] ―because there 
are little tiny parts in plants that when mixed together give them a green color‖). However, 
when presented with the same explanations for a nonliving natural object, such as why an 
emerald is green, children preferred reductionist explanations over teleological explanations. 
While Keil proposed that teleological reasoning is the first explanatory principle children 
grasp in the biological domain and approximates that of adults‘ reasoning, Kelemen (1999a) 
asserted that children apply teleological reasoning in other domains, such as when 
understanding artifacts or other people‘s behaviour. Hence, Jaakkola and Slaughter (2002) 
argued that, in order to be a genuinely biological explanatory principle, the form of 
teleological reasoning should be specific to biological goals; it should not be possible for the 
purposes and functions ascribed to biological objects be applied to non-biological objects.  
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As suggested by Inagaki and Hatano (2002), children come to rely on the notion of 
life teleology, by which the purpose of bodily organs is to maintain life, and that the 
maintenance of life is likely carried out by the transfer of energy or vital power; overall, 
referred to as a teleo-vitalistic framework. Similarly, Jaakkola and Slaughter (2002) proposed 
that the maintenance of life is one potential biological goal, at least in the context of 
children‘s reasoning about bodily functions. Their investigation of children‘s knowledge of 
the body showed that children‘s knowledge of bodily functions and the locations of particular 
body parts increased between the ages of four and eight. Further, between the ages of four 
and six, children increasingly made more appeals to life, by referring to the goal of 
maintaining life or avoiding death when asked what particular body parts (X) were ―for‖ or 
―what would happen if someone did not have an X?‖. Children who made appeals to life 
were categorised as life theorists, and children who did not make appeals to life were 
categorised as non-life theorists. Interestingly, findings showed life theorists were more 
knowledgeable of bodily functions than non-life theorists, but the groups did not differ in 
their knowledge of the locations of the body parts. Jaakkola and Slaughter concluded that 
such a finding indicates that there is a dramatic shift in their understanding of the body when 
children understand life as a biological goal. That is, their recognition that the goal of bodily 
functions is to maintain life represents their use of biological (or life) teleology as a causal 
explanatory principle or framework. 
If it is the case that children‘s acquisition of a biological teleology framework aids in 
their understanding of the body, Slaughter and Lyons (2003) further argued that it could be 
possible to improve children‘s knowledge of the body by emphasising the necessity of the 
bodily organs for sustaining life. In their study, three- to five-year-olds were assessed for 
their knowledge of bodily organs as well as their understanding of death. Children were then 
categorised as either life theorists or non-life theorists, according to their responses in the 
body parts interview. As also found in Jaakkola and Slaughter (2002), life theorists had more 
knowledge of organ functions than non-life theorists. Children who subsequently participated 
in a training procedure, designed to teach them about vital body parts and processes and the 
essential role of organs in maintaining life, showed significant improvements in their 
understanding of biological matters. Children who were previously categorised as non-life 
theorists could be categorised as life theorists after undergoing training. In fact, life-theorists 
and non-life theorists performed equally well on the body parts interview after receiving 
training, and their knowledge of death also improved. Slaughter and Lyons concluded that, at 
least when reasoning about the body and death, children use a biological teleology framework 
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in which the organs are recognised as being crucial for life. In addition, children‘s acquisition 
of this explanatory framework likely prompts a reorganisation of their biological 
understanding so that they become better positioned to learn and recall new information 
about biological concepts, including life and death. 
 
Summary 
The research reviewed in this chapter shows that children‘s understanding of the body 
rapidly increases from about the age of four, and suggests that they are highly receptive to 
information about the body. At the age of four, they begin to grasp the notion that biological 
objects are different from other types of objects. Further, as they get older, children start to 
consider the causal mechanisms that are responsible for biological processes and for the 
maintenance of life, which are unique to the biological domain. Based on the findings 
presented above, it was expected that the biological domain would be a fertile one in which to 
further investigate how children evaluate the trustworthiness of informants. First, there exist 
many labels for parts of the body that are not learnt by children until well into formal 
education, and such information may even pertain to objects of which children already have 
some knowledge (e.g., learning that epidermis also refers to the skin) or to parts of such 
objects (e.g., nostril, pupil).  Hence, the study presented in Chapter 6 consists of an informant 
who provides novel labels for familiar body parts, and is compared to informants who 
provide clearly accurate or inaccurate labels for those body parts. Second, in contrast to 
artifacts, the complexity of body parts and their processes allows for elaborate explanations 
of function and appearance to be provided. Indeed, as discussed above, children appear 
capable of evaluating different types of causal explanations about the body. Therefore, in line 
with the arguments presented in the prior chapter, the studies presented in Chapter 7, 8, and 9, 
examine children‘s construal of informants who differ in the types of explanations they 
provide for parts of the body; specifically, on the basis of whether informants provide 
explanations for the functions of body parts or descriptions of obvious characteristics of body 
parts. 
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Chapter 5 
Study 1 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, previous studies of children‘s selective trust (e.g., 
Corriveau et al., 2009; Koenig & Harris, 2005) have mainly focused on presenting informants 
who provide testimony for observable common objects (i.e., artifacts), such as a cup or book, 
for which there is generally an unambiguous label and little scope for informants to 
demonstrate profound knowledge of the objects. By contrast, the area of biological 
knowledge is a domain in which a person can show how competent he or she is at talking 
about various body parts and organs, and it also offers many novel labels which children do 
not learn about until formal schooling. Given that children‘s knowledge of the human body 
rapidly expands from the age of four (Inagaki & Hatano, 2006; Jaakkola & Slaughter, 2002), 
I proposed that biological knowledge would be a suitable domain in which to examine 
children‘s selective trust. In the studies outlined in this thesis, I presented children with 
informants who provided information, in the form of labels and/or explanations for various 
body parts and organs. The domain of biological concepts also allowed for the inclusion of 
plausible labels which are novel to children. The study presented in this chapter was a 
preliminary investigation of children‘s biological knowledge to determine which body parts 
and organs they are most and least familiar with. In addition to identifying common themes in 
children‘s explanations for parts of the body, this study also helped to establish the well-
recognised body parts/organs to feature in the familiarisation trials, and the unfamiliar body 
parts/organs to feature in the test trials for the subsequent studies in this thesis which use the 
selective trust paradigm. 
 
Methods 
Participants  
27 children (15 girls), living in the Sydney metropolitan area, participated in this 
study: 14 four-year-olds (M = 53.64, SD = 3.15, range: 48-57) and 13 five-year-olds (M = 
62.00, SD = 1.35, range: 60-64). Most children were Caucasian, although a range of 
ethnicities was represented. All children spoke fluent English. Children were recruited 
through invitations to parents of children attending local daycare centres. Children were 
tested individually by a single experimenter in a designated quiet room or space within the 
centre. 
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Materials  
Participants were asked a series of questions about 18 body parts and organs. A 
girl/boy puppet (same as the child‘s gender), controlled by the experimenter, was used to 
present the questions. The body parts/organs were shown in a random order, alternating 
between easy external body parts (e.g. eye, foot) and difficult internal organs (e.g. lungs, 
pancreas), to maintain children‘s attention and limit frustration. The body parts/organs were 
stylised pictorial representations printed on A4-sized paper and are listed in the left-hand 
column of Table 5.1. An example of one of the organs presented to children is shown in 
Figure 5.1. Pictures of other organs used in this study, as well as in the subsequent studies 
presented in this thesis, are presented in Appendix C. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Lungs. 
 
Design and Procedure 
The procedure was adapted from a study on children‘s body knowledge by Jaakkola 
and Slaughter (2002). The testing session lasted for approximately 10-15 minutes. 
The first part of the procedure involved the introduction of the puppet and a warm-up 
task. Participants sat with the experimenter at a table and the experimenter introduced the 
puppet by saying, ―Do you know who this is? This is my friend, Johnny/Jenny. Johnny/Jenny 
is a bit little (i.e., young). He‘s/she‘s only three years old and doesn‘t know much about the 
body. How old are you? You‘re a little bit bigger, aren‘t you? In this game, maybe you can 
help Johnny/Jenny learn about the body?‖ The puppet then spoke to the children, ―Hi [child‘s 
name], can you help me please?‖ 
In the warm-up task, to familiarise children with the format of the questions in the 
task, the experimenter presented a picture of a woman‘s head with long wavy hair (Figure 
5.2) to the children and puppet. The puppet examined the picture and looked expectantly at 
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the children. The experimenter pointed to the woman‘s hair and said, ―Can you tell 
Johnny/Jenny what this is called?‖ After the children‘s response (all of the children said 
―hair‖), the experimenter asked, ―Can you show Johnny/Jenny where else you can find hair?‖ 
Once the children successfully pointed to their own hair or the puppet‘s hair, the 
experimenter said, ―Can you tell Johnny/Jenny what you use your hair for?‖ and, if 
necessary, ―Can you tell Johnny/Jenny anything else about hair?‖ The puppet nodded after all 
responses made by children. Following this warm-up task, the test trials began. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Warm-up stimulus: Hair. 
  
The experimenter brought out the test pictures, which were facedown in one pile so 
children could not see them. The pile was prearranged such that the pictures of body 
parts/organs alternated between easy and difficult body parts/organs. The experimenter 
presented each picture one by one and asked children the same series of questions as the 
warm-up task. Children were given as long as they needed to answer each question and given 
positive encouragement for their efforts. The questions were: 
(1) Label trial: ―Can you tell Johnny/Jenny what this is called?‖ If children stated the 
correct label, they were praised and asked the next question. If children stated an 
incorrect label, the experimenter said, ―Actually, I don‘t think that‘s what it is 
called. Can you guess what else this might be called?‖ Finally, if children stated 
that they ―did not know‖ or were ―not sure‖, they were given a two-choice 
alternative question to see if they would be able to recognise the organ/body part 
after hearing its label (two-choice alternatives are shown in the right-hand column 
of Table 5.1). For instance, if children were unsure about a picture of a liver, the 
experimenter said, ―I can give you a clue. This has two names. Which name 
sounds better? Liver or Hepatic?‖ The order of the correct answer in the two-
choice alternative question was randomised. The experimenter always remained 
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neutral in delivering the two-choice alternative so that children were not cued 
towards the correct answer.  
(2) Location Trial: ―Can you show Johnny/Jenny where the X is?‖ X referred to either 
the label used by children who gave a correct response in the Label Trial or the 
label endorsed by children given a two-choice alternative. If children responded 
with the correct location, they were praised and asked the next question. If 
children were unsure or were silent, they were asked to guess where they thought 
the respective organ/body part was located. However, if children refused to guess, 
the experimenter assured them that their responses were satisfactory and 
continued with the next question. 
(3) Function Trial: ―Can you tell Johnny/Jenny what you use your X for?‖ Children 
were questioned about what they thought was the primary function of the 
organ/body part. If children stated a correct function, they were praised and asked, 
―Can you tell Johnny/Jenny anything else you use your X for?‖ If children were 
hesitant, they were asked to guess. Finally, if they were still unsure, the 
experimenter assured them that their responses were satisfactory and continued 
with presenting the next organ/body part. 
(4) Extra Trial: ―Can you tell Johnny/Jenny what else you know about X?‖ This final 
question was used to maximise the amount of information obtained from children 
about their knowledge of the body part/organs. 
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Table 5.1 
Body Parts and Organs Presented and Respective Two-choice Alternatives. 
Body Parts Presented (Easy) Two-choice Alternative 
Nose Naris 
Eye Sclera 
Foot Talus 
Ear Auricle 
Teeth Molar 
Mouth (Lips)* Philtrum 
Arm Humerus 
Leg Femur 
Hand Manus 
Organs Presented (Difficult) Two-choice Alternative 
Brain Cerebrum 
Liver Hepatic 
Lungs Pleura 
Larynx Vagus 
Gall Bladder Bile duct 
Stomach Fundus 
Pancreas Acini 
Heart Aorta 
Kidney Renal 
* Upon testing, it became apparent that children were more likely to label the picture of the mouth as ―lips‖. 
This response was categorised as also correct, but will be considered further in the Discussion. 
 
Results 
Findings will be presented as follows. First, an overview of children‘s accuracy of 
labelling, when unprompted, is considered. Second, children‘s accuracy when prompted with 
the two-choice alternative question, featuring the accurate and novel label, is presented. 
Third, children‘s ability to locate body part/organs is summarised. Finally, the forms of 
explanation children give for the body parts/organs are outlined. Age differences in children‘s 
responses were not found and, therefore, will not be detailed in this section. 
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Accuracy of Labelling 
The percentage of children who provided a correct label for each body part/organ, 
unprompted, is shown in Figure 5.3. In general, children were highly accurate with external 
body parts. All children were able to accurately label the eye, nose and teeth without 
assistance. By contrast, children had more difficulty with internal organs. The brain, heart, 
lungs, and kidney were the only organs which were recognised by some children. However, 
all children were unable to label the gall bladder, larynx, liver, pancreas and stomach. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Percentage of children who gave a correct label (unprompted) for each body 
part/organ, in descending order. 
 
Most children offered one label for each body part/organ. However, there were often 
multiple responses for the mouth, arm and leg when children were asked to provide a label. 
While it was anticipated that children would accurately label the picture of the mouth as a 
―mouth‖, 20 out of 27 children referred to the body part as ―lips‖, whereas the remaining 
children labelled it as a ―mouth‖. During testing, it became apparent that most of the 
children‘s first response to the picture of the mouth was ―lips‖. Given that ―lips‖ was also an 
accurate label for the picture of the mouth, ―mouth‖ and ―lips‖ were both scored as correct 
responses in the label trial. However, if children said that they ―did not know‖ what it was, 
the two-choice alternative question was offered. For the arm and leg, children also opted to 
respond with smaller parts, such as hand, fingers, knees, foot and toes (48.1% and 51.9% 
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respectively). Nearly all children offered the name for the full limb after being prompted 
with, ―Can you guess what else this might be called?‖ However, if children were still unable 
to give the correct label for a body part/organ, they were given a two-choice alternative 
question, in which they had to endorse either the accurate label or a novel label. 
 
Accurate vs. Novel Labels 
A small number of children had responded incorrectly when first asked to label the 
arm (1), ear (3), leg (1) and mouth (2). With the exception of the mouth, all children chose 
the correct label for the arm, ear and leg when presented with the two-choice alternative 
question. The two children who incorrectly labelled the picture of the mouth endorsed the 
novel label, ―philtrum‖. This finding will be elaborated further in the Discussion. 
The percentage of children, who were prompted with the two-choice alternative 
question for the internal organs, and chose the accurate label is shown in Figure 5.4. Children 
chose the correct label at a rate above chance for the organs: brain, lungs, stomach and heart. 
However, responses did not differ from chance for all other internal organs. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Percentage of children who chose the accurate label over the novel label in the 
two-choice alternative question, in descending order. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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 In considering children who labelled correctly, with and without prompting, accuracy 
is above chance for all external body parts as well as the following organs: brain, lungs, heart 
and stomach. This finding is presented in Figure 5.5. Responses did not differ from chance 
for the gall bladder, kidney, larynx, pancreas and liver. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Overall accuracy of children‘s labelling of body part/organs, in descending order. 
* p <.05. ** p <.01. 
 
Accuracy of Location 
Correct responses for location are based on definitions used by Jaakkola and 
Slaughter (2002). The percentage of children who responded with the correct location of each 
body part/organ is shown in Figure 5.6. All children could accurate locate the arm, eye, foot, 
hand, leg, nose and teeth. Further, children were more able to correctly locate external body 
parts than internal organs. 
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Figure 5.6. Percentage of children providing the correct location of each body part/organ, in 
descending order. 
 
Forms of Explanation 
Children‘s explanations were classified into four different categories: Core Function, 
Peripheral Function, Characteristic and Incorrect/Irrelevant. If children gave multiple 
descriptions for a body part/organ, which fit in more than one category, each description was 
individually coded. The categories are described as follows. 
 Core Function: a primary function of the body part/organ which is important for 
interacting with the world and/or sustaining life. Responses for this category are based 
on definitions used by Jaakkola and Slaughter (2002). General remarks such as, ―it 
keeps you alive/healthy‖ were not coded. 
 Peripheral function: an action or function of the body part/organ which is appropriate 
to the body part/organ, but is not vital for interacting with the world or sustaining life. 
 Characteristic: a property or feature of the body part/organ which is not directly 
associated with its core or peripheral function, such as a description of its external 
appearance or the names of parts which make up the body part/organ. 
 Incorrect/Irrelevant: coded if children made no correct responses, or provided 
irrelevant information. If children made any responses which could be coded under 
any of the categories listed above, any other remarks were ignored. 
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Examples of the first three categories for all body parts/organs, based on children‘s 
responses, are shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 
Examples of Children’s Core Function, Peripheral Function and Characteristic Responses 
for each Body Part/Organ. 
Body 
Part/Organ 
Core 
Function 
Peripheral 
Function 
Characteristic 
Arm Hold objects Bend, move Fingers, muscles, put stamps/tattoos 
on 
Ear Listen, hear Wiggle Medicine goes in 
Eye Look, see Blink Different colours, eyelashes 
Foot Walk, run Kick Nail polish, shoes, has bones 
Hand Hold, touch Shake, wave Five fingers, has little bumps 
Leg Walk, run Hop Knee, long, straight 
Mouth/Lips Eat, talk Kiss, smile Lipstick, tongue 
Nose Smell, 
breathe 
Sniff Bump nose and it hurts, blocked nose 
Teeth Chew, bite Brush, wiggle It grows 
Brain Think Dream Squishy, blood inside, there are holes 
Gall Bladder * * * 
Heart Pump blood Beat, make noise These bits are the pumping bits 
Kidney Do wees * Kidney stones 
Larynx * * * 
Liver * * * 
Lungs Breathe  Looks like butterfly 
Pancreas * * * 
Stomach Store food Rumbles Call it tummy 
Note. * signifies that no relevant responses were given. 
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The percentage of children who demonstrated knowledge of the body part/organ in at 
least one of the categories (i.e. Core Function, Peripheral Function or Characteristic) is shown 
in Figure 5.7. Children were more able to provide information about external body parts than 
internal organs. Further, they did not provide any information about the gallbladder and liver. 
A summary of four- and five-year-olds‘ explanations is shown in the Appendix D. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Percentage of children who gave at least one plausible explanation for each body 
part/organ, in descending order. 
 
The number of children who provided various forms of explanation for external body 
parts are shown in Table 5.3. With the exception of the arm and hand, the majority of 
children‘s descriptions related to a core function of the body part. For the arm and hand, most 
responses were related to a peripheral function of the body part. No irrelevant or incorrect 
responses were given for the eye, leg and teeth. 
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Table 5.3 
Numbers of Children’s Forms of Explanation for External Body Parts. 
Body part Irrelevant/none Core function Peripheral Function Characteristic 
Arm 3 10 20 10 
Ear 2 23 2 5 
Eye 0 20 10 9 
Foot 1 20 13 11 
Hand 1 19 18 5 
Leg 0 23 15 13 
Mouth 3 15 13 9 
Nose 1 20 10 3 
Teeth 0 26 11 8 
 
The forms of children‘s explanation for internal organs are shown in Table 5.4. Some 
children demonstrated knowledge of the brain, heart, lungs and stomach. However, most 
children were unable to provide a knowledgeable description for the organs. All children 
were unable to give any information about the gall bladder, liver and pancreas. 
 
Table 5.4 
Numbers of Children’s Forms of Explanation for Internal Organs. 
Organ Irrelevant/none Core function Peripheral Function Characteristic 
Brain 11 10 5 4 
Gall Bladder 27 0 0 0 
Heart 17 3 6 3 
Kidney 24 1 0 2 
Larynx 26 1 0 0 
Liver 27 0 0 0 
Lungs 20 6 0 1 
Pancreas 26 0 0 0 
Stomach 23 3 1 1 
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to explore children‘s existing knowledge of the labels and 
functions for various body parts and organs. Results show that four- and five-year-olds were 
more familiar with external body parts than internal organs, and they have exceptional 
knowledge of the eye, nose, and teeth. Children also demonstrated extensive knowledge of 
the foot, hand, leg, mouth, arm and ear. With regards to the internal organs, children provided 
the most information about the brain, heart, lungs, and stomach after being prompted with its 
label. However, children provided very little information about the label, location and 
function of the kidney, gall bladder, larynx, liver and pancreas. 
Regarding external body parts, children‘s explanations generally referred to core 
functions, peripheral functions and characteristics. References to core functions were most 
frequent for all body parts except for two, arm and hand, which were most frequently 
described in terms of peripheral functions. For internal organs, the brain, heart, stomach and 
lungs were also described in terms of core functions, peripheral functions and characteristics; 
but at a much lower frequency than for external body parts. Explanations relating to core and 
peripheral functions typically contained many verbs and children often demonstrated those 
actions using their own bodies. For instance, when asked about the function of the eye, most 
children would blink rapidly before verbally reporting, ―blinking‖. Further, when children 
mentioned characteristics of body parts, their statements were usually related to external and 
observable features, such as having nail polish on the fingers, or the fact that eyes can have 
different colours. In general, children speak of external body parts in terms of actions and 
observable properties. 
This study sought to determine which body parts and organs would be presented in 
the subsequent studies presented in this thesis. For familiarisation trials, the body parts which 
were well-recognised by children and had been given explanations relating to core functions, 
peripheral functions, and characteristics were chosen. Therefore, from the current results, the 
eye and nose were the most apparent choices for familiarisation trials. Explanations for the 
ear, on the other hand, generally related to its core function (e.g. hearing, listening) with little 
mention of any peripheral functions. This may be due to the fact that children were 
knowledgeable of the importance of the ear in the auditory system, but had less awareness of 
other inherent functions. In addition, while the teeth were also widely recognised and 
understood by children, it was not selected because it could only be referred to using a 
collective noun (i.e. ―Those are teeth‖), which does not conform to the typical manner in 
which items are presented during familiarisation trials as reported in the literature, (e.g. 
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―That‘s a ball‖). Hence, to maintain consistency across all trials, only body parts/organs 
which could be presented in the form, ―That‘s an X‖ were selected. Finally, based on 
children‘s overall knowledge of the label, location, and function of body parts, the hand and 
the foot were chosen for the remaining familiarisation trials. The arm and leg were not chosen 
because they contained smaller parts to which children‘s attention was also drawn. For 
instance, when children were shown the arm and leg, many were inclined to name other parts, 
including foot, hand, fingers, knees, and toes. 
Children‘s responses when shown the mouth were unexpected as they more often 
referred to the picture as ―lips‖, rather than ―mouth‖. In addition, two children responded 
incorrectly in the first instance and chose the novel label, ―philtrum‖, when prompted with 
the two-choice alternative question. The reason for these unexpected findings could be due to 
the stimulus itself. The picture of the mouth presented to children was a closed and slightly 
smiling mouth, which could be interpreted as referring to ―lips‖. However, 96.3% of children 
successfully indicated the location of the mouth/lips and 88.9% of children were able to 
demonstrate some knowledge of the body part. In fact, the explanations offered by children 
often referred to functions which were more relevant to the interior of the mouth, such as, 
talking and eating. Further, when shown the picture for teeth, which was an open mouth, 
seven children responded with ―mouth‖ when asked for a label, and four children stated that 
teeth could be found ―in your mouth‖ when asked to locate the teeth. That is, while there 
were multiple answers for the picture of the mouth, children still recognised and provided 
correct information about the body part, suggesting that they had clear knowledge of the 
mouth. Therefore, ―mouth‖ was assigned as an inaccurate label used by the inaccurate 
informant; for example, when labelling a picture of a foot. The labels for the other external 
body parts (i.e. leg, ear and arm) were assigned as inaccurate labels during familiarisation 
trials. To avoid confusion and to increase the strangeness of the inaccurate informant‘s 
labelling, accurate and inaccurate labels were matched appropriately such that the hand was 
never called an ―arm‖ and the foot was never called a ―leg‖ by the inaccurate informant. 
For test trials, the least recognised internal organs were selected to be the most 
suitable stimuli as most children were unable to label, locate and describe them. Because the 
organs will be labelled using novel terms (e.g. ―slod‖, ―linz‖), it was anticipated that the 
organs chosen would be unfamiliar to children and that there would be no interference 
between the novel labels and their existing knowledge. In taking into account children‘s 
overall understanding of the internal organs in this study, the gall bladder, liver, pancreas and 
larynx were selected as the novel objects presented in the test trials. The kidney was also a 
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potential candidate but, as shown in the results, some children were able to label and offer 
explanations; in this study, one child recognised the kidney and another mentioned kidney 
stones. 
In the subsequent chapters, I present a series of experiments that utilise the findings of 
Study 1 to investigate whether children demonstrate selective trust in the biological domain 
in the same way that they do in the artifacts domain. The body parts presented in the 
familiarisation trials pertained to the body parts that children showed most knowledge of (i.e., 
eye, hand, nose, foot), and the organs presented in the test trials pertained to the organs that 
children had no knowledge of (i.e., pancreas, larynx, liver, gall bladder). In Chapter 6, the 
question of interest was how children construe informants who provide new labels for parts of 
the body in contrast to informants who provide clearly accurate or inaccurate labels. In 
Chapters 7 to 9, I present children with informants who differ in the depth of the explanations 
they provide to determine whether children are discerning of informants‘ claims; specifically, 
one informant outlines the functions of the body parts/organs whereas the other informant 
simply describes their obvious appearance. 
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Chapter 6 
Study 2 
 
The results of the study presented in Chapter 5 revealed that children have more 
knowledge of the body when talking about external body parts (e.g., eye, hand) than about 
internal organs (e.g., pancreas, liver). Based on these results, the study presented in this 
chapter sought to capitalize on children‘s developing knowledge of the body. In a 
modification of the selective trust paradigm, children were presented with familiar and 
unfamiliar body parts/organs to investigate whether children demonstrate selective trust in the 
biological domain, as well as how children construe informants who provide new information 
(in the form of novel labels) when compared to informants who provide clearly accurate or 
inaccurate information. It is important to note that the use of novelty in research is not a new 
idea per se. In fact, there is extensive literature on children‘s early word learning that has 
manipulated the novelty of objects (Graham, Namy, Gentner, & Meagher, 2010; Jaswal, 
2004) and the novelty of labels (Hollich, Golinkoff, & Hirsh-Pasek, 2007; Merriman & 
Schuster, 1991). For instance, Jaswal (2004) showed that, when presented with pictures of 
hybrid animals that varied in the degree of novelty, 3- and 4-year-olds‘ acceptance of a 
speaker‘s unexpected labels depended on their evaluations of the speakers‘ intent. In relation 
to studies that have featured novel labels, Merriman and Schuster (1991) found that children 
as young as two demonstrate a disambiguation effect by which they tend to select unfamiliar 
objects over familiar objects upon hearing a novel label. Hence, while novel labels have been 
widely used in the literature and it is well-established that young children are able to make 
sense of such labels, the questions put forward in this study relate how children construe 
informants who provide novel labels when compared to informants who provide accurate or 
inaccurate labels; such a question is yet to be explored. Further, it was investigated whether 
there is a developmental shift by which children come to consider informants who provides 
novel labels to be somewhat more reliable than informants who provide inaccurate labels 
given that there are apparent age-changes in children‘s evaluations of accurate and inaccurate 
informants between the ages of three and four. Hence, the motivations for this study largely 
derive from existing gaps in the selective trust literature as to the nature of children‘s 
selective trust in the context of novel labelling. 
The following study was published in the Journal of Experimental Child Psychology.  
 
 
68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Five-year-olds are willing but four-year-olds refuse to trust informants who offer new 
and unfamiliar labels for parts of the body 
Betty Luu
a
, Marc de Rosnay
a
, and Paul L. Harris
b
 
a
 School of Psychology, The University of Sydney 
b
 Graduate School of Education, Harvard University 
 
Published October, 2013 
69 
Abstract 
This study employed the selective trust paradigm to examine how children interpret novel 
labels when compared with labels they already know to be accurate or inaccurate within the 
biological domain. The participants—3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 144)—were allocated to 
one of three conditions. In the accurate versus inaccurate condition, one informant labeled 
body parts correctly, whereas the other labeled them incorrectly (e.g., calling an eye an 
―arm‖). In the accurate versus novel condition, one informant labeled body parts accurately, 
whereas the other provided novel labels (e.g., calling an eye a ―roke‖). Finally, in the 
inaccurate versus novel condition, one informant labeled body parts incorrectly, whereas the 
other offered novel labels. In subsequent test trials, the two informants provided conflicting 
labels for unfamiliar internal organs. In the accurate versus inaccurate condition, children 
sought and endorsed labels from the accurate informant. In the accurate versus novel 
condition, only 4- and 5-year-olds preferred the accurate informant, whereas 3-year-olds did 
not selectively prefer either informant. In the inaccurate versus novel condition, only 5-year-
olds preferred the novel informant, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds did not demonstrate a 
selective preference. Results are supportive of previous studies suggesting that 3-year-olds 
are sensitive to the errors of inaccurate informants, when contrasted with accurate informants, 
and that 4-year-olds privilege accuracy. However, 3- and 4-year-olds appear to be unsure as 
to how the novel informant should be construed. In contrast, 5-year-olds appreciate that 
speakers offering new information are more trustworthy than those offering inaccurate 
information, but they are cautious in judging such informants as being ―better‖ at providing 
that information. 
 
Key words: selective trust; epistemic trust; testimony; biological knowledge; past accuracy; 
new labels 
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Five-year-olds are willing but four-year-olds refuse to trust informants who offer new 
and unfamiliar labels for parts of the body 
 
Children learn about the world not only through their own personal experiences but 
also via testimony, through what other people tell them. Therefore, it is important for children 
to be able to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy sources of information to 
learn effectively. Harris (2007, 2012) proposed that, from an early age, children create a 
global impression or profile of an informant based on information they obtain about, for 
example, an informant‘s history of accuracy, ignorance, and degree of confidence. As a 
result, children consider some informants to be more epistemically trustworthy than others. 
Much of the research on epistemic trust has focused on children‘s evaluation of the ability of 
informants to provide accurate object labels. In various contexts, children from 3 years of age 
have shown a preference to learn labels for unfamiliar objects from previously accurate 
labelers rather than from previously inaccurate labelers (Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Corriveau 
et al., 2009, 2011; Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini et al., 2007). 
Most of these studies have focused on children‘s evaluations of informants who label 
artifacts—observable common objects (e.g., balls, dolls)—and whether they do so accurately 
or inaccurately. However, children can and do acquire information about many other 
domains, and they frequently encounter people who offer new information (e.g., novel labels) 
that are not necessarily accurate or inaccurate. This study examines how children evaluate 
informants who differ in the reliability with which they provide biological information about 
the human body. Such information has a different character from those domains of 
knowledge that have dominated epistemic trust research, which has largely focused on 
(human-made) artifacts. Body knowledge is a domain in which children rapidly acquire new 
information from around 4 or 5 years of age as they start to learn about imperceptible 
structures and processes (Inagaki & Hatano, 2006; Jaakkola & Slaughter, 2002). In the 
current study, therefore, we examined how children vet new information in this domain, a 
topic hitherto largely neglected in the trust in testimony research literature. 
Children can learn via testimony about domains that consist of objects, which are 
highly observable and can ultimately be examined firsthand. Artifacts are visible, and 
children can rapidly acquire labels and knowledge via observation, instruction, and 
demonstration. Nevertheless, children also learn a great deal via testimony about largely or 
entirely unobservable entities, things that they would have no means of easily examining for 
themselves, such as historical events and religious beings. For example, children come to 
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learn about the existence of God, the presence of germs, and the shape of the earth (Harris & 
Koenig, 2006) despite not having firsthand experience of these entities. Furthermore, Harris, 
Pasquini, Duke, Asscher, and Pons (2006) showed that children between 4 and 8 years of age 
attest to the existence of entities that they cannot directly see for themselves but have heard 
about from others, and they endorse particular entities (e.g., real entities such as germs and 
oxygen) with more confidence than others (e.g., special beings such as Santa Claus and the 
Tooth Fairy). 
There are, however, certain domains that ordinarily contain both observable and 
unobservable entities and within which objects and processes are often inferred by their 
results or outcomes. Such domains include the mental and the biological. For instance, in the 
mental domain, children are able to witness external indicators of mental states by observing 
others‘ intentional acts, but they also come to realize that people possess unobservable mental 
attitudes and traits that they learn about indirectly, often via others‘ self-reports. In the 
biological domain, although children are able to confirm the existence of external entities, 
such as body parts (e.g., eye, nose), many objects (e.g., internal organs) and processes (e.g., 
digestion) are generally unobservable despite children‘s direct access to their own bodies. 
Thus, the objects within the mental and biological domains are also distinctive because they 
are built into the individual and can sometimes be directly experienced; they are part of our 
self-knowledge. For example, people experience thoughts and desires of their own, and they 
quickly understand that there are structures and processes within their own bodies; they may 
feel the process of digestion, the breathing of the lungs, or the beating of the heart. Artifacts, 
on the other hand, are generally human-made and exist externally to individuals. Even though 
people can claim ownership of specific artifacts, such artifacts do not form part of the 
inherent makeup of those individuals. Therefore, given the differences between the strongly 
observable domain of artifacts and the less easily observable mental and biological domains, 
it is important to confirm whether children apply the same general principles, across different 
domains, when evaluating who is a trustworthy source of information. Evidence so far 
suggests that children‘s trust in accurate informants is pervasive in the domain of artifacts. 
Some recent studies have examined children‘s trust in the mental domain in relation to trait 
judgments (e.g., Boseovski, 2012; Lane et al., 2013) and suggest that children‘s selective 
trust is influenced by informants‘ traits. However, no studies have systematically examined 
children‘s trust in the biological domain. 
As noted earlier, it is now widely accepted that children‘s knowledge of the body 
increases rapidly from around 4 years of age, which roughly coincides with the age at which 
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children demonstrate a systematic preference for reliable labelers of artifacts in the current 
literature. Therefore, we sought to establish whether children differentially prefer accurate 
labelers over inaccurate labelers in a domain consisting of entities that children themselves 
possess but are not always readily observable. We were interested in the question of whether 
children apply the same epistemic strategies and trust accurate labelers of biological entities 
in a similar way to how they trust accurate labelers of artifacts. Given that the parts of the 
body and organs are real entities, like artifacts, we expected that children would use the same 
strategies and prefer informants who are accurate over those who are inaccurate. 
By using entities from the biological domain, however, another interesting question 
emerges that has been largely neglected in the existing literature. In the biological domain, 
there exist many labels that are not learned by children until well into formal education. 
Children are continually exposed to new information and, thus, are required to make sense of 
this new information in light of their existing knowledge. Furthermore, such information may 
even pertain to objects of which children already have some knowledge (e.g., learning that 
―epidermis‖ also refers to the skin) or to parts of such objects (e.g., ―nostril‖, ―iris‖). Indeed, 
Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2012) showed that toddlers were more willing to accept new 
labels for familiar objects from an informant who appeared to be reliable than from an 
informant who appeared to be incompetent. Although much of the current selective trust 
research focuses on presenting informants who are either correct or incorrect when providing 
labels for objects, children are unlikely to encounter informants who are consistently 
inaccurate in the real world. A more plausible type of informant children are likely to 
encounter is one who provides information that is new and unfamiliar and that cannot be 
readily judged as accurate or inaccurate. 
Several studies have introduced different types of informants whose value as a 
potential source of information cannot be easily determined. For instance, an informant can 
claim knowledge without necessarily providing accurate information (e.g., by simply stating 
that he or she knows something about the object). Alternatively, an informant can withhold 
information without necessarily appearing ignorant or inaccurate (e.g., by simply drawing 
attention to the object). Using a single-informant study, Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2012) 
demonstrated that 24-month-olds were more likely to retain second labels (i.e., novel labels 
for familiar objects) from informants who were previously accurate, claimed knowledge (i.e., 
who said, ―I know what that is!‖), or were uninformative (i.e., who said, ―Look at that‖) when 
identifying familiar objects, but not from informants who were previously inaccurate or 
acknowledged ignorance (i.e., who said, ―I don‘t know what that is‖). Therefore, it appears 
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that reliable labeling trumps children‘s assumption that whole objects have only one category 
label (i.e., mutual exclusivity), and children have a default trust, such that they expect adults 
to be reliable labelers unless they have a history of inaccuracy or ignorance (see Koenig & 
Woodward, 2010). That is, even when an informant does not directly provide the accurate 
label but still appears to be knowledgeable, young children are willing to acquire new labels, 
even for objects that are known to them. 
Studies with older children (3 and 4 years of age), featuring an informant whose 
accuracy cannot be directly verified, have presented a neutral informant similar to the 
uninformative informant mentioned above. For example, Koenig and Jaswal (2011) found 
that 3- and 4-year-olds preferred to learn new information from a neutral informant, who had 
simply made neutral remarks about the dogs (e.g., ―That‘s a nice one‖), over an inexpert 
informant, who had inaccurately labeled a series of dogs. Similarly, Corriveau and colleagues 
(2009) used a neutral informant, who made neutral remarks to draw attention to the object 
(e.g., ―Let me take a look at that‖), to examine age-related changes in children‘s tracking of 
accuracy and inaccuracy. Their results showed that 3-year-olds monitor for inaccuracy, 
preferring the neutral informant over the inaccurate informant, but not preferring the accurate 
informant over the neutral informant. In contrast, 4-year-olds selectively trusted an accurate 
informant over a neutral informant, and trusted a neutral informant over an inaccurate 
informant. The findings of Corriveau and colleagues served to consolidate earlier findings of 
Pasquini and colleagues (2007) in that 3-year-olds‘ performance in selective trust paradigms 
can be framed in terms of sensitivity to inaccuracy, whereas the performance of 4-year-olds 
fits squarely with the interpretation that although they are still sensitive to inaccuracy, they 
nevertheless privilege accuracy. 
The single-informant studies discussed earlier (Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-
Jespersen & Echols, 2012) suggest that children are willing to acquire novel labels for objects 
for which they possess preexisting labels. However, no studies to date have familiarized 
children with an informant who provides new labels for known objects and assessed whether 
children subsequently prefer learning from such an informant. The informant who provides 
new labels is distinct from informants who appear to be knowledgeable, uninformative, or 
neutral in that actual labels are provided. In the current study, children were presented with 
an informant who was informative in that she was able to provide labels, but (most 
importantly) such labels did not blatantly signal accuracy or inaccuracy. Specifically, we 
introduced a new type of informant who offered novel labels that were unfamiliar to children 
but were still plausible. Such novel labels are likely to be representative of what children 
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encounter in real conversational and pedagogical interactions where they learn about entirely 
new things, encounter alternative labels for objects that are already known to them, or start to 
realize that known objects have special labels that refer to specific features or are used in 
certain contexts. Moreover, the domain of body knowledge is a suitable domain to examine 
children‘s construal of the novel informant because their knowledge of the body is 
burgeoning at this time and they are likely to encounter a range of new information about the 
body. 
In sum, this study employed the selective trust paradigm to examine how children 
interpret a novel labeler of body parts in comparison with labelers who can be readily 
evaluated as accurate or inaccurate. We were interested in whether the novel labeler would be 
construed as unreliable, like the inaccurate informant, because of her failure to provide 
accurate labels. Alternatively, there was a possibility that children would consider the novel 
labeler to be informative, like the accurate informant, because she provided new labels that 
were not blatantly inaccurate. The focus was on 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds because previous 
studies have shown that children from around 3 years of age systematically differentiate 
reliable informants from unreliable informants in various settings (Koenig & Harris, 2005a). 
Another motivation for including 3-year-olds was so that we could confirm whether they 
show a systematic preference for a novel informant over an inaccurate informant, just as they 
prefer a neutral informant over an inaccurate informant (as in Corriveau et al., 2009, and 
Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). 
The procedure was adapted from previous studies of selective trust in testimony (most 
notably Corriveau et al., 2009) but with the inclusion of the novel informant, which resulted 
in three contrasts (henceforth conditions): accurate versus inaccurate, accurate versus novel, 
and inaccurate versus novel. During familiarization trials, each condition featured a pair of 
informants who differed in accuracy when labeling a series of body parts with which children 
would be strongly familiar. In subsequent test trials, children were first asked which 
informant they would ask to learn about the labels for unfamiliar organs, entities that they 
have no direct opportunity to observe and, hence, must rely on testimony to learn about. 
Informants then provided different labels for the organs, and children were asked whose label 
they would endorse. 
Based on previous findings, it was predicted that children across all ages would prefer 
an accurate informant over an inaccurate informant. That is, children would rely on the same 
principles to evaluate the trustworthiness of informants in the domain of body knowledge as 
they do in the domain of artifacts. Next, in accordance with the findings of Corriveau and 
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colleagues (2009), who showed that 3-year-olds are sensitive to inaccuracy but do not 
privilege accuracy, it was predicted that 4- and 5-year-olds would prefer the accurate 
informant over the novel informant, whereas 3-year-olds would not differentiate between 
them. Finally, it was anticipated that children across all age groups would prefer the novel 
informant over the inaccurate informant because they would consider the blatant errors of the 
inaccurate informant to signal untrustworthiness more than the new information provided by 
the novel informant. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 144 children (71 girls and 73 boys): 48 3-year-olds (M = 42.98 
months, SD = 2.90, range = 37–47), 48 4-year-olds (M = 52.83 months, SD = 3.89, range = 
48–59), and 48 5-year-olds (M = 65.40 months, SD = 3.73, range = 60–71). All children lived 
in a metropolitan area and spoke fluent English. Most children were Caucasian, although a 
range of ethnicities was represented. Another 8 children were excluded from the main study 
due to fussiness (3), refusal to select an informant (2), interference by mother or day care 
staff (2), or initially stating that they would always select a particular informant because she 
wore a ―prettier‖ color (1). Children were recruited from a database of interested parents and 
via parental invitation. Children were tested individually in a quiet room in their day care 
center or school or at the university laboratory. Stimuli were presented as video clips on a 
laptop. 
 
Materials 
There were three conditions (accurate vs. inaccurate, accurate vs. novel, and 
inaccurate vs. novel), each consisting of eight video clips: four clips for the familiarization 
trials and four clips for the test trials. In each video clip, two female informants (wearing 
either an orange or blue shirt) sat on either side of a table, and a male interviewer (wearing a 
black shirt) stood between them. The interviewer held up, at chest height, a white A3-sized 
sheet of cardboard with a colored picture of a body part or organ printed on it. The order of 
body parts and organs presented was the same for all children. 
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Design and procedure 
Children were randomly allocated to conditions, with equal numbers of boys and girls 
in each condition. At the beginning of the session, the experimenter introduced a picture book 
about the human body as a way of familiarizing children with the items that were to be shown 
in the video clips. For instance, the experimenter said, ―We‘re going to learn some things 
about the body today. Look at this picture [points]. Did you know there are bones inside your 
body? Can you feel your bones? [demonstrates on self]. Have a look here. There are other 
things inside your body. Here‘s your heart. Do you know where your heart is?‖ The 
experimenter never explicitly referred to any body parts and organs featured in the video 
clips. 
Next, the experimenter introduced the task by saying, ―We‘re going to play a little 
game on the computer about the body.‖ The experimenter showed a still frame of the two 
informants sitting on either side of the table and the interviewer standing between them. The 
experimenter said, ―First, you‘re going to meet these three people. Do you see them? The boy 
in the black shirt is going to hold up some pictures of things from the body. Then, this girl in 
the orange shirt and this girl in the blue shirt are going to tell you the names of the things in 
the pictures. I want you to listen very carefully to what the girls say, and then I‘m going to 
ask you some questions. Are you ready?‖ The order in which the informants were mentioned 
was varied across children, and no hints about the accuracy of the informants were provided. 
Familiarization trials. In the first familiarization trial, the experimenter presented a 
picture of an eye and said, ―I wonder what the girls think this is called. Let‘s listen to what 
they say.‖ Children then watched the corresponding video clip in which the interviewer held 
up a picture of an eye and asked the informants, ―Can you tell me what this is called?‖ Each 
informant then labeled the body parts in accordance with the accuracy role she had been 
assigned: accurate, inaccurate, or novel. For instance, in the accurate versus inaccurate 
condition, the accurate informant consistently said the correct label for the body part (e.g., 
―That‘s an eye‖ for a picture of an eye), whereas the inaccurate informant consistently stated 
a clearly incorrect label (e.g., ―That‘s an arm‖). In the accurate versus novel condition, the 
accurate informant labeled the body part correctly and the novel informant offered a novel 
but plausible label (e.g., ―That‘s a roke‖). Finally, in the inaccurate versus novel condition, 
the inaccurate informant incorrectly labeled the body part, whereas the novel informant 
provided an unfamiliar label. Informants‘ labels, according to accuracy role, are shown in 
Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 
Familiarization Trials According to Informants’ Accuracy Role. 
Body part Accurate Informant Inaccurate informant Novel Informant 
Eye That‘s an eye That‘s an arm That‘s a roke 
Foot That‘s a foot That‘s a mouth That‘s a cham 
Nose That‘s a nose That‘s a leg That‘s a dax 
Hand That‘s a hand That‘s an ear That‘s a wug 
 
Before the end of each video clip, once both of the informants had provided different 
labels for the body part, the experimenter paused the clip and reiterated the labels used by the 
informants (e.g., ―The girl wearing the blue shirt said it‘s a nose, and the girl wearing the 
orange shirt said it‘s a leg‖). Children were not asked to choose between the two labels 
provided by the informants so as to allow them to freely interpret the informants‘ input 
without committing to the viability of the labels before the test trials. The next familiarization 
trial, with a different body part, was then presented. The informant who spoke first alternated 
among the four video clips, and the accuracy role assigned to each informant was 
systematically varied across children. 
Test trials. After the four familiarization trials, children were given four test trials 
featuring organs they would have difficulty in identifying. The experimenter introduced the 
test trials by saying, ―Now, you are going to see some pictures of things that are inside the 
body that you might not know the names of.‖ The aim of these test trials was not to test 
whether children could correctly identify these organs but rather to assess whether children 
would make use of the informants‘ previous reliability when learning new information. 
Informants provided novel nonword labels for the organs, as in previous studies (Corriveau et 
al., 2009), so that children could not select an informant based on their recognition of the 
truly correct label. To confirm that children were not able to identify these organs, the 
experimenter presented children with an identical picture of the respective organ at the start 
of each test trial. None of the children correctly identified these organs. In each test trial, 
children were given an ask question and an endorse question. At the end of the four test trials, 
children were asked explicit judgment questions. The questions are described below. 
Ask question. Children were shown a picture of the unfamiliar organ for that trial and 
were asked, ―Do you know what this is called?‖ No child was able to supply the correct label. 
They were then shown a still frame of the two informants and were given the ask question: ―I 
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bet one of these girls can help you. Which girl would you like to ask, the girl in the orange 
shirt or the girl in the blue shirt?‖ However, if children offered their own label for the organ, 
the experimenter said, ―Actually, I don‘t think that‘s what it‘s called,‖ before giving the ask 
question. The order in which each informant was mentioned in the ask question alternated 
between trials. Children‘s verbal responses (e.g., ―The girl in the blue shirt‖) or nonverbal 
responses (e.g., pointing) were recorded.  
Endorse question. Regardless of which informant children selected for the ask 
question, the corresponding test trial video clip was played. The interviewer held up a picture 
of the organ and asked the informants, ―Can you tell me what this is called?‖ The first 
informant offered a novel label (e.g., ―That‘s a slod‖), and the second informant offered a 
different novel label (e.g., ―That‘s a linz‖). The novel labels used in the test trials are shown 
in Table 6.2. Which informant spoke first alternated among the four video clips, and the novel 
labels provided by each informant were counterbalanced across informants‘ accuracy role. 
After each informant provided a label, children were given the endorse question. The 
video clip was paused, showing the two informants and interviewer, and children were asked 
for the label of the organ (e.g., ―The girl in the orange shirt said it‘s a slod, and the girl in the 
blue shirt said it‘s a linz. What would you say?‖). The order in which the informants were 
mentioned in the endorse question was consistent with the order in which they were 
questioned by the interviewer. Children‘s verbal responses (e.g., ―What the girl in orange 
said,‖ ―a slod‖) or nonverbal responses (e.g., pointing) were recorded. 
 
Table 6.2 
Test Trials (Unfamiliar Organs): Novel Labels. 
Organ Novel Label A Novel Label B 
Liver That‘s a slod That‘s a linz 
Pancreas That‘s a mogo That‘s a nevi 
Larynx That‘s a sneg That‘s a hoon 
Gall Bladder That‘s a yiff That‘s a zazz 
 
Explicit judgment questions. Following the four test trials, the experimenter showed 
a still frame of the two informants and asked children three explicit judgment questions about 
the reliability of informants‘ labeling. First, ―Was the girl in the blue shirt very good or not 
very good at saying the names of these things?‖ Second, ―Was the girl in the orange shirt 
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very good or not very good at saying the names of these things?‖ Finally, ―Which girl was 
better at saying the names of these things?‖ The order in which each informant was referred 
to was varied for the first two explicit judgment questions. Children‘s verbal responses (e.g., 
―Very good,‖ ―Not very good,‖ ―The girl in the orange shirt‖) or nonverbal responses (e.g., 
nodding, pointing) were recorded. 
 
Results 
Initial analyses were conducted to examine whether children‘s responses were 
consistent across different question types (ask, endorse, and explicit judgment). Although 
there were some small differences by question type, this initial analysis largely justified the 
creation of overall scores, which have been used previously (Corriveau & Harris, 2009; 
Corriveau et al., 2009). Next, these overall scores were examined by condition and age. 
Finally, children‘s performance for the different question types was examined in detail. 
 
Comparison of Children’s Performance Across Question Types 
As in previous studies (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009), children were given 1 point for an 
appropriate response for every ask question, endorse question, and explicit judgment 
question. In the accurate versus inaccurate and accurate versus novel conditions, selection of 
the accurate informant was considered appropriate. In the inaccurate versus novel condition, 
following predictions, selection of the novel informant was considered appropriate. Totals for 
each question type were created by summing children‘s appropriate responses, resulting in a 
total score from 0 to 4 for ask questions, from 0 to 4 for endorse questions, and from 0 to 3 
for explicit judgment questions. Following Corriveau and colleagues (2009), scores for the 
explicit judgment questions were transformed linearly (multiplied by 4/3) to allow 
meaningful comparison with ask and endorse totals (see Table 6.3).  
A 3 x 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted, with age (3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) and 
condition (accurate vs. inaccurate, accurate vs. novel, inaccurate vs. novel) as between-
subjects variables, and question type (ask, endorse, and explicit judgment) as the within-
subjects variable. A significant main effect was found for question type, F(2, 270) = 4.32, p = 
.014, ηp2 = .03; age, F(2, 135) = 12.90, p = .001, ηp2 = .16; condition, F(2,135) = 10.91, p = 
.001, ηp2 = .14; and the age × condition interaction was also significant, F(4, 135) = 3.00, p = 
.021, ηp2 = .08. Importantly, question type did not interact with age or condition, strongly 
suggesting consistency in children‘s responding. A post-hoc LSD test revealed that children 
provided significantly more appropriate answers on explicit judgment questions than on ask 
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questions (p = .006), which suggests that the explicit judgment questions more strongly 
reflected children‘s sensitivity to informant status. However, all question types performed in 
essentially the same manner (see Table 6.3). Thus, despite children‘s differential sensitivity 
to the questions, a total score was calculated, as is typical in this literature. This permitted a 
further insight into the age x condition interaction, as described in more detail below. 
 
Table 6.3 
Mean Numbers (and Standard Deviations) of Appropriate Responses (Maximum = 4) to 
Question Types as a Function of Age and Condition. 
 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds 
Accurate vs. Inaccurate    
Ask questions      2.69 (0.95)*    2.50 (0.97)
b
 3.31 (0.70)*** 
Endorse questions 2.88 (1.15)** 3.00 (1.03)** 3.19 (0.91)*** 
Explicit judgments
a
 3.08 (1.35)** 3.08 (1.52)* 3.75 (1.00)*** 
Accurate vs. Novel    
Ask questions 1.63 (0.96) 2.56 (0.89)* 2.81 (0.75)** 
Endorse questions 1.75 (0.93) 2.75 (0.93)** 3.13 (0.81)*** 
Explicit judgments 1.50 (1.68) 3.33 (1.46)** 3.42 (1.19)*** 
Inaccurate vs. Novel    
Ask questions 1.94 (1.06) 2.06 (0.93) 2.56 (0.81)* 
Endorse questions 1.94 (0.93) 2.06 (1.24)   2.81 (0.98)** 
Explicit judgments 2.17 (1.53) 2.08 (1.68)      2.58 (1.72) 
Note. Asterisks denote response patterns that are different from chance. 
aExplicit judgment scores (/3) were transformed following Corriveau et al. (2009) by multiplying by 4/3 so that 
they were directly comparable with Ask and Endorse label probes. 
 bp < .06, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Overall Scores 
The total overall score was calculated by summing children‘s appropriate responses 
for ask questions; endorse questions, and the untransformed explicit judgment questions, 
resulting in a maximum score of 11 points. Children‘s overall pattern of responding, total 
overall scores, as a function of condition and age, are shown in Figure 6.1. To explore the age 
x condition interaction discussed above, three separate one-way ANOVAs and post-hoc LSD 
tests were conducted on age differences for each condition. In the accurate vs. inaccurate 
condition, there were no significant differences in children‘s appropriate responses across the 
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different age groups, F(2,45) = 2.45, p = .098. In the accurate vs. novel condition, there was a 
main effect for age, F(2,45) = 13.59, p = .001, ηp2 = .38, with 4- and 5-year-olds providing 
significantly more appropriate responses than 3-year-olds (ps = .001), but not differing from 
each other (p = .407). Finally, in the inaccurate vs. novel condition, the influence of age was 
only marginally significant, F(2,45) = 2.90, p = .066, ηp
2
 = .11. However, follow-up analyses 
showed that 5-year-olds provided significantly more appropriate responses than 3-year-olds 
(p = .034) and marginally more appropriate responses than 4-year-olds (p = .056). Three- and 
4-year-olds did not differ significantly from each other (p = .822).  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Total scores on test trials as a function of condition and age group. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
 
To examine whether children systematically demonstrated overall trust in the 
appropriate informant, total overall scores for appropriate choices were first compared to a 
chance expectation of 5.5 using related samples t-tests. In the accurate vs. inaccurate 
condition, all age groups preferred the accurate informant at a rate above chance: 3-year-olds 
M = 7.88, SD = 2.28, t(15) = 4.17, p = .001, d = 1.04; 4-year-olds M = 7.81, SD = 2.43, t(15) 
= 3.81, p = .002, d = .95; 5-year-olds M = 9.31, SD = 1.74, t(15) = 8.76, p = .001, d = 2.19. 
In the accurate vs. novel condition, 3-year-olds performed at chance, M = 4.50, SD = 2.45, 
t(15) = 1.63, p = .123, whereas the two older age groups preferred the accurate informant at 
above chance levels: 4-year-olds M = 7.81, SD = 2.46, t(15) = 3.77, p = .002, d = .94; 5-year-
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olds M = 8.50, SD = 2.03, t(15) = 5.90, p = .001, d = 1.48. Finally, in the inaccurate vs. novel 
condition, 5-year-olds performed above chance, M = 7.31, SD = 2.54, t(14) = 2.84, p = .012, 
d = .71. However, younger children did not differ from chance: 3-year-olds M = 5.50, SD = 
2.03, t(15) = 0.00, p = 1.00; 4-year-olds M = 5.69, SD = 2.41, t(15) = 0.31, p = .760. 
 
Performance on Ask, Endorse, and Explicit Judgment Questions 
Finally, to further examine how children responded to the separate question types, the 
mean number of appropriate responses to each of the question types, as a function of age and 
condition, is presented in Table 6.3. Using related samples t-tests, means for each question 
type were compared to a chance expectation of 2 (note that the explicit judgment scores were 
transformed, see above).  
All age groups provided significantly more appropriate responses in the accurate vs. 
inaccurate condition across all question types: for 3-year-olds, ask questions, t(15) = 2.91, p = 
.011, d = .73, endorse questions, t(15) = 3.05, p = .008, d = .76, and explicit judgment 
questions, t(15) = 3.20, p = .006, d = .80; for 4-year-olds, ask questions, t(15) = 2.07, p = 
.056, d = .52, endorse questions, t(15) = 3.87, p = .002, d = .97, and explicit judgment 
questions, t(15) = 2.86, p = .012, d = .71; for 5-year-olds, ask questions, t(15) = 7.46, p = 
.001, d = 1.72, endorse questions, t(15) = 5.22, p = .001, d = 1.30, and explicit judgment 
questions, t(15) = 7.00, p = .001, d = 1.75.  
In the accurate vs. novel condition, 4- and 5-year-olds provided significantly more 
appropriate responses across all question types: for 4-year-olds, ask questions, t(15) = 2.52, p 
= .023, d = .63, endorse questions, t(15) = 3.22, p = .006, d = .81, and explicit judgment 
questions, t(15) = 3.65, p = .002, d = .93; for 5-year-olds, ask questions, t(15) = 4.33, p = 
.001, d = .95, endorse questions, t(15) = 5.58, p = .001, d = 1.40, and explicit judgment 
questions, t(15) = 4.76, p = .001, d = 1.19. In contrast, 3-year-olds‘ did not discriminate based 
on informant status across the question types: ask questions, t(15) = 1.57, p = .138, endorse 
questions, t(15) = 1.07, p = .300, and explicit judgment questions, t(15) = 1.19, p = .252.  
Finally, in the inaccurate vs. novel condition, only 5-year-olds provided significantly more 
appropriate responses for the ask questions, t(15) = 2.76, p = .014, d = .69, and endorse 
questions, t(15) = 3.31, p = .005, d = .83, but not for the explicit judgment questions, t(15) = 
1.36, p = .195. Overall, these analyses were largely consistent with the analysis of total 
overall scores.  
It was interesting to note that 5-year-olds consistently selected the appropriate 
informant for the ask questions, endorse questions and explicit judgment questions in the 
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accurate vs. inaccurate and the accurate vs. novel conditions. However, in the inaccurate vs. 
novel condition, although 5-year-olds preferred the appropriate informant for the ask and 
endorse questions, their selection of the appropriate informant for the explicit judgment 
questions did not reach significance. To put this difference in perspective, for the three 
explicit judgments considered simultaneously, 94% of 5-year-olds‘ decisions (transformed M 
= 3.75) favored the accurate informant over the inaccurate informant, and 86% (transformed 
M = 3.42) favored the accurate informant over the novel informant. By contrast, only 65% 
(transformed M = 2.58) favored the novel informant over the inaccurate informant, despite 
the fact that 5-year-olds significantly preferred the novel informant for the ask and endorse 
questions. 
 
Discussion 
There were two main aims of this study. First, we sought to establish whether 3-, 4-, 
and 5-year-olds apply the same epistemic strategies in the biological domain as they do for 
artifacts when evaluating the trustworthiness of accurate informants compared with 
inaccurate informants. Second, we investigated children‘s selective trust in informants who 
provide novel labels for familiar objects when compared with informants who provide 
accurate or inaccurate labels. The novel informant was introduced to examine how children 
construe a speaker who is helpful, in the sense that she provides an actual label, even though 
the label itself cannot be verified as correct or incorrect. 
With respect to the first prediction, all age groups preferred the accurate informant 
over the inaccurate informant, thereby strongly replicating previous findings (Corriveau et al., 
2009; Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005) despite profound differences in the 
epistemic domain of interest as well as minor differences in procedure (i.e., children were not 
asked to choose between the informants‘ labels during familiarization trials). This finding is 
important because it confirms that children‘s sensitivity to the accuracy of information is not 
domain specific and extends to body knowledge for which children must integrate 
information about observable and unobservable objects (and processes) into their self-
knowledge. Children‘s ability to evaluate the trustworthiness of the informants who provided 
labels for body parts also sits comfortably with their rapidly developing body knowledge at 
this age (Jaakkola & Slaughter, 2002). 
The second prediction was that 4- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, would trust 
the accurate informant over the novel informant, a hypothesis that was fully supported. The 
4- and 5-year-olds‘ preferences for the accurate informant in both the accurate versus 
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inaccurate and accurate versus novel conditions lend support to the idea that from 4 years of 
age, children use a more advanced strategy than 3-year-olds, such that they give greater 
credence to informants who provide accurate information rather than simply discredit 
informants who are inaccurate. In contrast, 3-year-olds showed no differential preference 
between the accurate and novel informants. This finding supports the existing view that 
children under 4 years of age employ an inaccuracy strategy, such that they presume an 
informant is trustworthy unless that informant has made an error (Corriveau et al., 2009; 
Pasquini et al., 2007). 
The third prediction was that all children would prefer the informant who had 
provided novel labels over the informant who had provided blatantly incorrect labels. 
Contrary to this expectation, only 5-year-olds showed a systematic preference for the novel 
labeler. Given the parity between 4- and 5-year-olds in previous trust in testimony research, 
as well as in the first two conditions of the current study, this difference alerts us to a possible 
developmental transition between 4 and 5 years of age. Furthermore, it alerts us to the fact 
that the assumptions made in the Introduction concerning children‘s willingness to entertain 
information from a novel labeler may be mistaken. There are various possible interpretations 
that can be put forward to explain this unexpected age change. However, here we outline only 
the most straightforward explanation for children‘s changing construal of the novel 
informant, that is, the finding that 5-year-olds, but not 3- or 4-year-olds, were able to properly 
evaluate the trustworthiness of the novel informant. The overall performance of 3- and 4-
year-olds is first considered below before we consider the implications of 5-year-olds‘ pattern 
of results. 
The failure of 3-year-olds to differentiate between the novel and inaccurate 
informants was surprising in light of (a) their systematic preference for the accurate labeler 
over the inaccurate labeler and (b) their failure to differentiate between the accurate and novel 
labelers. However, 3-year-olds‘ failure to differentiate the novel informant from either the 
accurate or inaccurate informant could be indicative of difficulties the youngest age group 
had in interpreting the behavior of the novel informant. In other words, 3-year-olds may be 
sensitive to inaccuracy, but only when it is presented alongside an accurate labeler (or a 
neutral labeler; see Corriveau et al., 2009; Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). When presented with an 
accurate labeler and an inaccurate labeler, they characterize the inaccurate labeler as 
unreliable. However, in the absence of that contrast (i.e., as in the inaccurate vs. novel and 
accurate vs. novel conditions), they make no determinate response. Hence, on this view, 3-
year-olds are indeed alert to inaccuracy, but only under quite restricted conditions, namely, 
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when it occurs alongside accuracy. In the case of 4-year-olds‘ performance, their preference 
for the accurate informant in the accurate versus novel condition can be explained in terms of 
the greater emphasis they place on informants who provide accurate information. That is, 
rather than take accuracy for granted like 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds strengthened their trust in 
the accurate informant and regarded her as more trustworthy than the novel informant. In 
contrast, in the inaccurate versus novel condition, where no accurate source of information 
was available, 4-year-olds, like 3-year-olds, may have become unsure and, hence, did not 
differentiate between informants. 
Regarding 5-year-olds‘ performance in the inaccurate versus novel condition, their 
preference for the novel labeler stood in marked contrast to the behavior of younger children. 
Our results suggest that 5-year-olds treated the novel informant as significantly more credible 
than the inaccurate informant. A plausible interpretation of this finding is that, because 
children‘s biological knowledge increases rapidly at this age, 5-year-olds were more open to 
the possibility that biological objects possess more than one label. Markman and Wachtel 
(1988) observed that, at some stage, children eventually need to violate the assumption of 
mutual exclusivity in order to use multiple labels for objects. Furthermore, O‘Neill (2005) 
suggested that children‘s ability to assess new information and to compare it with information 
that they already know should depend on their understanding of their own mind and others‘ 
minds—their theory of mind. Specifically, 5-year-olds, having a more nuanced or developed 
theory of mind than the younger children, may have been open to the possibility that the 
novel informant knew something they did not know and, hence, was providing them with 
information that was relevant and at least potentially credible. It is interesting to note that one 
5-year-old spontaneously said that the novel informant was ―like a scientist, and she‘s very 
clever.‖ By implication, this child credited the novel informant with knowledge that she 
lacked. However, it is important to note that although 5-year-olds were willing to seek and 
endorse the labels provided by the novel informant, they held back from favoring the novel 
informant when asked to explicitly judge whether she was ―very good‖ or ―better‖ at 
providing the labels for the objects. In other words, 5-year-olds were still wary of placing 
their entire trust in the novel informant‘s testimony. 
This study is a first attempt to examine whether children are willing to learn from 
informants who provide new and unfamiliar labels in comparison with informants who offer 
labels that children strongly know to be either accurate or inaccurate. As discussed above, 5-
year-olds were more systematic in their interpretations of the novel informant than their 
younger counterparts. Questions still remain about how younger children construed the novel 
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informant. Nevertheless, this study paves the way for further research to be conducted. For 
example, 4- and 5-year-olds‘ preference for the novel informant differed according to 
whether she had been paired with an accurate informant or an inaccurate informant. In 
contrast, 3-year-olds‘ trust in the novel informant was similar irrespective of the informant 
with whom she was paired. These results suggest that there may be emerging context effects, 
namely, the role of the contrasting informant. To explore these effects, in a future study, 
children could be initially familiarized with the novel informant, who is paired with either an 
accurate or inaccurate informant. In subsequent test trials, the novel informant could then be 
paired with a new informant whose reliability is completely unknown. The findings of such a 
study would demonstrate whether children selectively trust or distrust the novel informant in 
comparison with the new informant and whether their trust is tempered by the context in 
which she is presented (i.e., the familiarization trials). Future research could also use a single 
informant paradigm in which children decide whether to trust the information provided by a 
sole novel informant. Other research avenues could include contrasting the novel informant 
with different types of informants (e.g., neutral, knowledge able, ignorant) to clarify how 
children view the novel informant in light of sources they already know to be reliable or 
unreliable. 
Overall, surveying the performance of the three age groups, it is clear that there were 
profound developmental changes in children‘s construal of the various informants, and these 
differences extend to the comparison between 4- and 5-year-olds when the novel informant 
was introduced. The extant literature on children‘s trust in testimony suggests that there is a 
fundamental shift in children‘s emphasis on accuracy and inaccuracy between 3 and 4 years 
of age, but much less attention has been given to the differences between 4- and 5-year-olds. 
Our results strongly suggest that 5-year-olds are better able to simultaneously consider the 
implications of both accuracy and inaccuracy than their 4-year-old counterparts, and it may 
be for this reason that they are more open to the new information provided by the novel 
informant. At the very least, it is clear that the novel informant is construed differently by 
each age group and is seen as informative by older children. Nevertheless, it remains possible 
that younger children could use explanations and other markers of plausibility (e.g., 
confidence, expertise) when evaluating the credibility of informants presenting new 
information. For example, Jaswal (2004) showed that 3- and 4-year-olds were more accepting 
of an unexpected label for a picture of a hybrid animal, which more closely resembled a cat 
than a dog, when a speaker signaled that the use of the label was deliberate by saying, 
―You‘re not going to believe this, but this is actually a dog,‖ rather than when the speaker 
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simply stated, ―This is a dog.‖ In the current study, the novel informant was presented 
without any other contextual information, and yet 5-year-olds were still receptive to the 
informant‘s credibility. Such receptivity might extend downward if the novel informant were 
to provide a justification for why a different (unfamiliar) label was used instead of the 
accurate label. Indeed, 5-year-olds might even explicitly judge the justified novel informant 
to be ―very good‖ or ―better‖ at providing information under such conditions, a possibility 
that could be directly tested. 
In conclusion, the results of this study show that children‘s monitoring of the accuracy 
of information is not exclusive to highly observable artifacts. Children apply the same 
epistemic principles when observing accurate and inaccurate labelers of objects from 
domains that consist of largely unobservable entities (i.e., body parts and organs). 
Furthermore, it appears that it is not until 5 years of age that children reliably trust informants 
who provide new and unfamiliar labels for objects for which they possess prior knowledge. 
That is, 5-year-olds begin to grasp the notion that people who offer new information are more 
trustworthy than those who offer blatantly incorrect information, and they will seek and 
endorse new information from such informants. At the same time, 5-year-olds continue to 
exhibit a degree of caution; they do not judge such informants as being more competent at 
providing the information. 
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Chapter 7 
Study 3A and 3B 
 
The results of Chapter 6 show that, using the traditional paradigms, children‘s 
epistemic trust extends to the biological domain. Hence, the subsequent studies presented in 
this thesis sought to establish the extent to which children‘s scepticism extends to 
explanations about objects of the human body. In keeping with the points raised in Chapter 3, 
I examined explanatory depth as a cue to an informant‘s (accuracy-independent) competence 
in the following study given that children receive testimony that extends beyond labels for 
objects. There has been some research into children‘s sensitivity to different types of 
explanations. For instance, Baum et al. (2008) investigated children‘s evaluations of 
explanations that were either circular or non-circular, and found that children by the age of 
five or six demonstrate a preference, albeit fragile, for non-circular explanations over circular 
explanations, which suggests that children have some capacity to monitor and evaluate the 
quality of explanations. 
In relation to the human body and children‘s developing naive biology, Morris et al. 
(2000) investigated children‘s preferences for certain types of causal explanations for specific 
bodily processes, and found that five-year-olds preferred vitalistic explanations (e.g., 
―Because our chest takes in energy from the air we breathe‖), over a physiological 
explanation (e.g., ―Because our lungs take in oxygen and change it into carbon dioxide that 
we have no use for‖) and an intentional explanation (e.g., ―Because we want to make 
ourselves feel fresh again‖). However, no studies to date have directly examined how 
children evaluate explanations about body parts and organs which are obvious (e.g., external 
observable features), when compared to deeper functional explanations (e.g., internal 
functions). 
In one study, which featured an internal-external distinction, Sobel and Corriveau 
(2010) showed that children from the age of four prefer learning labels from informants who 
are knowledgeable of objects‘ internal, rather than external, properties. In other words, 
children recognise the distinction between internal and external properties, and they consider 
informants who know about internal properties of objects to know more than informants who 
know about external properties. Such findings can be treated analogously to the internal-
external distinction of the human body. For example, children‘s knowledge of the function 
and location of various organs increases between the ages of four and eight (Jaakkola & 
Slaughter, 2002). In Study 1 (presented in Chapter 5), four- and five-year-olds were very 
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skilled at identifying external body parts and explaining their respective functions. In 
addition, several four- and five-year-olds made references to the core or peripheral functions 
of internal organs, which highlights their developing awareness of internal bodily processes: 
brain (n = 14), heart (n = 10), lungs (n = 7), stomach (n = 4), and kidney (n = 4). For instance, 
children referred to the brain as being ―for thinking‖, the heart as being ―for pumping the 
blood‖, and the lungs as being ―for breathing‖. In summary, children may consider 
informants who offer additional information about internal processes of organs to be more 
trustworthy than informants who offer only obvious information. Certainly, as adults, we 
could conceive of an informant who offers functional explanations about the inner workings 
of the eye (or any other artifact for that matter) to be more knowledgeable than an informant 
who can only talk about external and observable characteristics (e.g., colour, parts). 
In contrast to the typical design of existing studies, Study 3A omitted the initial four 
familiarisation trials. These trials were removed because the goal of the study was not to 
present children with informants who differed in the accuracy by which they labelled objects, 
but to examine whether children are aware of different types of explanations. In addition, it 
would be difficult for the informants to provide information about the functions of organs 
without making reference to what they were called, and it is possible that omitting their labels 
could be construed as a sign of ignorance by children. In the four test trials, informants 
provided different novel labels and additional information about internal organs which 
children would not be familiar with (i.e., pancreas, gall bladder, liver, larynx). At the end of 
each test trial, children were asked whose label they would endorse. There were two types of 
functional explanations; one that concerned the workings of the organ and its relevant 
processes (process-oriented), and one that concerned the ―purposeful design‖ of the organ 
(teleology-oriented). The process-oriented and the teleology-oriented informants, who both 
provide functional explanations, were contrasted with a surface informant who provided 
obvious descriptions of the organ's outer characteristics. Based on Chouinard (2007), the 
surface informant provided descriptions of appearance (e.g., colour), property (e.g., 
smoothness, hardness), parts, and number. The two functional explanation types were 
presented to different subjects (between-groups) and they were contrasted with the same 
surface descriptions. Stimuli are shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
The process-oriented explanations were made up of a function (e.g., ―That part of the 
body makes energy‖) and a statement of the process that accompanies the function (e.g., ―It 
sends out a message that tells your body to turn the food you eat into energy when you are 
moving around‖). Such explanations were built upon the findings of Chouinard (2007), in 
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which children are more likely to seek information about the functions and activities of 
objects rather than information about external observable properties. Further, as shown in 
Study 1 (Chapter 5), children frequently made references to the core or peripheral functions 
of body parts and organs when asked, "what do you use your X [body part/organ] for?" 
In contrast, the teleology-oriented explanations were made up of a state which the 
body is striving for (e.g., ―When you want to keep moving, your body needs to get energy 
from the food you eat‖) and a statement of the organ's function that allows the body to reach 
its target state (e.g., ―That part of the body is for getting energy‖). The teleology-oriented 
explanations were devised based on the work of several researchers. For example, Jaakkola 
and Slaughter (2002) investigated children's teleological reasoning with respect to the 
biological goal of life and found that, between the ages of four and six, children make 
reference to the importance of bodily functions in maintaining life. Indeed, as found in Study 
1, some of the four- and five-year-olds referred to the function of particular organs (e.g., 
brain, heart) as being for keeping a person alive. Further, Kelemen (1999a) showed that four- 
and five-year-olds, and adults, tended to view body parts and artifacts in teleological terms; 
that the entity is for X because they are designed to do X. Finally, in Keil (1992), five- to 
seven-year-olds preferred teleological explanations (e.g., plants are green "because it is better 
for plants to be green and it helps there be more plants") over mechanical explanations (e.g., 
"there are little tiny parts in plants that when mixed together give them a green colour"). 
In accordance with existing studies of selective trust, children were asked to endorse 
one of the novel labels provided by the informants (e.g., ―The girl in the orange shirt said it‘s 
a slod and the girl in the orange shirt said it‘s a linz. What would you say?‖). At the end of 
the four endorse trials, children were asked three explicit judgement questions. These 
questions deviate from those used in the existing selective trust research as they asked 
children to judge which informant was "very good", "not very good" and "better" at ―talking 
about these things‖, rather than ―saying the names of these things‖. The questions were asked 
in this way to pick up on children‘s sensitivity to the competence of the informants. For 
instance, it is possible that children may fail to differentiate between informants when 
required to endorse novel labels. However, they may discriminate between informants when 
judging who is "very good" or "not very good" at providing information about the organs. A 
justification question (after the explicit judgement questions) also probed why children chose 
a particular informant as being "better" at talking about the organs. It was hoped that this 
would allow children to comment on the informants' underlying knowledge or ability. 
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Therefore, Study 3A assessed how children differentially trust informants on the basis 
of explanation type as a function of age. There were two independent variables: Age (four- or 
five-year-olds) and type of contrast for explanatory depth (i.e., Condition: process-oriented 
vs. surface OR teleology-oriented vs. surface). Four- and five-year-olds were tested in Study 
3A given the verbally demanding nature of the task and the possibility that there is a 
developmental transition between these ages. The two dependent variables were: (1) number 
of test trials in which children endorsed the novel label provided by the functional informant, 
and (2) number of times children judged the functional informant as being "very good" and 
"better". It was predicted that children would be more likely to endorse the informant who 
provided functional explanations over the informant who provided surface explanations, as 
well as judge the functional informant to be a better source of information. 
In addition, I also looked at individual differences in children‘s verbal ability and their 
theory of mind (ToM). My rational for doing this was simple. First, given the focus on 
explanations, which are syntactically and semantically much more demanding than labels, I 
thought that verbal ability might relate to trust (i.e., verbally more competent children are 
better able to evaluate the different explanation types) even if age did not. Second, and this 
was a long shot, I thought that children with better ToM might be more switched on to the 
intent of their interlocutor. So this is more than verbal ability per se, ToM here is used to 
assess the extent to which children are evaluating the purpose of their interlocutor‘s 
communicative efforts. Previous research has investigated the relation between children‘s 
ToM and selective trust (Diyanni et al., 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Pasquini et al., 2007), 
but such studies have yet to establish definitive links. 
 
Method – Study 3A 
 
Participants 
Participants were 64 children (32 girls) in two age groups: four-year-olds (M = 53.59, 
SD = 3.36, Range = 48-59), and five-year-olds (M = 63.44, SD = 3.37, Range = 60-71). All 
children lived in the metropolitan area and spoke fluent English. Most children were 
Caucasian, although a range of ethnicities was represented. Children were recruited via 
parental invitation and tested individually in a quiet room in their school. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
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Selective trust. Stimuli were presented as video clips on a laptop. There were four 
test trial video clips. In each clip, two female informants (wearing either an orange or blue 
shirt) sat on either side of a table and a male interviewer (wearing a black shirt) stood 
between them. The interviewer held up, at chest height, a white A3-sized sheet of cardboard 
with a colored picture of an organ printed on it. The order of organs presented was the same 
for all children. 
 Introduction to the task.  The experimenter introduced the task, by saying, ―We‘re 
going to learn some things about the body today. Look at this [picture book]. Did you know 
that there are bones inside your body? Have a look here. There are other things inside your 
body. Here are your lungs. Do you know where your lungs are? How about your stomach? 
Etc. Okay, let‘s put this book away. We‘re going to play a little game on the laptop about the 
body. The game looks something like this [show still frame]. First, we‘re going to meet these 
three people. Do you see them? The boy in the black shirt is going to hold up some pictures. 
Then, this girl in the orange shirt and this girl in the blue shirt are going to tell you what they 
know about the things in the pictures. The pictures are going to be things that are inside your 
body. It‘s okay if you don‘t know what some of these things are; that‘s what we are going to 
learn about today. I want you to listen very carefully and then I‘m going to ask you some 
questions. Are you ready?‖ 
 Endorse questions.  At the beginning of each test trial, children were shown an 
unfamiliar organ and asked, ―Do you know what this is called?‖ If they responded with 
something other than no, the experimenter said, ―Actually, I don‘t think that‘s what it is 
called‖. Then: "I bet these girls can help us. Let‘s listen to what the girls say." In the video 
clip, the male interviewer stated, "Can you tell me what you know about this?" and the 
informants responded (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2 for stimuli). After each test trial, children were 
asked:  ―The girl in the blue shirt said it‘s a ___, and the girl in the orange shirt said it‘s a 
___. What would you say?‖ 
 Explicit judgement questions.  After all test trials, the experimenter asked three 
explicit judgement questions. The order in which the informants were referred to in the first 
two questions was counterbalanced. The questions were: (1) ―Was the girl in the orange shirt 
very good or not very good at talking about these things?‖, (2)―Was the girl in the blue shirt 
very good or not very good at talking about these things?‖, and (3) ―Which girl was better at 
talking about these things?‖ 
 Justification question.  At the end of the study, children were asked, ―Why did you 
say the girl in the [blue/orange] shirt was better at talking about these things?‖ 
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Table 7.1 
Test Trials in the Processes-Oriented Condition. 
Organ Process-Oriented Informant Surface Informant 
Pancreas That‘s a slod. That part of the body 
makes energy. It sends out a message that 
tells your body to turn the food you eat 
into energy when you are moving 
around. 
That‘s a linz. It has a long lumpy 
yellow part and green lines going 
through it. There is a long pink tube at 
the front and it curls around. 
Larynx That‘s a yiff. That part of the body traps 
air to make noise. It opens up to let air 
pass through and helps you talk when air 
gets trapped inside. 
That‘s a zazz. It has three yellow plates 
at the top and many blue discs near the 
bottom. The white parts are bones and 
they make it hard. 
Gall Bladder That‘s a mogo. That part of the body 
breaks down the fat that is in some of the 
foods you eat, like junk foods. It makes 
special stuff that mixes with the fat and 
breaks it into smaller pieces. 
That‘s a nevi. It is a small green thing 
that is inside your body. There is a 
smooth round shape at the top and it is 
joined to two long green skinny tubes at 
the bottom. 
Liver That‘s a tark. That part of the body 
makes new blood. It takes the old blood, 
breaks it up and uses the parts to make 
new blood. 
That‘s a chab. It has two red parts and 
the part on the left is bigger. There is a 
pink string in the middle and a blue hole 
at the top. 
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Table 7.2 
Test Trials in the Teleology-Oriented Condition. 
Organ Teleology-Oriented Informant Surface Informant 
Pancreas That‘s a slod. When you want to keep 
moving, your body needs to get energy 
from the food you eat. That part of the 
body is for getting energy. 
That‘s a linz. It has a long lumpy 
yellow part and green lines going 
through it. There is a long pink tube at 
the front and it curls around. 
Larynx That‘s a yiff. When you have something 
to say, your body needs to make sound. 
That part of the body is for making sound 
and talking. 
That‘s a zazz. It has three yellow plates 
at the top and many blue discs near the 
bottom. The white parts are bones and 
they make it hard. 
Gall Bladder That‘s a mogo. When you want to stay 
healthy, your body needs to break down 
the fat that is in some of the foods you 
eat, like junk foods. That part of the body 
is for breaking down fat. 
That‘s a nevi. It is a small green thing 
that is inside your body. There is a 
smooth round shape at the top and it is 
joined to two long green skinny tubes at 
the bottom. 
Liver That‘s a tark. When you don't have 
enough blood inside, your body needs to 
make more blood. That part of the body 
is for making new blood. 
That‘s a chab. It has two red parts and 
the part on the left is bigger. There is a 
pink string in the middle and a blue hole 
at the top.  
 
Verbal Ability and Theory of Mind 
Verbal ability. Verbal ability was assessed using the WPPSI-III information, 
vocabulary and word reasoning subtests. In the information subtest, children were asked 
various general knowledge questions (e.g., ―How many legs does a bird have?‖ or ―How 
many days make a week?‖). In the vocabulary subtest, children were asked to define or 
describe given words (e.g., ―What is a train?‖ or ―What does swing mean?‖) Finally, in the 
word reasoning subtest, children listened to a series of clues about an object and were 
required to guess what the object was (e.g., ―This is something you chew... and it can make 
bubbles‖). In each subtest, the questions became progressively more difficult. Verbal ability 
was scored by adding each correct response and creating a raw score for each subtest. Each 
raw score was then standardized and then added to create a total standardized verbal ability 
score. 
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Theory-of-mind tasks. Children‘s ToM was assessed using three tasks: (1) a first-
order reasoning unexpected contents task, (2) a first-order reasoning unexpected transfer task, 
(3) a first-order reasoning unexpected transfer task, with a second-order false belief question. 
All tasks were presented in a storybook format with coloured pictures. The script and pictures 
used for these ToM tasks are presented in Appendix E. 
In Task (1), children were shown a box of Pringles which, unexpectedly, held crayons 
inside. After being introduced to a protagonist (Lily), children were asked a false belief 
question, ―Lily has never seen inside this box of Pringles before. What does Lily think is 
inside the box?‖ and a memory question, ―What‘s really inside the box?‖ Children were 
scored as passing this task if they were able to correctly answer the false belief question (i.e., 
―chips/Pringles‖) and the memory question (i.e., ―crayons‖). 
In Task (2), children were introduced to a boy (Luke) who had initially placed his ball 
inside a pink box. While Luke is absent, another boy (Sean) moves the ball from the pink box 
to a blue box. After being told that Luke returns for his ball, children were asked a false belief 
question, ―Where will Luke look for his ball?‖ and a memory question, ―Where is the ball 
really?‖ Children were scored as passing this task if they were able to correctly answer the 
false belief question (i.e., ―pink box‖) and the memory question (i.e., ―blue box‖). 
In Task (3), children were introduced to two siblings (Mary and Simon), who were 
told by their father to place a bar of chocolate in the fridge. While Mary is absent, Simon 
decides to keep the chocolate for himself and hides the chocolate in his bag. Children were 
first given the first-order reasoning component of this task, in the form of a false belief 
question, ―Where does Mary think the chocolate is?‖ and a memory question, ―Where has 
Simon really put the chocolate?‖ Children were scored as passing this task if they were able 
to correctly answer the false belief question (i.e., ―fridge‖) and the memory question (i.e., 
―bag‖). It was subsequently revealed to children that Mary was playing by the kitchen 
window and had witnessed Simon hiding the chocolate in his bag. Children were then given 
the second-order reasoning component of this task, in the form of a false belief question, 
―Where does Simon think Mary will look for the chocolate?‖ and a memory question, ―Where 
was the chocolate first of all?‖ Children were scored as passing this task if they were able to 
correctly answer the false belief question (i.e., ―fridge‖) and the memory question (i.e., 
―bag‖). 
From these tasks, two separate ToM scores were derived: a first-order reasoning score 
with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 3, created by adding up the number of first-order 
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reasoning tasks passed; and a second-order reasoning score with a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 1, based on whether children passed the second-order reasoning task. 
 
Results 
Results will be presented in the following order. First, children‘s responses in the 
selective trust paradigm as a function of age are described. Second, relations between 
children‘s selective trust and ToM are outlined. Finally, differences in children‘s selective 
trust based on level of ToM understanding are further elaborated. 
 
Children’s Selective Trust as a Function of Age 
Children were given a point for an appropriate response in each endorse trial and 
explicit judgement question: i.e., selection of the informant who provided functional 
explanations was considered to be appropriate. Separate total scores were created by 
summing children‘s appropriate responses, resulting in a total score from 0-4 for endorse 
trials, and 0-3 for explicit judgement questions. To allow meaningful comparison with 
endorse totals, scores for the explicit judgement questions were linearly transformed (i.e., 
multiplied by 4/3). An overall total score was also created by summing the endorse total and 
the (transformed) explicit judgement total, resulting in a total score from 0-8. 
Table 7.3 presents the mean number of appropriate responses to each of the question 
types, as well as total scores, as a function of age and condition. Using related samples t-tests, 
means for the endorse trials and explicit judgement trials were compared to a chance 
expectation of 2, and means for the overall total score was compared to a chance expectation 
of 4. 
Analyses revealed that children‘s selective trust for each age group did not 
significantly differ from chance for any of the endorse trials and explicit judgement 
questions, nor for the overall total scores. The only exceptions were two marginally 
significant results. In the teleology vs. surface condition, five-year-olds tended prefer the 
surface informant for the explicit judgement questions, t(15) = 2.00, p = .064, and the overall 
total, t(15) = 2.10, p = .054. 
 
97 
Table 7.3 
Mean Number (and SD) of Appropriate Responses to Question Types, and Total Scores, as a 
Function of Age and Condition. 
 4-year-olds (n = 32) 5-year-olds (n = 32) 
Process vs. Surface   
Endorse trials (/4) 1.69 (1.40) 2.06 (1.18) 
Explicit judgements (/4) 1.83 (1.81) 1.58 (1.63) 
Overall Total (/8) 3.52 (2.99) 3.65 (2.41) 
Teleology vs. Surface   
Endorse trials (/4) 2.38 (1.02) 1.56 (1.09) 
Explicit judgements (/4) 2.25 (1.87) 1.25 (1.50)a 
Overall Total (/8) 4.63 (2.44) 2.81 (2.27)b 
a p = .064 b p = .054 
 
 A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with age (four- and five-year-olds) and 
condition (process vs. surface and teleology vs. surface) as between-subjects variables, and 
question type (endorse trials and explicit judgement questions) as the within-subjects 
variable. No significant main effects or interactions were found (all ps > .05), indicating that 
children‘s selective trust did not differ across the three age groups, conditions, and question 
types. 
Given the parity in performance between the process vs. surface and teleology vs. 
surface conditions, children‘s responses were collapsed across conditions, such that higher 
scores indicate greater preferences for the functional informant. By doing so, statistical power 
was also increased, which assisted in the analysis of children‘s selective trust based on their 
verbal ability and ToM performance. These analyses are detailed in the next sections. 
 
Correlations Between Children’s Selective Trust, Verbal Ability, and ToM 
Correlations between children‘s selective trust, ToM (first-order and second-order 
reasoning scores) and verbal ability are presented in Table 7.4. There were no indications that 
children‘s selective trust was related to verbal ability. However, there was a modest relation 
between children‘s first-order false belief reasoning and their tendency to endorse, across the 
whole sample (r = .255, N = 64, p < .05). Specifically, children who performed better on the 
first-order ToM tasks tended to select the appropriate informant in the endorse trials; that is, 
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the functional informant. In the next section, we look at this result more closely, specifically 
focussing on age.  
 
Table 7.4 
Correlations Between Children’s Selective Trust, ToM and Verbal Ability. 
 Endorse 
trials 
Explicit 
judgements 
Overall 
total 
Verbal 
Ability 
1st-order 
false belief 
2nd-order 
false belief 
Endorse trials 1 .542** .867** .054 .255* -.046 
Explicit judgements  1 .886** -.014 .095 -.139 
Overall total   1 .021 .193 -.099 
Verbal Ability    1 .392** .233 
1st-order false belief     1 .365** 
2nd-order false belief      1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).  
 
Children’s Selective Trust as a Function of ToM Performance 
Children were classified into two groups according to their performance on the first-
order reasoning tasks: those who successfully passed all tasks, and those who did not pass all 
tasks. Table 7.5 outlines children‘s selective trust according to their performance on the ToM 
tasks, collapsed across conditions.  
 
Table 7.5 
Mean Number (and SD) of Appropriate Responses to Question Types, and Total Scores, as a 
Function of Age and ToM performance. 
 Did not pass 
all ToM tasks 
Successfully passed 
all ToM Tasks 
Four-year-olds n = 25 n = 7 
Endorse trials (/4) 2.04 (1.27) 2.00 (1.29) 
Explicit judgements (/4) 2.19 (1.80) 1.52 (1.95) 
Overall total (/8) 4.23 (2.71) 3.52 (3.01) 
Five-year-olds n = 20 n = 12 
Endorse trials (/4) 1.35 (1.04)* 2.58 (0.90)* 
Explicit judgements (/4) 1.07 (1.41)** 2.00 (1.66) 
Overall total (/8) 2.42 (2.19)** 4.58 (1.98) 
Note. Asterisks denote response patterns that are different from chance * p < .05 ** p < .01 
99 
Using related samples t-tests, means for the endorse trials and explicit judgement 
trials were compared to a chance expectation of 2, and means for the overall total score was 
compared to a chance expectation of 4. It was found that five-year-olds who successfully 
passed all ToM tasks endorsed the functional informant at a rate significantly above chance, 
t(11) = 2.24, p = .046. On the other hand, five-year-olds who did not pass all ToM tasks were 
significantly below chance in their endorsement of the functional informant, t(19) = 2.80, p = 
.012, their explicit judgements of the functional informant as being a better source of 
information, t(19) = 2.96, p = .008, as well as their overall total scores, t(19) = 4.58, p = .004. 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine whether children‘s 
endorsements, explicit judgements and overall totals differed as a function of success on first-
order ToM tasks (did not pass vs. passed all). For four-year-olds, analyses revealed no 
significant results, indicating that their selective trust in the informants did not differ 
according to ToM. However, for five-year-olds, selective trust significantly differed 
depending on ToM for endorse trials, t(30) = 3.40, p = .002, and for overall totals, t(30) = 
2.80, p = .009. In other words, five-year-olds who were more skilled at ToM were more 
likely to trust the informant who provided functional explanations. Post-hoc analyses showed 
that this was true in both conditions. However, there was not enough power to look at them 
separately. To sum, it appears that five-year-olds who are highly skilled in ToM are more 
likely to trust an informant who provides functional explanations. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine whether four- and five-year-olds differentiate 
between informants who offer explanations that differ in explanatory depth. It was 
anticipated that children would be more likely to trust an informant who provided functional 
explanations about organs, rather than an informant who provided only obvious descriptions 
of observable characteristics. Overall, this core manipulation was largely unsuccessful. Four- 
and five-year-olds do not differentially trust informants who differ in level of explanatory 
depth when it comes to information provided about internal organs. That is, children do not 
consider functional explanations, whether process- or teleology-oriented, to be more 
informative than surface descriptions. Several reasons are put forward to explain why this 
manipulation did not work, as well as alternative approaches. 
First, it is possible that the information offered by the informants is too detailed and 
complex for children to monitor and understand. In contrast to previous studies on children‘s 
selective trust, which feature one-word labels or very brief descriptions (e.g., object 
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functions), both informants in this study gave lengthy descriptions/explanations. It is 
possible, therefore, that children perhaps had difficulty attending to the differential 
explanatory depth of the informants because they were unable to adequately process the large 
amount of information. However, such an explanation is unlikely because children‘s verbal 
mental ability was assessed and no relations were found between verbal mental ability and 
selective trust. Nevertheless, it is possible that older children (e.g., eight-year-olds) need to be 
tested to examine whether they are better able to differentiate between the information 
offered by the informants. This possibility is explored in Study 3B, presented in the next 
section. 
Second, children‘s inability to differentiate between informants may be due to the 
complexity of the domain of biological knowledge. As mentioned earlier, children‘s 
knowledge of the body increases markedly between the ages of four and eight (Jaakkola & 
Slaughter, 2002). However, in terms of functional explanations, internal organs are usually 
described in terms of what they do rather than how people use them. For example, it is more 
appropriate to say that the heart ―beats and pumps blood around the body‖, rather than to say 
that ―you use your heart to beat and pump blood around the body‖.  In contrast, functional 
information provided about common artifacts tend to be explained in terms of how people use 
them (e.g., ―you use a hammer to drive nails into wood‖) rather than what they do without 
reference to an agent‘s act upon the artifact (e.g., ―hammers drive nails into wood‖ sounds 
less suitable). In this study, it may have been difficult for children to conceptualise organs as 
performing the activities mentioned because the explanations were largely about what they 
do. To address this potential issue, a follow-up study could present novel objects (i.e., 
artifacts, as done in existing literature) and informants who offer information which differs in 
explanatory depth; in particular, the functional informant would describe how people use the 
artifact. It is possible that children may be better able to judge which informant provides 
adequate explanations for objects when it is framed in terms of its intended use by people, 
rather than when it is framed in terms of what they do. 
Finally, children may have been unable to differentiate between informants because 
they were perplexed by the unfamiliar internal organs presented. In this study, none of the 
children could correctly identify any of the internal organs. As a result of their lack of 
knowledge, they may have been more inclined to select the novel label which they thought 
sounded more right for the organ presented, rather than attend to the differential explanatory 
depth in the additional information presented. Under this interpretation, it is also possible that 
the trend for five-year-olds to prefer the labels provided by the surface informant was because 
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they were better able to verify the claims of the surface informant, since her claims matched 
the picture of the unfamiliar organs presented, whereas the claims of the functional informant 
did not. Therefore, to rectify this issue of unfamiliarity, it may be necessary to re-introduce 
the familiarisation trials, featuring familiar body parts (e.g., eye, hand). In doing so, children 
may be better able to attend to different levels of explanations because they possess the pre-
existing knowledge to evaluate what informants say about the body parts. For example, they 
may consider an informant who talks about what the eye is used for and does as being more 
informative than an informant who simply describes the outward appearance of the eye. 
Interestingly, the functions of external body parts are often described in terms of how people 
use them, rather than what they do (e.g., you use your hand for touching, your feet for 
walking), so children may be better able to differentiate between functional and surface 
informants if explanations are framed in terms of how they are used by people. In subsequent 
test trials, after being exposed to different levels of explanatory depth, children would be 
asked who they prefer learning about internal organs from. As demonstrated in Study 2, 
children were willing to learn labels of internal organs from previously accurate labellers of 
body parts. Therefore, they may be just as likely to prefer learning about internal organs from 
informants who are good at explaining the functions of external body parts. On a related note, 
familiarisation trials featuring familiar artifacts could also be used to assess whether children 
prefer learning about novel artifacts from informants who previously offered functional 
explanations about familiar artifacts. This possibility is further investigated in Chapter 8. 
Despite the absence of systematic relations between age and selective trust, the 
finding that selective trust was related to ToM was surprising. In previous research, links 
between children‘s trust in an accurate labeller and ToM have not been established. For 
instance, Pasquini et al. (2007) found no relation between three- and four-year-olds‘ false 
belief understanding, assessed using an unexpected contents task, and their selective trust in 
reliable informants. However, the findings of Fusaro and Harris (2008) suggested that the two 
abilities are related; at least for four-year-olds. It is important to note that the selective trust 
paradigm in Fusaro and Harris was slightly different because the informants were not 
presented as either accurate or inaccurate. Instead, in the familiarisation trials, the comparison 
was made between an informant, whose labelling elicited cues of assent (e.g., nods and smile) 
from two bystanders, and another informant, whose labelling elicited cues of dissent (e.g., 
headshakes and frowns) from the same bystanders. Further, four-year-olds completed a 
battery of mental state understanding (MSU) tasks, rather than a single false belief task, 
which assessed diverse desires, diverse beliefs, perceptual access and knowledge, false belief, 
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and hidden emotion. Results revealed that children classified to be high in MSU 
systematically favoured the informant who previously invoked bystander assent (even when 
the bystanders were no longer present in the test trials), whereas children classified as being 
low in MSU did not reliably differentiate between the informants. 
In the present study, an interesting relation between five-year-olds‘ trust in the 
functional informant and their ToM emerged. Further, the finding that children‘s selective 
trust was unrelated to their verbal ability strongly suggests that preference for the informant 
who offered functional explanations was simply not due to how verbally competent they 
were. While children‘s ToM does not relate to their trust in accurate labellers, the 
complexities of the information provided by informants in the present study may have 
allowed the relations between ToM and selective trust to emerge. In other words, children 
who had better ToM may have been better attuned to the intent of their interlocutor. Drawing 
upon the findings of Fusaro and Harris (2008), children who were higher in ToM may have 
been better able to identify the enduring knowledge state of the functional informant, and that 
the explanations provided by the functional informant was more informative, whereas those 
children who were lower in ToM considered the surface informant to be more trustworthy 
because she was providing information that could be directly confirmed using the picture of 
the internal organs presented. 
In conclusion, it seems that four- and five-year-olds do not differentiate between 
informants who offer functional or surface information about unfamiliar internal organs. 
Various modifications to the procedure have been suggested to rectify existing issues, as well 
as to further investigate children‘s selective trust in informants who differ in explanatory 
depth. Nonetheless, there appears to be a relationship between five-year-olds‘ ToM and their 
selective trust in that children who are better skilled at ToM are more likely to trust an 
informant who provides functional explanations of internal organs. On the other hand, five-
year-olds who are lower in ToM are more likely to trust an informant who provides 
descriptions of the observable characteristics of internal organs. 
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Study 3B 
Study 3B was conducted as a follow-up study to Study 3A, which examined four- and 
five-year-olds‘ sensitivity to explanatory depth as a cue to informants‘ (accuracy-
independent) competence. The rationale behind the original study was to directly examine 
whether children differentiate between obvious explanations (which refer to features that are 
highly observable) and deeper functional explanations (which refer to non-observable internal 
functions) for parts of the body. In contrast to the typical design of existing selective trust 
studies, Study 3A omitted the initial four familiarisation trials. In the four test trials, 
informants provided a novel label and followed it up with explanations for the internal organ 
which children would not be familiar with (i.e., pancreas, gall bladder, liver, larynx). At the 
end of each test trial, children were asked whose novel label they would endorse. There were 
two types of functional explanations; one that concerned the workings of the organ and its 
relevant processes (process-oriented), and one that concerned the ―purposeful design‖ of the 
organ (teleology-oriented). The process-oriented and the teleology-oriented informants, who 
both provided functional explanations, were contrasted with a surface informant who 
provided obvious descriptions of the organ's outer characteristics.  
The results of Study 3A revealed that four- and five-year-olds did not systematically 
differentiate between informants who provide functional explanations or surface descriptions 
of unfamiliar internal organs. However, there appeared to be a relationship between five-
year-olds‘ first-order ToM and their selective trust, particularly in relation to their 
endorsements of informants. With such findings in mind, the next step was to test a group of 
older children (i.e., eight-year-olds) to see whether they would be better able to differentiate 
between the functional and surface informants. Children‘s first- and second-order ToM were 
also assessed to see whether the relation between ToM and selective trust was still evident. 
Finally, to obtain a better sense of how children construed the two informants, children were 
asked a series of structured questions at the end of the testing session. Such questions 
assessed the extent to which children could remember which informant provided a particular 
type of explanation, as well as whether they thought that both informants were equally 
knowledgeable or whether one informant was more knowledgeable than the other. 
If eight-year-olds were found to differentiate between the two types of explanation 
offered by the informants, it could then be concluded that children are sensitive to the depth 
of explanations (at least about entities which are unfamiliar and not directly observable), but 
only when they are much older. If, however, eight-year-olds were still unable to differentiate 
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between the two types of explanation, it could then be concluded that the manipulation is 
probably ineffective and does not warrant further examination.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 32 eight-year-olds (16 girls): M = 98.34, SD = 3.05, Range = 93-
107. All children lived in the metropolitan area and spoke fluent English. Most children were 
Caucasian, although a range of ethnicities was represented. Children were recruited via 
parental invitation and tested individually in a quiet room in their school. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 Materials and procedure were identical to Study 3A. However, a series of follow-up 
questions presented after the selective trust paradigm were included, as detailed below. 
Additional questions. Children were asked a series of follow-up questions to further 
examine their interpretations of the informants. The order in which each informant was 
referred to, the order of memory questions, and the order by which function and appearance 
were referred to in the final question were counterbalanced. 
Knowledge comparison questions. Children were asked: (1) ―Did the girl in the 
orange shirt know lots of things about the body or not so many things?‖ (2) ―Did the girl in 
the blue shirt know lots of things about the body or not so many things?‖ and (3) ―Which girl 
knew more things about the body?‖ 
Memory-functional questions. Children were asked: (1) ―Did the girl in the orange 
shirt talk a lot about what the things inside the body are for or not so much?‖ (2) ―Did the girl 
in the blue shirt talk a lot about what the things inside the body are for or not so much?‖ and 
(3) ―Which girl talked more about what the things inside the body were for?‖ 
Memory-surface questions. Children were asked: (1) ―Did the girl in the orange shirt 
talk a lot about what the things inside the body look like or not so much?‖ (2) ―Did the girl in 
the blue shirt talk a lot about what the things inside the body look like or not so much?‖ and 
(3) ―Which girl talked more about what the things inside the body look like?‖ 
Function vs. Appearance question. Children were asked, ―Do you think someone is 
smarter if they know what something is for or if they know what something looks like?‖ 
Verbal ability. In contrast to Study 3A with four- and five-year-olds, verbal ability 
was assessed using the Test of Language Development (TOLD) picture vocabulary and oral 
vocabulary subtests because it is developmentally appropriate for eight-year-olds. In the 
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picture vocabulary subtest, children were shown a series of four pictures and asked to point to 
the picture that best represented the target word spoken by the experimenter. In the oral 
vocabulary subtest, children were asked to define or describe given words (e.g., ―What‘s a 
bird?‖ or ―What does sad mean?‖). In each subtest, the questions became progressively more 
difficult. Verbal ability was scored by adding each correct response and creating a raw score 
for each subtest. Each raw score was then standardized and then added to create a total 
standardized verbal ability score. 
Theory-of-mind tasks. Children‘s ToM was assessed using the same tasks used in 
Study 3A, with the addition of a fourth vignette. In this new task, children were introduced to 
a boy named Joe, who is unaware that his mother has bought him a new bike and hidden it in 
the garage. Joe expresses his desire for a new bike to his mother. However, in her attempt to 
surprise Joe, she informs him that she has bought him a toy instead. Children were given the 
first-order reasoning component of this task, in the form of a false belief question, ―What 
does Joe think he‘s getting for his birthday?‖ and a memory question, ―What is he really 
getting?‖ Children were scored as passing this task if they were able to correctly answer the 
false belief question (i.e., ―toy‖) and the memory question (i.e., ―bike‖).  It was then 
subsequently revealed that Joe found the bike in the garage while looking for a ball to play 
with. Children are then shown Joe‘s parents having a conversation. Joe‘s father asks Joe‘s 
mother whether their son knows what present he is getting. Children are asked a second-order 
ignorance question, ―What does Joe‘s mum say?‖ and to provide a justification, ―Why does 
she say that?‖ Next, Joe‘s dad asks, ―What does Joe think you got him for his birthday?‖ 
Children were then given the second-order reasoning component of this task, in the form of a 
false belief question, ―What does mum say?‖ and to provide a justification, ―Why does she 
say that?‖ Next, children were given two additional questions: a reality control question, 
―What does Joe really know he is getting for his birthday?‖ and a memory question, ―What 
did Joe‘s mum pretend he was getting first of all?‖ Children were scored as passing this task 
if they were able to correctly answer the false belief question (i.e., ―toy‖) and the reality 
control and memory questions (i.e., ―bike‖ and ―toy‖ respectively). 
From these tasks, two separate ToM scores were derived: a first-order reasoning score 
with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 4, created by adding up the number of first-order 
reasoning tasks passed; and a second-order reasoning score with a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 2, created by adding up the number of second-order reasoning tasks passed. 
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Results 
Results will be presented as follows. First, eight-year-olds‘ responses in the selective 
trust paradigm and to the follow-up questions will be described. Second, children‘s 
performance on the ToM tasks and verbal ability assessments, and its relations to selective 
trust will be outlined. Finally, differences in children‘s selective trust as a function of age 
(i.e., comparing results to that of Study 3A) will be further examined. 
 
Eight-Year-Olds’ Selective Trust 
Children were given a point for selecting the functional informant in each endorse 
question and explicit judgement question. Separate total scores were created by summing 
children‘s appropriate responses, resulting in a total score from 0-4 for endorse questions, and 
0-3 for explicit judgement questions. To allow meaningful comparison with endorse totals, 
scores for the explicit judgement questions were linearly transformed (i.e., multiplied by 4/3). 
An overall total score was also created by summing the endorse total and the (transformed) 
explicit judgement total, resulting in a total score from 0-8. 
A mixed ANOVA was conducted with condition (process vs. surface and teleology 
vs. surface) as the between-subjects variable, and question type (endorse, explicit judgement) 
as the within-subjects variable. No significant main effects for condition were found, F(1,30) 
= .73, p = .401, and the condition x question type interaction was also not significant, F(1,30) 
= .57, p = .458. There was a marginally significant effect for question type, F(1,30) = 3.76, p 
= .062, with eight-year-olds tending to select the functional informant more often for endorse 
questions (M = 1.93, SD = .83) than for explicit judgement questions (M = 1.42, SD = .1.55).  
Table 7.6 presents the mean number of appropriate responses to each of the question 
types, as well as total scores. Using related samples t-tests, means for the endorse questions 
and explicit judgement questions were compared to a chance expectation of 2, and means for 
the overall total score was compared to a chance expectation of 4. Analyses revealed that, in 
the process-oriented condition, children‘s selective trust did not differ significantly from 
chance for the endorse questions, t(15) = .104, p = .919; explicit judgement questions, t(15) = 
.81, p = .432; nor for the overall total scores, t(15) = .68, p = .506. In the teleology-oriented 
condition, children‘s selective trust also did not differ significantly from chance in the 
endorse questions, t(15) = .57, p = .580.  However, children‘s performance was significantly 
different from chance in the explicit judgement questions, t(15) = 2.30, p = .036; and the 
overall total score was marginally significant, t(15) = 1.98, p = .066. These results suggest 
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that eight-year-olds preferred the surface informant over the teleology-oriented informant, at 
least when judging which informant was ―very good‖ or ―better‖ at providing information. 
 
Table 7.6 
Mean Number (and SD) of Appropriate Responses to Question Types, and Total Scores for 
Eight-Year-Olds. 
 Eight-year-olds (n = 32) 
Process vs. Surface  
Endorse questions (/4) 1.98 (.79) 
Explicit judgements (/4) 1.67 (1.65) 
Overall Total (/8) 3.65 (2.08) 
Teleology vs. Surface  
Endorse questions (/4) 1.88 (.89) 
Explicit judgements (/4) 1.17 (1.45)* 
Overall Total (/8) 3.04 (1.93)
a
 
Note. Asterisks denote response patterns that are different from chance. 
ap = .066, *p < .05 
 
Performance on Follow-up Questions 
Children‘s justifications for deciding that one of the informants was ―better‖ were 
examined. Responses were coded as: (1) ―don‘t know‖ or uncodable responses, (2) general 
references to informant‘s accuracy or competence, or (3) specific references to informant‘s 
knowledge of functions or obvious features. Overall, 75% of the eight-year-olds made 
general references to the accuracy or competence of the informant they selected as ―better‖ 
(e.g., ―she said the right things‖, ―she knows more‖, ―she was always right, she was smart‖). 
Only four children (12.5%) specifically referred to the informant‘s knowledge of organs‘ 
function or outward appearance (e.g., ―when she was saying the last picture, it was small and 
big and there was a pink string,‖ ―she told us what they look like and what they are,‖ ―the girl 
in orange was only saying what the colours were‖, ―she was right, she said there was a hole‖). 
Note that, out of the four children who provided a specific justification, only one favoured the 
functional informant. 
To examine their responses to the other follow-up questions, children were given a 
point for selecting the functional informant in each trial. Separate total scores were created by 
summing children‘s responses, resulting in a total score from 0-3 for knowledge comparison, 
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memory-functional, and memory-surface questions, and a total score from 0-1 for the 
function vs. appearance question.  To allow meaningful comparison with the other totals in 
this study, scores for the knowledge and memory questions were linearly transformed (i.e., 
multiplied by 4/3). An overall total memory score was also created by summing the memory-
functional and memory-surface totals, resulting in a total score from 0-8. 
A 2 x 5 mixed ANOVA was conducted with condition (process vs. surface and 
teleology vs. surface) as the between-subjects variable, and question type (endorse, explicit 
judgement, knowledge questions, memory-functional questions, memory-surface questions) 
as the within-subjects variable. Analyses revealed no significant main effects for condition, 
F(1,30) = .30, p = .587, or question type, F(4,120) = 2.07, p = .089. The condition x question 
type interaction was also not significant, F(1,30) = .29, p = .773. 
Table 7.7 presents the mean number of appropriate responses to the follow-up 
questions, as well as total scores. Using related samples t-tests, means for the follow-up 
questions were compared to a chance expectation of 2, and means for the overall total score 
was compared to a chance expectation of 4. Analyses revealed that eight-year-olds‘ 
performance in the knowledge and memory questions did not differ significantly from chance 
in either condition. Overall, it appears that children had difficulties with these follow-up 
questions as they could not accurately recall which informant talked the most about ―what the 
parts of the body look like‖ or ―what the parts of the body were for‖. 
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Table 7.7 
Mean Number (and SD) of Appropriate Responses to Knowledge and Memory Questions for 
Eight-Year-Olds. 
 Eight-year-olds (n = 32) 
Process vs. Surface  
Knowledge questions (/4) 1.67 (1.79) 
Memory-functional questions (/4) 1.83 (2.00) 
Memory-surface questions (/4) 2.42 (1.77) 
Memory Total (/8) 4.25 (3.35) 
Teleology vs. Surface  
Knowledge questions (/4) 1.33 (1.61) 
Memory-functional questions (/4) 2.00 (2.07) 
Memory-surface questions (/4) 2.08 (2.00) 
Memory Total (/8) 4.08 (3.79) 
 
For the function vs. appearance question, children were required to select whether 
they thought a person was smarter if they knew ―what something is for‖ or if they knew 
―what something looks like‖. In the process-oriented condition, 63% of children selected that 
a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter than a person who knew ―what 
something looks like‖. However, a binomial test revealed that this difference was not 
significant (p = .454). Similarly, in the teleology-oriented condition, 56% of children selected 
that a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter than a person who knows ―what 
something looks like‖, but again, this difference was not significant (p = .804). 
 
ToM, Verbal Ability and its Relations to Selective Trust 
Given their age, the performance of eight-year-olds on the ToM tasks was expected to 
be at ceiling, and this expectation was confirmed. For first-order ToM reasoning, with the 
exception of two children, all children obtained a maximum score of 4. For second-order 
ToM reasoning, with the exception of eight children, all children obtained a maximum score 
of 2. Correlations between children‘s selective trust, ToM (first-order, second-order 
reasoning, and total scores) and verbal ability are presented in Table 7.8. 
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Table 7.8 
Correlations Between Children’s Selective Trust, ToM and Verbal Ability (n = 32). 
 Endorse 
questions 
Explicit 
judgements 
Overall 
total 
1st-order 
false belief 
2nd-order 
false belief 
Verbal 
Ability 
Endorse questions 1 .351* .751* .452** .398* .093 
Explicit judgements  1 .882** .240 .242 .152 
Overall total   1 .396* .371* .154 
1st-order false belief    1 .612** .255 
2nd-order false belief     1 .295 
Verbal Ability      1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).  
 
There were no indications that children‘s selective trust was related to verbal ability. 
However, there were modest relations between children‘s performance on endorse questions 
and their first-order ToM reasoning (r = .452, N = 32, p = .009), as well as their second-order 
ToM reasoning (r = .398, N = 32, p = .024). In other words, children who performed better on 
the ToM tasks tended to select the functional informant in the endorse questions. No relations 
were found between children‘s performance on explicit judgement questions and their ToM 
reasoning. However, children‘s overall total scores significantly correlated with both their 
first-order ToM reasoning (r = .396, N = 32, p = .025), and second-order ToM reasoning (r = 
.371, N = 32, p = .036). 
 
Children’s Selective Trust as a Function of ToM Performance 
Children were then classified into two groups according to their performance on the 
first- and second-order ToM tasks: those who successfully passed all tasks, and those who did 
not pass all tasks. Table 7.9 outlines children‘s selective trust according to their performance 
on the ToM tasks, collapsed across conditions. It should be noted that a large majority of 
children passed the ToM tasks, so there was not enough power to look at differences in 
selective trust as a function of ToM within each condition. 
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Table 7.9 
Mean Number (and SD) of Appropriate Responses to Question Types, and Total Scores, as a 
Function of ToM performance. 
 Did not pass 
all tasks 
Successfully passed 
all tasks 
t-value 
comparing 
between 
groups 
First-order ToM n = 2 n = 30  
Endorse questions (/4) 0.50 (0.71) 2.02 (0.75) 2.78** 
Explicit judgements (/4) 0.00 (0.00) 1.51 (1.56) 1.35 
Overall total (/8) 0.50 (0.71) 3.53 (1.91) 2.20* 
Second-order ToM n = 8 n = 24  
Endorse questions (/4) 1.38 (0.74)* 2.11 (0.78) 2.33* 
Explicit judgements (/4) 0.83 (0.99)* 1.61 (1.67) 1.24 
Overall total (/8) 2.21 (1.65)* 3.72 (1.99) 1.94
a
 
Note. Asterisks denote response patterns that are different from chance * p < .05 ** p < .01 
ap = .062 
 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine whether children‘s 
endorsements, explicit judgements and overall totals differed as a function of success on the 
ToM tasks (i.e., did not pass vs. passed all). Analyses revealed that children who passed all 
first-order ToM tasks more often endorsed the functional informant, t(30) = 2.78, p = .009, 
and had higher overall total scores, t(30) = 2.20, p = .035, than children who did not pass all 
first-order ToM tasks. However, there were no significant differences in performance on 
explicit judgement questions as a function of first-order ToM, t(30) = 1.35, p = .186. 
For second-order ToM, children who successfully passed all tasks more often 
endorsed the functional informant than children who did not pass all tasks, t(30) = 2.33, p = 
.027. The difference in children‘s overall scores as a function of second-order ToM was 
marginally significant, t(30) = 1.94, p = .062, but no differences in performance on explicit 
judgement questions as a function of second-order ToM were found, t(30) = 1.24, p = .225. 
To sum, eight-year-olds who were more skilled at ToM were more likely to trust the 
informant who provided functional explanations.  
Related samples t-tests were then used to determine whether children‘s performance 
was above chance within the groups of children who either passed all or did not pass all ToM 
tasks. Means for the endorse and explicit judgement questions were compared to a chance 
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expectation of 2, and means for the overall total score was compared to a chance expectation 
of 4. Analyses revealed that performance was not significantly different from chance for 
children who answered all first-order ToM tasks correctly or did not answer all first-order 
ToM tasks correctly (ps > .05). However, for children who did not answer all second-order 
ToM tasks correctly, their tendency to selected the functional informant was significantly 
below chance: for endorse questions, t(7) = 2.38, p = .049; for explicit judgements, t(7) = 
3.33, p = .013; and for overall scores, t(7) = 3.07, p = .018. The performance of children who 
correctly answered all second-order ToM tasks correctly did not exceed chance expectations 
(ps > .05). 
 
Comparisons to the Performance of Younger Children in Study 3A 
A 3 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with age (four-, five-, and eight-year-olds) 
and condition (process vs. surface and teleology vs. surface) as between-subjects variables, 
and question type (endorse, explicit judgement) as the within-subjects variable. No 
significant main effects or interactions were found (ps > .05), indicating that children‘s 
selective trust did not differ across the three age groups, conditions, and question types. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to follow up on the null results of Study 3A, which 
consisted of four- and five-year-olds, to examine whether eight-year-olds would be better 
able to differentiate between informants who provide explanations that differ in explanatory 
depth. It was anticipated that eight-year-olds would be more likely to trust an informant who 
provided functional explanations over an informant who provided only obvious descriptions 
of observable characteristics. Overall, this core manipulation was, once again, largely 
unsuccessful. Eight-year-olds did not systematically trust informants who provide functional 
explanations for the processes of internal bodily organs. That is, there was little evidence to 
suggest that eight-year-olds consider functional explanations, whether process- or teleology-
oriented, to be more informative than surface descriptions. In the sections below, I briefly 
discuss continuities between the results of Studies 3A and 3B, and suggest future avenues of 
research, which have been implemented in Study 4. 
First, one of the few indications of systematic preferences for an informant emerged 
in the teleology-oriented condition. In this condition, both five- and eight-year-olds tended to 
favour the surface informant in the explicit judgement questions and in the overall trust score. 
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Such a result suggests that children construed the teleology-oriented informant as less 
credible than the surface informant, and the process-oriented and surface informant as equally 
credible. However, children‘s lack of preference for the teleology-oriented informant is not 
consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., Jaakola & Slaughter, 2002; Keil, 1992), 
which demonstrate that children as young as four do prefer teleological explanations. In 
addition, what is surprising is children‘s failure in the knowledge and memory questions, 
which casts further doubt on how capable children were of interpreting the informants. The 
eight-year-olds in this study were verbally competent and performed very well in the ToM 
tasks. However, their inability to accurately recall which informant provided a specific type 
of explanation suggests that they had difficulties in making a distinction between the two 
types of explanations. Finally, when analysing the performance of children across Studies 3A 
and 3B, no systematic differences in children‘s selective trust as a function of age were 
found. In other words, there were no indications that preferences for the functional informant 
over the surface informant improved with age. 
Another possible explanation for the null findings is that children in Studies 3A and 
3B considered both informants to be credible. Given the unfamiliarity of the organs 
presented, children may have construed both informants as providing useful information. In 
other words, they may have noticed that the surface informant provided information which 
was relevant and could be verified using the pictures of the organs. Similarly, they may have 
noticed that the functional informant also provided relevant information about the organs and 
its functions. Hence, since children did not make a distinction between the explanation types, 
they did not differentially prefer one informant‘s label over the other. At present, it is not 
known which of these possible explanations better account for children‘s performance in this 
study. However, as will be argued below, it is likely that this core manipulation is ineffective 
and does not require further investigation. 
Second, in relation to individual differences, children‘s selective trust was not related 
to their verbal ability, as was found in Study 3A. Thus, it is not the case that children who are 
verbally more competent are better able to evaluate the different types of explanations. 
However, consistent with the findings of Study 3A, relations between children‘s selective 
trust and ToM were revealed. In Study 3A, five-year-olds who were less skilled in first-order 
ToM tended to favour the surface informant for the endorse question, explicit judgements, 
and the overall scores. On the other hand, five-year-olds who were more skilled in ToM more 
often endorsed the functional informant. In this study, eight-year-olds who were less skilled 
in second-order ToM tended to favour the surface informant, but those who were more 
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skilled did not systematically endorse the functional informant. It is surprising that these links 
between children‘s selective trust and ToM emerged since the existing research has not 
definitively established such links (Pasquini et al., 2007). It is possible that the sophistication 
of the explanations provided by informants in the present study may have allowed the 
relations between ToM and selective trust to emerge. In the Discussion of Study 3A, based on 
the findings of Fusaro and Harris (2008), I speculated that children who were lower in ToM 
may have considered the surface informant to be more trustworthy because she provided 
information that could be directly verified from the pictures of the internal organs. 
 
General Discussion 
Overall, the results of Study 3A and 3B do not provide convincing evidence of 
children‘s ability to differentiate between explanations which differ in explanatory depth, at 
least in relation to objects that are non-observable and unfamiliar to children. Below, I briefly 
summarise possible reasons for why this manipulation did not work, as well as outline 
approaches to address these issues, which were implemented in a subsequent Study 4. 
As noted in the Discussion of Study 3A, I speculated as to whether children‘s null 
performance was because the explanations were too detailed and complex for children to 
understand. As a result, I proposed utilising a sample of older children (i.e., eight-year-olds) 
to see whether they would be better able to comprehend the explanations. The results of 
Study 3B showed that even eight-year-olds did not differentiate between the two types of 
informants. However, it is unlikely that their failure to comprehend the detailed explanations 
is the primary reason for their lack of systematic trust. As noted in the results, children‘s 
verbal ability was assessed and no relations were found between verbal ability and selective 
trust. 
Another reason put forward was that the internal organs were described in terms of 
what they do rather than how people use them. For example, it is more appropriate to say that 
the heart ―beats and pumps blood around the body‖, rather than to say that ―you use your 
heart to beat and pump blood around the body‖. In contrast, functional information provided 
about common artifacts tend to be explained in terms of how people use them (e.g., ―you use 
a hammer to drive nails into wood‖) rather than what they do without reference to an agent‘s 
act upon the artifact (e.g., ―hammers drive nails into wood‖ sounds less suitable). In this 
study, it may have been difficult for children to conceptualise organs as performing the 
activities mentioned because the explanations were largely about what they do. On a related 
note, children may have been unable to differentiate between informants because they were 
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perplexed by the unfamiliar internal organs presented. In this study, none of the eight-year-
olds correctly identified any of the internal organs. Due to their lack of knowledge, they may 
have been less inclined to attend to the differential explanatory depth in the additional 
information presented, perhaps because they were more occupied with attending to the novel 
labels. 
To conclude, the results of Studies 3A and 3B did not show that four- to eight-year-
olds differentiate between informants who offer functional or surface information about 
unfamiliar internal organs. There were some indications of a relationship between five- and 
eight-year-olds‘ ToM and their selective in that children who are less skilled at ToM are more 
likely to trust an informant who provides surface explanations of internal organs. However, 
this relation does not appear to be consistent and robust across ages. Overall, the core 
manipulation was not effective in examining whether children are sensitive to differences in 
explanatory depth. Modifications to the procedure were suggested to rectify existing issues, 
as well as to further investigate children‘s selective trust in informants who differ in 
explanatory depth in a subsequent Study 4. 
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Chapter 8 
Study 4 
 
The results of Study 3A and 3B showed that four-, five-, and eight-year-olds do not 
systematically endorse labels for unfamiliar internal organs from an informant who gave 
explanations about the function of organs over an informant who simply gave descriptions of 
the outward appearance of those organs. However, it should be noted that none of the 
children were able to correctly identify the organs. As a result, one of the reasons put forward 
for children‘s inability to show selective trust was because they were confused by the 
unfamiliar internal organs presented and, hence, were not able to make a distinction between 
the two types of explanations. Another plausible explanation was that children considered 
both explanations to be equally credible because in each case they were being provided with 
relevant information about organs they were not familiar with. 
The findings of Studies 3A and 3B are inconsistent with recent studies which have 
investigated children‘s sensitivity to explanations which differ in quality; in particular, 
explanations which are either circular or non-circular in nature. These studies suggest that 
children are quite capable of evaluating different types of explanations. For example, Kurkul 
and Corriveau (2014) showed that children from the age of five are able to evaluate 
explanations which differ in circularity and prefer learning from informants who provided 
non-circular explanations. However, it is important to note that Kurkul and Corriveau 
investigated children‘s sensitivity to the circularity of explanations, whereas Studies 3A and 
3B investigated children‘s sensitivity to the depth of explanations. Circular explanations, in 
comparison to noncircular explanations, are inherently flawed because they do not provide 
information that could be considered helpful. On the other hand, both functional and surface 
explanations are providing truthful and relevant information; so it may come as no surprise 
that children do not necessarily distinguish between them when deciding whom to trust. One 
other major difference is that Kurkul and Corriveau featured initial training trials with 
familiar objects, an aspect which was omitted in Studies 3A and 3B. It is perhaps important 
that children are first familiarised with information they are knowledgeable about (e.g., 
concerning familiar objects, events) before they can decide whom to trust when learning 
about things they do not know about. Hence, to examine the role of unfamiliarity, 
familiarisation trials featuring familiar external body parts (e.g., eye, hand), were re-
introduced in Study 4. By doing so, children‘s ability to differentiate between the 
explanations might improve for two reasons. First, children might be better able to evaluate 
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the explanations because the informants provide information about body parts which are well 
known to them. For example, since children already know about the eye, they may consider 
the informant who talks about what the eye is used for and what it does as more informative 
than the informant who simply describes the outward appearance of the eye. Second, the use 
of external body parts allows for functions to be described in terms of what they are used for 
(e.g., you use your hand for touching, your feet for walking), rather than what they do. As 
discussed in Studies 3A and 3B, the internal organs were described in terms of what they do, 
rather than what they are used for. For instance, it was more appropriate to say that the liver 
―makes new blood‖, rather than to say that ―you use it make new blood‖. That is to say, 
internal organs differ from external body parts in that there is not a great deal of conscious 
voluntary control in their functioning. Therefore, in reinstating the familiarisation trials in 
Study 4 with external body parts, it was possible to examine whether children are better able 
to differentiate between functional and surface explanations when the functions are presented 
in terms of what the objects (i.e., body parts) are used for. 
On a related note, another reason given for children‘s inability to differentiate 
between informants in Studies 3A and 3B was because of the complexity of the biological 
domain and because children are not able to grapple with the notion that internal organs do 
things rather than are used to do things. Children may find it easier to distinguish different 
levels of explanation if the objects presented are common artifacts. Therefore, to further 
examine the role of familiarity, a comparison condition was included, which featured 
informants who provided functional or surface explanations for familiar artifacts (e.g., 
toothbrush, spoon). Given children‘s familiarity with artifacts, it was expected that this would 
facilitate their ability to attend to the different types of explanations. It was also interesting to 
examine whether they would be better able to differentiate between informants in the artifact 
domain, but not in the biological domain. That is, in the biological domain, in which their 
knowledge is still developing (Jaakkola & Slaughter, 2002), children may not yet be prepared 
to attend to different forms of explanations; but they may be more capable in the artifact 
domain. 
In subsequent test trials, after being exposed to different levels of explanatory depth 
for familiar objects (i.e., body parts or familiar artifacts), children were asked whom they 
preferred to learn labels for unfamiliar objects from (i.e., organs or novel artifacts). 
Children‘s preferences were assessed using the ask, endorse and explicit judgement questions 
from existing studies (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009; Pasquini et al. 2007). Children have been 
shown to be willing to learn labels from informants who provide accurate information about 
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the functions of objects (e.g., Birch et al., 2008; Kurkul & Corriveau, 2014; Sobel & 
Corriveau, 2010). Therefore, they may be just as likely to seek labels for internal organs from 
informants who are competent in explaining the functions of external body parts. It would be 
informative to examine whether children generalise their trust in informants who provide 
competent explanations about body parts when learning labels for unfamiliar organs. As 
already discussed, it has been well-established in the literature that children are discerning 
when presented with informants who provide labels. Such an approach has already been 
shown to be fruitful when examining how children‘s epistemic trust is influenced by manner. 
However, there is little research on how children consider informants who provide 
explanations. Further, by adhering to the traditional paradigm, in which children are required 
to select an informant they would prefer to learn labels from, the results of this study will 
shed light on whether there are limits to children‘s willingness to generalise their trust. In 
Kurkul and Corriveau, children did show a preference to learn labels from informants who 
provided noncircular explanations, whereas in Kushnir et al. (2013) did not systematically 
prefer learning labels from informants who demonstrated greater causal knowledge. Hence, it 
remains to be seen whether children consider informants who provide functional explanations 
to be a better source for object labels than informants who provide obvious descriptions.  
In this study, it was possible to implement a within-subjects design to increase power. 
Consistent with Study 3B, eight-year-olds were tested in Study 4. Eight-year-olds 
participated in both the artifacts paradigm and the body parts paradigm, and the paradigm 
which they participated in first was counterbalanced. Such a design allowed for an increase in 
the sample size, as well as an opportunity to examine whether there were order effects. In 
Studies 3A and 3B, the functional explanations had been separated into two forms: process-
oriented and teleology-oriented. The process-oriented explanations were concerned with the 
workings of the organ and its relevant processes, whereas the teleology-oriented explanations 
were concerned with the ―purposeful design‖ of the organ. However, it was apparent that the 
children in Studies 3A and 3B did not respond differently to either type of functional 
explanation. Therefore, to create a more complete sense of what the objects are used for, the 
functional information in Study 4 combined these two types of explanations. It was also 
hoped that the manipulation would be strengthened as a result. For example, the eye was 
described as: ―That‘s an eye. When you need to watch where you‘re going, you use your eyes 
for seeing and looking. Things inside your eyes send messages to your brain so you can know 
what you‘re looking at‖. On the other hand, the information provided by the surface 
informant was largely similar to that presented in Studies 3A and 3B in that the informant 
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made reference to the object‘s appearance (e.g., colour), property (e.g., smoothness, 
hardness), parts, and number. Such characteristics were selected based on the work of 
Chouinard (2007) on the nature of children‘s questions. In Study 4, the eye was described as 
follows: ―That‘s an eye. You have an eyebrow on top and eyelashes around it. There is a 
small black circle in the middle. You have two eyes. They can be different colours; like blue, 
green or brown‖. 
Finally, to examine whether there were consistencies between the findings of Studies 
3A, 3B and 4, children‘s ToM and verbal ability were assessed. It was anticipated that, if 
there were improvements in children‘s selective trust as a result of reintroducing 
familiarisation trials and implementing the artifacts condition, younger children (e.g., five-
year-olds) could then be tested to see whether they also demonstrate selective trust. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 32 eight-year-olds (16 girls): M = 100.34, SD = 4.50, Range = 92-
111. All children lived in a metropolitan area and spoke fluent English. Most children were 
Caucasian, although a range of ethnicities was represented. Children were recruited via 
parental invitation and tested individually in a quiet room in their school. Children were 
tested across two sessions, and the delay between sessions ranged from 4-7 days. In the first 
session, children participated in one paradigm (e.g., body parts), and were given verbal ability 
and ToM assessments. In the second session, children participated in the alternative paradigm 
(e.g., artifacts). 
 
Materials 
Selective trust. Stimuli were presented as video clips on a laptop. Each child 
participated in two types of selective trust paradigm: a body parts paradigm and an artifacts 
paradigm. 
Body parts paradigm. Children watched eight video clips (combining familiarization 
and test trials). In each clip, two female informants (wearing either an orange or blue shirt) 
sat on either side of a table and a male interviewer (wearing a black shirt) stood between 
them. In each video clip, the interviewer held up, at chest height, a white A3-sized sheet of 
cardboard with a colored picture of a body part or organ printed on it. The order of body parts 
and organs presented was the same for all children. 
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Artifacts paradigm. Children watched eight video clips (again combining 
familiarization and test trials). In each clip, two female informants (wearing either a green or 
red shirt) sat on either side of a table and a male interviewer (wearing a black shirt) stood 
between them. The informants and interviewer in the artifacts procedure were different from 
those featured in the body parts procedure. In each video clip, the interviewer held up, and 
then placed a familiar or novel artifact on the table. The order of artifacts presented was the 
same for all children. 
Other measures. Measures of individual differences were also obtained. Children‘s 
verbal ability was assessed using the Test of Language Development (TOLD) picture 
vocabulary and oral vocabulary subtests, and their ToM was assessed using four tasks 
presented in a storybook format with coloured pictures. Testing and scoring of eight-year-
olds‘ verbal ability and ToM was identical to Study 3B.  
 
Design and Procedure 
Selective trust. The within-subjects variable was type of paradigm: body parts or 
artifacts. Half the children (equal numbers of boys and girls) participated in the body parts 
paradigm first, followed by the artifacts paradigm. The other half participated in the artifacts 
paradigm first, followed by the body paradigm. Within each paradigm, children were initially 
familiarized with two informants who provided different types of explanations for familiar 
objects. One informant provided explanations which referred to the functions of the body 
parts/artifacts and how they could be used, whereas the other informant provided 
explanations which referred to the obvious and observable characteristics of the body 
parts/artifacts. In subsequent test trials, children were introduced to unfamiliar 
organs/artifacts and asked to seek and endorse novel labels from one of the informants, as 
well as to judge which informant was more competent at providing information. 
Introduction to the tasks. For the body parts paradigm, the experimenter introduced 
the task by first showing a picture book about the human body and highlighting that there 
were parts which were on the ―outside of the body‖ as well as on the ―inside of the body‖ and 
that the children were ―going to play a little game on the laptop about the body‖. For the 
artifacts paradigm, the experimenter introduced the task by first placing all of the familiar and 
novel artifacts on the table, and children were given the opportunity to examine the artifacts 
before being told they were ―going to play a little game on the laptop about objects‖.  
Children were then shown a still frame of the informants and interview. The 
experimenter said, ―The game looks something like this. First, we‘re going to meet these 
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three people. Do you see them? The boy in the black shirt is going to hold up some 
pictures/objects. Then, this girl in the [colour] shirt and this girl in the [other colour] shirt are 
going to tell you what they know about those things. Some of the pictures/objects are things 
you might have seen before and already know about. And some of the pictures/objects are 
things that you might not have seen before. I want you to listen very carefully and then I‘m 
going to ask you some questions. Are you ready?‖ 
Familiarisation Trials. The experimenter presented a picture of the body part (in the 
body parts paradigm) or the actual artifact (in the artifacts paradigm) and pointed to a still 
frame of the video clip, in which the interviewer was holding the same picture/artifact. The 
experimenter said, ―I wonder what the girls will say about this?‖ and played the video. At the 
start of each familiarisation trial, the interviewer presented the body part/artifact and stated, 
―Can you tell me what you know about this?‖ The informants correctly labelled the object, 
but provided different explanations. The familiarisation trials for the body parts and artifacts 
paradigms are presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. The informant who spoke first alternated 
between the familiarization video clips and the explanation assigned to each informant was 
systematically varied between children. 
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Table 8.1 
Familiarisation Trials in the Body Parts Paradigm. 
Body 
Part 
Functional informant Surface informant 
Eye That‘s an eye. When you need to watch 
where you‘re going, you use your eyes 
for seeing and looking. Things inside 
your eyes send messages to your brain so 
you can know what you‘re looking at. 
 
That‘s an eye. You have an eyebrow on 
top and eyelashes around it. There is a 
small black circle in the middle. You 
have two eyes. They can be different 
colours; like blue, green or brown.  
Foot That‘s a foot. When you need to go 
somewhere, you use your feet for 
standing and moving. There are muscles 
inside your feet that stretch and tighten so 
you can walk, run and jump.  
 
That‘s a foot. You have five toes on each 
food and you have nails on the ends of 
your toes. It is part of your leg and there 
is a bone sticking out. You have two feet. 
Nose That‘s a nose. When you need to get air 
inside your body, you use your nose for 
breathing and smelling. There are little 
hairs inside that trap dust from the air so 
it makes you sneeze. 
 
That‘s a nose. It is long and bony at the 
top and soft at the bottom. There are two 
black holes. Your nose is in the middle of 
your face and you only have one nose. 
Hand That‘s a hand. When you need to know 
what something feels like, you use your 
hands for touching and feeling. There are 
bones inside your fingers that bend so 
you can pick up and hold things.  
That‘s a hand. It has four fingers and one 
thumb. There are little lines on your hand 
and those are the folds of your skin. It is 
part of your arm, and you have two 
hands. 
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Table 8.2 
Familiarisation Trials in the Artifacts Paradigm. 
Familiar 
artifact 
Functional informant Surface informant 
Spoon That‘s a spoon. When you need to eat 
runny or soft foods, you use it to eat 
with. You hold the handle and scoop 
food up with the round bit so you can 
put food in your mouth.  
 
That‘s a spoon. It‘s made of metal and 
is very smooth. It feels cold to touch 
but warms up after you hold it. It has a 
long handle and a short round bit at the 
bottom.  
Toothbrush That‘s a toothbrush. When you need to 
clean your teeth, you use it to brush 
your teeth. You put toothpaste on the 
bristles and hold the long part in your 
hand so you can brush your teeth. 
 
That‘s a toothbrush. It‘s made out of 
plastic and a little bit of rubber. It‘s 
light to hold and feels bumpy to touch. 
At the top, it has little, thin pieces of 
plastic bunched together. 
Shoe That‘s a shoe. When you need to keep 
your feet warm and clean, you wear it 
to protect your feet. You put your feet 
inside and tie the shoelaces up tightly 
so it doesn‘t fall off. 
 
That‘s a shoe. It's made out of fabric, 
rubber and plastic. This one is white 
and blue. It has long pieces of string 
which zig-zag through the holes, and an 
empty space inside. 
Bottle That‘s a bottle. When you need to bring 
water to drink, you use it to carry water. 
You open the lid and fill it up with 
water so you can you drink from it if 
you are thirsty. 
That‘s a drink bottle. It‘s skinny at the 
top and wider at the bottom. It‘s made 
of metal, but the lid on top is plastic. 
It‘s shiny and light. It makes a noise 
when you knock on it. 
 
Test trials. After the four familiarisation trials, children were given four test trials 
featuring organs (e.g., pancreas, larynx) or artifacts (e.g., tea strainer, cord organizer) they 
would have difficulty identifying. The experimenter introduced the test trials by saying, 
―Now we are going to see some things that you might not know the names of.‖ Test trials 
consisted of three types of questions: (1) ask, (2) endorse, and (3) explicit judgement. There 
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were additional follow-up questions at the end of the procedure. Further details about these 
questions are presented below. 
At the start of each test trial, children were presented with the picture of the 
unfamiliar organ or artifact and asked, ―Do you know what this is called?‖ With the 
exception of three children, two who correctly identified the liver, and one who correctly 
identified the orange hose peg, no child was able to correctly identify the unfamiliar 
organs/artifacts. Children were then shown a still frame of the two informants and given the 
ask question, ―I bet one of these people can help. Which person would you like to ask, the 
girl in the [colour] shirt or the girl in the [other colour] shirt?‖ If children said they knew 
what the organ was called or gave an incorrect label, the experimenter said, ―Actually, I don‘t 
think that‘s what it‘s called. I bet one of these people can help. Which person would you like 
to ask, the girl in the [colour] shirt or the girl in the [other colour] shirt?‖ Children were then 
asked to select one of the informants for the ask question. The order in which each informant 
was mentioned in the ask question alternated between trials. Children‘s verbal responses 
(e.g., ―The girl in the blue shirt‖) or nonverbal responses (e.g., pointing) were recorded.  For 
the three children who made correct identifications, the test trial was discontinued, and they 
were presented with the next test trial with a different organ/artifact. 
Next, regardless of which informant children selected for the ask question, the video 
clip was played. The interviewer held up the picture of the organ or the novel artifact and 
stated, ―Can you tell me what this is called?‖ The first informant offered a novel label (e.g., 
―That‘s a slod‖), and the second informant offered a different novel label (e.g., ―That‘s a 
linz‖). The test trials for the body parts and artifacts paradigms are presented in Tables 8.3 
and 8.4. Which informant spoke first alternated between the four test trial video clips, and the 
novel labels provided by each informant were counterbalanced across children. 
After each informant provided a label, children were given the endorse question. The 
video clip was paused, showing the two informants and interviewer, and children were asked 
for the label of the unfamiliar organ or artifact (e.g., ―The girl in the orange shirt said it‘s a 
slod and the girl in the blue shirt said it‘s a linz. What would you say?‖). The order in which 
the informants were mentioned in the endorse question was consistent with the order they 
were questioned by the interviewer in the video clip. Children‘s verbal responses (e.g., ―What 
the girl in orange said‖, ―a slod‖) or nonverbal responses (e.g., pointing) were recorded. 
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Table 8.3 
Test Trials in the Body Parts Paradigm. 
Organ Novel Label A Novel Label B 
Pancreas That‘s a slod That‘s a linz 
Gall Bladder That‘s a mogo That‘s a nevi 
Liver That‘s a tark That‘s a chab 
Larynx That‘s a yiff That‘s a zazz 
 
Table 8.4 
Test Trials in the Artifacts Paradigm. 
Artifact Novel Label A Novel Label B 
Orange hose peg That‘s a roke That‘s a cham 
Figure of 8 object That‘s a danu That‘s a toma 
Sink/tea strainer That‘s a larp That‘s a crut 
Cord organiser That‘s a joob That‘s a thaf 
 
After all test trials, the experimenter asked three explicit judgement questions about 
the two informants. The order in which the informants were referred to in the first two 
questions was counterbalanced. The questions were: (1) ―Was the girl in the [colour] shirt 
very good or not very good at talking about these things?‖, (2) Was the girl in the [other 
colour] shirt very good or not very good at talking about these things?‖, and (3) ―Which girl 
was better at talking about these things?‖ 
Follow-up questions. Children were then asked a series of follow-up questions to 
further examine their interpretations of the informants. The order in which each informant 
was referred to, the order of memory questions, and the order by which function and 
appearance were referred to in the final question were counterbalanced. 
The justification question was presented after the final explicit judgement question. 
Children were asked to justify their choice from the last explicit judgement question, ―Why 
did you say the girl in the [colour] shirt was better at talking about these things?‖ 
Knowledge comparison questions asked children: (1) ―Did the girl in the [colour] shirt 
know lots of things about the body or not so many things?‖ (2) ―Did the girl in the [other 
colour] shirt know lots of things about the body or not so many things?‖ and (3) ―Which girl 
knew more things about the body?‖ 
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Memory-functional questions asked: (1) ―Did the girl in the [colour] shirt talk a lot 
about what the parts of the body are for or not so much?‖ (2) ―Did the girl in the [other 
colour] shirt talk a lot about what the parts of the body are for or not so much?‖ and (3) 
―Which girl talked more about what the parts of the body are for?‖ 
Memory-surface questions asked: (1) ―Did the girl in the [colour] shirt talk a lot about 
what the parts of the body look like or not so much?‖ (2) ―Did the girl in the [other colour] 
shirt talk a lot about what the parts of the body look like or not so much??‖ and (3) ―Which 
girl talked more about what the parts of the body look like?‖ 
Finally, in the function vs. appearance question, children were asked, ―Do you think 
someone is smarter if they know what something is for or if they know what something looks 
like?‖ 
 
Results 
Results will be presented as follows. First, children‘s selective trust and their 
responses to the follow-up questions as a function of paradigm will be examined. Second, 
relations between children‘s responses to the follow-up questions and their selective trust will 
be detailed. Finally, children‘s performance on the ToM tasks and verbal ability assessments, 
and its relations to selective trust will be summarised. 
 
Children’s Selective Trust 
Children were given a point for favouring the functional informant in each ask, 
endorse, and explicit judgement question. Separate total scores were created by summing 
children‘s appropriate responses, resulting in a total score from 0-4 for ask questions, 0-4 for 
endorse questions, and 0-3 for explicit judgement questions. To equate the scores for the 
three children who correctly identified one of the novel objects, their ask and endorse totals 
were multiplied by 4/3. In addition, to allow meaningful comparison with ask and endorse 
totals, scores for the explicit judgement questions were linearly transformed (i.e., multiplied 
by 4/3). An overall total score was also eventually created by summing the endorse total and 
the (transformed) explicit judgement total, resulting in a total score from 0-12. 
To first assess whether there were differences across the question types and the order 
of paradigms, a 2 x 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with paradigm order (body parts 
paradigm first or artifacts paradigm first) as the between-subjects variable, and question type 
(ask, endorse, explicit judgement) and task (first task, second task) as the within-subjects 
variable. Analyses revealed that there was no significant main effect for question type, 
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F(2,60) = 0.84, p = .436. More importantly, question type did not interact with any of the 
other variables, suggesting consistency in children‘s response across paradigm order and task. 
Paradigm order was not significant, F(1,30) = 2.59, p = .118. However, there was a 
marginally significant task x paradigm order interaction, F(1,30) = 3.78, p = .061. This 
interaction is illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Mean scores on test trials as a function of task and paradigm order, collapsing 
across question types. 
 
Inspection of Figure 8.1 shows that although children were not very systematic in 
their replies, they did perform quite well in the body parts paradigm if they received it 
second. To better understand the interaction, simple effects analyses were conducted. 
Analysis of the simple effect of paradigm order for the first task revealed no differences in 
children‘s preference for the functional informant whether they first received the body parts 
paradigm or the artifacts paradigm (p = .823). However, analysis of the simple effect of 
paradigm for the second task revealed that children more often selected the functional 
informant in the body parts paradigm than in the artifacts paradigm (p = .021). Next, analysis 
of the simple effect of task (first task versus second task) for children who participated in the 
body parts paradigm first revealed no differences in children‘s performance across tasks (p = 
.528). In contrast, analysis of the simple effect of task for children who participated in the 
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artifacts paradigm first revealed greater preferences for the functional informant in the second 
task (i.e., the body parts task) that they completed as compared to the first task (i.e., the 
artifacts task) that they completed (p = .043). 
Next, given that there was a near-significant effect of task x paradigm order, it was 
important to analyse how children‘s performance compared to chance as a function of these 
two variables. Using related samples t-test, means for the ask, endorse and explicit judgement 
questions were compared to a chance expectation of 2, and means for the overall score were 
compared to a chance expectation of 6. Means for children‘s performance as a function of 
task and paradigm order are shown in Table 8.5. 
 
Table 8.5 
Mean Number (and SD) of Selection of Functional Informant as a Function of Task and 
Paradigm Order for Question Types and Overall Scores. 
 Body parts paradigm first Artifacts paradigm first 
First task   
Ask questions (/4) 2.06 (.62) 1.94 (.44) 
Endorse questions (/4) 2.04 (.98) 2.06 (1.00) 
Explicit judgements (/4) 2.25 (1.35) 2.17 (1.75) 
Overall scores (/12) 6.35 (2.36) 6.17 (2.34) 
Second task   
Ask questions (/4) 2.23 (.66) 2.44 (.89)
a
 
Endorse questions (/4) 1.83 (1.15) 2.44 (.96) 
Explicit judgements (/4) 1.75 (1.67) 3.08 (1.35)** 
Overall scores (/12) 5.81 (2.61) 7.96 (2.34)** 
Note. Asterisks denote response patterns that are different from chance. 
a p = .069, *p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
These analyses revealed that, when children participated in the body parts paradigm 
first, children‘s selective trust did not differ significantly from chance for any of the scores in 
the body parts paradigm or in the subsequent artifacts paradigm (all ps > .05). Similarly, for 
children who participated in the artifacts paradigm first, children‘s selective trust in that first 
task did not differ significantly from chance for any of the question types (all ps > .05). 
However, their performance in the subsequent body parts paradigm was systematic. Although 
children‘s preferences for the functional informant was only marginally above chance for the 
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ask questions, t(15) = 1.96, p = .069, children‘s preference for the functional informant was 
significantly above chance for the explicit judgement questions, t(15) = 3.20, p = .006, and 
for the overall scores, t(15) = 3.35, p = .004. Children‘s preferences for the functional 
informant in the endorse questions did not reach significance, t(15) = 1.82, p = .089. 
To sum, eight-year-olds preferred the informant who provided functional explanations 
rather than surface descriptions for parts of the body, but this preference was apparent only if 
children had been previously exposed to informants who provided different types of 
explanations for artifacts. That is, eight-year-olds showed no preference for the informant 
who provided functional explanations for parts of the body if this was the first task that they 
received. Moreover, children did not demonstrate a preference for the informant who 
provided functional explanations for artifacts, whether or not they had been previously 
exposed to informants who provided different types of explanations for parts of the body. 
 
Performance on Follow-up Questions 
Recall that immediately following the final explicit judgment question, children were 
asked a series of follow-up questions starting with a question in which children were invited 
to justify their claim that one of the informants was ―better‖ at providing explanations. 
Children‘s justifications were examined as a function of task and paradigm order. Responses 
were coded as: (1) ―don‘t know‖ or uncodable, (2) general references to the informant‘s 
accuracy or competence, or (3) specific references to the content of the informant‘s 
explanations, such as their knowledge of functions or obvious features.   
For children who participated in the body parts paradigm first, 81.3% of children (n = 
13) made general references to the accuracy or competence of the informant they selected as 
―better‖ (e.g., ―she explained it more‖, ―I thought most of them were correct‖). Only one 
child made specific references to the content of the informant‘s explanations (e.g., ―she said 
there were eyelashes around and there was your eyebrow, and different colours‖); a statement 
which favoured the surface informant. In the subsequent artifacts paradigm, 68.8% of 
children (n = 11) made general references to the accuracy or competence of the informant 
they selected as ―better‖, and five children made specific references to the content of the 
informant‘s explanations. Of these five children, three favoured the functional informant 
(e.g., ―she told what it's used for‖, ―she said you could use a spoon for all sorts of foods‖), 
and two favoured the surface informant (e.g., ―she was saying what you use it for and what 
it's made out of‖, ―for the spoon she said it was metal and had a long bit with a circle at the 
bottom‖). It is interesting to note that the justification provided by one child who favoured the 
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surface informant stated that she was knowledgeable about both artifact function (―she was 
saying what you use it for‖) and appearance (―...and what it's made out of‖), suggesting some 
possible confusion or overgeneralisation of knowledge. 
For children who participated in the artifacts parts paradigm first, 81.3% of children 
(n = 13) made general references to the accuracy or competence of the informant they 
selected as ―better‖ (e.g., ―she explained it more‖, ―I thought most of them were correct‖). 
Three children made specific references to the content of the informant‘s explanations, all of 
which favoured the surface informant (e.g., ―she said how they looked like and what they're 
made of‖, ―for the sneakers she said the materials and laces and stuff. The other girl just 
talked about protecting your feet‖, ―she told more and told what it was made of‖). In the 
subsequent body parts paradigm, 68.8% of children (n = 11) made general references to the 
accuracy or competence of the informant they selected as ―better‖, and four children made 
specific references to the content of the informant‘s explanations. Of these four children, 
three favoured the functional informant (e.g., ―she actually told you what they do and what 
they are, and what part of the body they take place in‖, ―she was describing the body parts 
and telling what you can do with them‖, ―she said what you use it for‖), and one favoured the 
surface informant (e.g., ―she told us what they look like‖). Thus, in response to the first 
follow-up question, children mostly referred to the accuracy or competence of the chosen 
informant in general terms – few children commented on the particular content of the 
explanation. 
To examine their responses to the other follow-up questions, children were given a 
point for selecting the functional informant in each trial. Separate total scores were created by 
summing children‘s responses, resulting in a total score from 0-3 for each of the knowledge, 
memory-functional, and memory-surface questions, and a total score from 0-1 for the 
function vs. appearance question. To allow meaningful comparison with the other totals in 
this study, totals for the knowledge and the two types of memory questions were linearly 
transformed (i.e., multiplied by 4/3) such that all total scores now ranged from 0-4. In 
addition, an overall total memory score was created by summing the memory-functional and 
memory-surface totals, resulting in a total score from 0-8. These mean scores are presented in 
Table 8.6. 
A 2 x 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with paradigm order (body parts first, 
artifacts first) as the between-subjects variable, and follow-up question type (knowledge, 
memory-functional, memory-surface) and task (first task, second task) as within-subjects 
variables. Analyses revealed that there was a significant main effect for follow-up question 
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type, F(2,60) = 3.76, p = .029, but not for task, F(1,30) = 0.24, p = .631, or for paradigm 
order, F(1,30) = 1.42, p = .243. Post-hoc LSD tests revealed that, for the follow-up questions, 
children performed significantly better on the memory-functional questions (p = .014) than 
on the knowledge questions, whereas performance on the memory-surface questions and the 
knowledge questions (p = .148) and on the two memory questions did not significantly differ 
from each other (p = .202). Significant interactions were also found between follow-up 
question type and paradigm order, F(2,60) = 4.07, p = .023, between follow-up question type 
and task, F(2,60) = 3.57, p = .034, and the follow-up question type x paradigm x paradigm 
order interaction was also significant, F(2,60) = 6.17, p = .004. 
Given that children‘s responses differed across the knowledge and memory follow-up 
questions and, to better understand the interactions which all included question type, two 
separate mixed ANOVAs were carried out. First, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted on 
children‘s knowledge scores with paradigm order (body parts first, artifacts first) as the 
between-subjects variable, and task (first task, second task) as the within-subjects variable. 
Analysis revealed that there was a significant main effect for task, F(1,30) = 5.41, p = .027, 
with children favouring the functional informant more often in their second task than in their 
first task. Paradigm order, however, did not reach significance, F(1,30) = 2.32, p = .138, and 
neither did the task x paradigm order interaction, F(1,30) = 3.04, p = .091. However, given 
the prior near-significant interaction observed for the selective trust questions, this interaction 
was further explored and is illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
  
132 
 
Figure 8.2. Mean knowledge scores as a function of task and paradigm order. 
 
Inspection of Figure 8.2 shows that although children were not very systematic in 
their replies to the knowledge question, they did perform quite well in the body parts 
paradigm if they received it second. To better understand the interaction, analyses of simple 
effects were conducted. Analysis of the simple effect of paradigm order for the first task 
revealed no differences in children‘s performance for the knowledge question across the two 
paradigms (p = .537). However, analysis of the simple effect of paradigm for the second task 
revealed that children more often favoured the functional informant for the knowledge 
question in the body parts paradigm than in the artifacts paradigm (p = .023). Next, analysis 
of the simple effect of task for children who participated in the body parts paradigm first 
revealed no differences in children‘s performance in the knowledge question across the first 
and second tasks they completed (p = .684). In contrast, analysis of the simple effect of task 
for children who participated in the artifacts paradigm first revealed greater preferences for 
the functional informant for the knowledge question in the second task (i.e., body parts 
paradigm) than in the first task (i.e., artifacts paradigm) that they completed (p = .007). 
Second, a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with paradigm order (body parts 
first, artifacts first) as the between-subjects variable, and task (first task, second task) and 
memory question (memory-functional, memory-surface) as within-subjects variables. 
Analysis revealed a marginally significant effect of paradigm order, F(1,30) = 3.62, p = .067, 
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with children‘s memory scores tending to be higher for those who participated in the body 
paradigm first than for those who participated in the artifacts paradigm first. The interaction 
of paradigm order x task was significant, F(1,30) = 4.51, p = .042, and the 3-way interaction 
of paradigm order x task x memory question was marginally significant, F(1,30) = 3.42, p = 
.074. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 8.3. Inspection of Figure 8.3 suggests that 
children only did well on the memory questions if they had just received the artifacts 
paradigm having initially received the body parts paradigm. To assess this conclusion, 
analyses of the simple effect of paradigm order for each of the four combinations of task and 
memory question were conducted. The simple effect of paradigm order was significant only 
for the memory-surface question in the second task (p = .002). That is, in the second task they 
completed, children performed significantly better on the memory-surface question if they 
had first completed the body parts paradigm and then the artifacts than if they had first 
completed the artifacts paradigm and then the body parts paradigm. The simple effect of 
paradigm order for the three other combinations of task and memory question did not reach 
significance (ps > .05). 
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Figure 8.3. Mean scores on memory-functional and memory-surface questions as a function 
of task and paradigm order. 
 
To further examine children‘s responses to the follow-up questions as a function of 
paradigm order and task, related samples t-tests were conducted. Scores for the knowledge 
and memory questions were compared to a chance expectation of 2, and scores for the 
memory total were compared to a chance expectation of 4 (see Table 8.6). 
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Table 8.6 
Mean Number (and SD) of Selection of Functional Informant as a Function of Paradigm 
Order and Task for Follow-up Questions. 
 Body parts paradigm first Artifacts paradigm first 
First task   
Knowledge (/4) 1.75 (1.35) 1.42 (1.65) 
Memory-functional (/4) 3.00 (1.79)* 2.67 (1.76) 
Memory-surface (/4) 2.33 (1.98) 2.83 (1.45)* 
Memory total (/8) 5.33 (3.37) 5.50 (2.28)* 
Function vs. appearance (/1) 0.56 (0.51) 0.75 (0.45)* 
Second task   
Knowledge (/4) 2.00 (1.38) 3.17 (1.37)** 
Memory-functional (/4) 3.00 (1.14)** 2.08 (1.88) 
Memory-surface (/4) 3.25 (1.19)** 1.33 (1.89) 
Memory total (/8) 6.25 (1.67)*** 3.42 (3.51) 
Function vs. appearance (/1) 0.81 (0.40)** 0.81 (0.40)** 
Note. Asterisks denote response patterns that are different from chance. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Analyses revealed that for the knowledge questions, children were generally 
unsystematic in identifying either informant as particularly knowledgeable. However, there 
was one notable exception to this pattern. Children who participated in the artifacts paradigm 
first, and then proceeded to the body parts paradigm systematically judged the functional 
informant to be more knowledgeable in that latter paradigm. Recall that this pattern echoes 
what emerged with respect to the earlier analysis of children‘s selective trust. A comparison 
of Figures 8.1 and 8.2 underlines this similarity which will be considered in more detail 
below. 
Turning to the memory questions, among children who participated in the body parts 
paradigm first, their responses in that paradigm were above chance for the memory-
functional questions, t(15) = 2.24, p = .041. Further, their performance in the subsequent 
artifacts paradigm were above chance for the memory-functional questions, t(15) = 3.50, p = 
.003, the memory-surface questions, t(15) = 4.20, p = .001, and for the memory total score, 
t(15) = 5.40, p < .001. For children who participated in the artifacts paradigm first, their 
responses in the artifacts paradigm were above chance for the memory-surface questions, 
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t(15) = 2.30, p = .036, and for the memory total score, t(15) = 2.64, p = .019. Their responses 
in the subsequent body parts paradigm were above chance for the knowledge questions only, 
t(15) = 3.42, p = .004. Overall, then, these comparisons to chance for the memory question 
confirm that children had some ability to recall which informant gave either functional 
information, or surface information, or both. On the other hand, when children participated in 
the body parts paradigm after the artifacts paradigm, they displayed no memory for how the 
informants differed – even though, as noted above, these same children judged the functional 
informant to be more knowledgeable. 
For the function vs. appearance question, children were required to select whether 
they thought a person was smarter if they knew ―what something is for‖ or if they knew 
―what something looks like‖. Given the demonstrated effects of task and paradigm order 
found above, children‘s responses to this final question were examined as a function of these 
two variables. A mixed ANOVA was conducted on children‘s responses to the function vs. 
appearance question, with paradigm order (body parts paradigm first, artifacts paradigm first) 
as the between-subjects and task (first task, second task) as the within-subjects variable. 
There was a marginally significant effect of task, F(1,30) = 3.95, p = .056, with children 
selecting the option, ―what something is for‖ more often in the second task than in the first 
task. The effect of paradigm order was not significant, F(1,30) = .48, p = .495, and the 
paradigm order x task interaction was also not significant, F(1,30) = 1.42, p = .243. 
Children‘s responses to the function vs. appearance question, as a function of task and 
paradigm order, were also compared to chance using binomial tests. Analysis showed that, 
for children who completed the body parts paradigm first, in their first task, 56% of children 
selected that a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter than a person who 
knew ―what something looks like‖. However, this difference was not statistically significant 
(p = .804). In the subsequent artifacts paradigm they completed, 81% of children selected that 
a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter than a person who knew ―what 
something looks like‖, and this difference was significant (p = .021). For children who 
completed the artifacts paradigm first, in their first task, 75% of children more often selected 
that a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter than a person who knew ―what 
something looks like‖, and this difference was marginally significant (p = .077). In the 
subsequent body parts paradigm they completed, 81% of children selected that a person who 
knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter than a person who knew ―what something looks 
like‖, and this difference was significant (p = .021). In summary, children tended to favour a 
person who could provide explanations about functions over a person who could provide 
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explanations about obvious features, but their preferences for this person were more 
systematic after they had participated in both paradigms. 
 
Relations Between Responses to Follow-up Questions and Selective Trust  
Because there were differences in children‘s performance as a function of task, 
relations between children‘s responses to the follow-up questions and their selective trust in 
both paradigms were examined. In addition, because the follow-up questions of the first 
paradigm explicitly referred to the distinction between functional and surface, it was possible 
that this prompted some of the children to systematically favour the functional informant in 
the second paradigm they participated in. First, bivariate correlations were carried out 
between children‘s performance on the follow-up questions (knowledge, memory-functional, 
memory-surface, memory total, function vs. appearance) and their responses to ask, endorse, 
and explicit judgement questions and total trust scores in the first and second paradigms they 
completed. 
In relation to their performance on the first paradigm, children who preferred the 
functional informant in the knowledge questions for the first paradigm were more likely to 
favour the functional informant in the endorse questions (r = .444, N = 32, p = .011), explicit 
judgement questions (r = .476, N = 32, p = .006), and in the total trust scores (r = .578, N = 
32, p = .001). The relation between children‘s knowledge scores and their ask scores was also 
marginally significant (r = .323, N = 32, p = .071). However, children‘s performance on the 
memory questions and the function vs. appearance question did not relate to their selective 
trust (all ps > .05). These results suggest that, in the first paradigm, children‘s trust in the 
functional informant was related to their construal of that informant as knowledgeable. The 
more children judged the functional informant to be knowledgeable, the more they favoured 
that informant in the selective trust test phase. To further examine these effects within the 
first paradigm, children were classified into two groups, depending on their knowledge scores 
for the first paradigm: (1) children with higher knowledge (HK) scores of 2.67 and above (i.e. 
2 or 3 out of 3 in terms of raw score on the knowledge questions), and (2) children with lower 
knowledge (LK) scores below 2.67. A mixed 3 x 2 ANOVA for children‘s selective trust was 
conducted separately for each of the paradigm orders, with ask, endorse, and explicit 
judgement scores as within-subjects variables, and the knowledge score classification 
variable as the between-subjects variable. Analyses revealed HK children more often trusted 
the functional informant than LK children for both paradigm orders: body parts paradigm 
first, F(1,14) = 8.62, p = .011; artifacts paradigm first, F(1,14) = 9.50, p = .008. In comparing 
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children‘s performance to chance, one-sample t-tests revealed that, while LK children 
selected the functional informant at chance levels for all test questions (all ps > .05), HK 
children were significantly above chance in selecting the functional informant for the ask 
questions, t(10) = 2.35, p = .041, the endorse questions, t(10) = 2.67, p = .024, the explicit 
judgement questions, t(10) = 4.25, p = .002, and for the total trust scores, t(10) = 5.30, p < 
.001. Hence, despite the overall unsystematic performance of children in the first task they 
participated in, it appears that children who deemed the functional informant to be a 
knowledgeable source of information were more likely to have initially demonstrated 
selective trust in her. 
In relation to children‘s performance on the second paradigm, children who preferred 
the functional informant in the knowledge questions for the second paradigm were more 
likely to favour the functional informant in the ask questions (r = .449, N = 32, p = .010), 
endorse questions (r = .427, N = 32, p = .015), explicit judgement questions (r = .489, N = 32, 
p = .004), and in the total trust scores (r = .605, N = 32, p < .001). In contrast, children‘s 
performance on the memory questions and the function vs. appearance question did not relate 
to their selective trust (all ps > .05). Consistent with the correlations found for the first 
paradigm above, children who trusted the functional informant were more likely to judge that 
informant as knowledgeable in the second paradigm. Again, children were classified into two 
groups, based on their knowledge scores for the second paradigm: (1) children with higher 
knowledge (HK) scores of 2.67 and above, and (2) children with lower knowledge (LK) 
scores below 2.67. A mixed 3 x 2 ANOVA for children‘s selective trust was conducted 
separately for each of the paradigm orders, with ask, endorse, and explicit judgement scores 
as within-subjects variables, and the knowledge score classification variable as the between-
subjects variable. Analyses revealed HK children more often trusted the functional informant 
than LK children in their second task when they participated in the artifacts paradigm first, 
F(1,14) = 16.19, p = .001, but not when they participated in the body parts paradigm first, 
F(1,14) = 2.47, p = .139. In other words, children who construed the functional informant in 
the body parts paradigm as being a knowledgeable source of information more often trusted 
her, but only after they had participated in a preceding artifacts paradigm. The reverse pattern 
did not emerge; children who construed the functional informant in the artifacts paradigm as 
being a knowledgeable source of information were not more likely to trust her, even after 
they had participated in a preceding body parts paradigm. In comparing children‘s 
performance to chance, one-sample t-tests revealed that, as in the first task, LK children 
performed at chance levels for all test questions (all ps > .05). In contrast, HK children were 
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above chance in selecting the functional informant for the ask questions, t(19) = 3.56, p = 
.002, the explicit judgement questions, t(19) = 3.31, p = .004, and in the total trust scores, 
t(19) = 4.36, p < .001, but marginally above chance in the endorse questions, t(19) = 1.90, p = 
.072. To sum, in line with the findings of the first task, children who classified the functional 
informant as knowledgeable also tended to trust her in the second task. 
Finally, when considering children‘s performance on the follow-up questions in the 
first paradigm, and their selective trust in the subsequent paradigm, children who favoured 
the functional explanation in the final functional vs. appearance question of their first task 
were more likely to endorse the functional informant in their second task (r = .459, N = 32, p 
= .008). However, no other correlations were significant (all ps > .05). That is, children‘s 
selective trust in their second task was not related to their knowledge or memory scores from 
the first task. To further examine the relation between children‘s responses to the functional 
vs. appearance question of the first task and their selective trust in the second task, children 
were classified into two groups: (1) children who decided that a person was smarter if they 
knew ―what something is for‖, and (2) children who decided that a person was smarter if they 
knew ―what something looks like‖. A mixed 3 x 2 ANOVA for children‘s selective trust was 
conducted separately for each of the paradigm orders, with ask, endorse, and explicit 
judgement scores from the second task as within-subjects variables, and response to the 
functional vs. appearance question from the first task as the between-subjects variable. 
Analyses revealed children who selected the functional option in their first task were more 
likely to trust the functional informant in their second task than children who selected the 
surface option when they participated in the body parts paradigm first, F(1,14) = 4.64, p = 
.049, but not when they participated in the artifacts paradigm first, F(1,14) = .01, p = .907. 
Further attempts to split children into separate groups based on their performance on the 
knowledge and memory questions of their first task and examining differences in their 
selective trust in their second task as a function of these classification variables revealed no 
other significant findings. 
 
ToM, Verbal Ability, and its Relations to Selective Trust 
Given their age, the performance of eight-year-olds on the ToM tasks was expected to 
be at ceiling, and this expectation was confirmed. For first-order ToM reasoning, with the 
exception of seven children, all children obtained a maximum score of 4. For second-order 
ToM reasoning, with the exception of nine children, all children obtained a maximum score 
of 2. 
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Bivariate correlations between children‘s selective trust variables, ToM (first-order, 
second-order reasoning, and total scores) and verbal ability were conducted. There were no 
indications that children‘s selective trust was related to verbal ability. In addition, no relations 
were found between children‘s responses in the body parts paradigm to any of the individual 
differences variables (all ps > .05). However, for the artifacts paradigm, children‘s 
performance on the memory-surface question was related to first-order ToM reasoning (r = 
.366, N = 32, p = .040), to second-order ToM reasoning (r = .413, N = 32, p = .019), and to 
the total ToM score (r = .432, N = 32, p = .014). Further, children‘s overall memory 
performance was related to first-order ToM reasoning (r = .505, N = 32, p = .003), to the total 
ToM score (r = .450, N = 2, p = .010), and marginally to second-order ToM reasoning (r = 
.322, N = 32, p = .072). To sum, it appears that children who are more skilled at ToM were 
better able to recall which informant provided a particular type of explanation in the artifacts 
paradigm. No other significant relations were found between children‘s selective trust in the 
artifacts paradigm and the individual differences variables (all ps > .05). Hence, further 
analysis of children‘s selective trust as a function of ToM was not carried out. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to follow up on the null results of Studies 3A and 3B to 
investigate whether eight-year-olds are better able to differentiate between informants who 
provide functional or surface explanations for highly familiar body parts. Moreover, the body 
parts were described in terms of what they are used for, rather than what they do, which could 
improve children‘s understanding given existing findings that children and adults tend to 
view body parts in teleological terms: an entity is for X because they are designed to do X 
(Kelemen, 1999a). In addition to the inclusion of these familiarisation trials, a comparison 
artifacts paradigm was introduced to examine whether children are better able to differentiate 
between common everyday artifacts, which are generally also described in terms of what they 
are used for, rather than what they do. It was anticipated that eight-year-olds would be more 
likely to trust an informant who provided functional explanations over an informant who 
provided obvious descriptions of observable characteristics. Overall, it appears that this core 
manipulation had a mixed level of success. 
Contrary to predictions, eight-year-olds generally did not prefer learning about novel 
labels for unfamiliar objects from the informant who provided functional explanations for 
familiar objects. However, there was one exception. Given the within-subjects design of this 
experiment, order effects emerged such that children‘s preferences for the functional 
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informant depended on the order in which the paradigms were presented. It is important to 
note that it is likely that the task x paradigm interactions observed in this study failed to reach 
significance due to low power. Nevertheless, the marginal order effects that emerged were 
informative for interpreting the results, and it can be seen that analyses of simple effects 
yielded important information about the influence of paradigm order.  Specifically, children 
systematically preferred the informant who provided functional explanations in the body 
parts paradigm, but only after they had participated in the artifacts paradigm first. However, 
the reverse did not apply: children did not systematically prefer the informant who provided 
functional explanations in the artifacts paradigm if they had participated in the body parts 
paradigm first. To sum, it appears that children are able to differentiate between informants 
who provide functional or surface explanations, at least for body parts, in certain contexts; 
namely, when preceded by a paradigm with informants who provide differing explanations 
for artifacts. However, children‘s responses to the follow-up questions were not wholly 
consistent with their selective trust. For instance, in the first follow-up question, the majority 
of children‘s justifications for which informant was ―better‖ referred to the general accuracy 
or competence of the informant. Few children provided specific justifications which referred 
to the informant‘s ability to provide information about the functions or appearance of the 
objects. Although the number of children who made specific justifications in this study is 
greater than that found in Study 3B, it is not a substantial number. Hence, despite children 
systematically preferring the functional informant in the body parts paradigm when it was 
presented as the second task, few children explicitly stated that their preferences were due to 
the functional informant providing information about the functions of the body parts. 
Although few children provided specific justifications, their responses to the 
knowledge follow-up questions suggest that their trust in the functional informant hinged on 
their construal of that informant as being knowledgeable. In the first task they completed, 
across both paradigms, even though children‘s selective trust was generally not systematic, 
the children who judged the functional informant as more knowledgeable were more likely to 
have demonstrated selective trust for the functional informant. Similarly, in the second task 
they completed, especially in the body parts paradigm, children who judged the functional 
informant as being more knowledgeable were more likely to have demonstrated selective 
trust for the functional informant. On the other hand, in both tasks, children who did not 
judge the functional informant to be knowledgeable did not differentiate between the 
informants during the selective trust trials. Overall, children who believed that the functional 
informant was more knowledgeable preferred to learn novel labels from her, rather than from 
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the informant who provided surface explanations. This finding suggests that some children 
were able to attend to the different types of explanations offered and that they considered the 
functional explanation to be, in some way, superior to the surface explanation. 
In terms of children‘s responses to the memory questions, for the most part, children 
successfully recalled which informant provided a particular type of explanation. In the first 
task they completed, children successfully associated at least one of the types of explanation 
with the appropriate informant. In the artifacts paradigm, children demonstrated better overall 
memory for what the informants said and they systematically recalled which informant 
provided information about what the artifacts looked like. On the other hand, in the body 
parts paradigm, children systematically recalled which informant provided information about 
what the body parts were for. The order effects observed in the selective trust paradigm were 
also apparent in children‘s responses to the memory questions in their second task. That is, 
while the children who participated in the artifacts paradigm second were capable of 
remembering which informant provided a particular type of explanation, the children who 
participated in the body parts second were unable to successfully answer the memory 
questions. This finding is perplexing given that children had been able to respond 
appropriately to the memory questions in the preceding artifacts paradigm. Further, children 
had systematically trusted the informant who provided functional explanations in this 
particular context (i.e., when the body parts paradigm was presented second). Hence, it is 
intriguing as to how children would be able to demonstrate selective trust but an inability to 
successfully recall what each particular informant had said that led to that differentiation. 
Possible explanations for this perplexing finding will be considered in further detail below. 
Given the order effects apparent in the results of this study, it was necessary to 
investigate what factors may be driving such effects. However, further analyses did not 
provide strong indications that a specific response in one of the follow-up question in the first 
task was related to selective trust in the second task. There were some evidence that, in the 
final follow-up question of the first task, children who rated a person as being smarter if they 
―knew what something was for‖ rather than if they ―knew what something looks like‖ were 
more likely to trust the functional informant in the second task. However, these effects were 
not consistent across the paradigm orders. The link between children‘s response to the 
function vs. appearance question in the first task and their subsequent selective trust in the 
second task was more evident for children who were assigned to the body parts paradigm 
first, which is not consistent with the systematic performance observed for the children who 
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were assigned to the artifacts paradigm first. To sum, the results do not shed light on what 
particular aspects of the first task motivated children‘s selective trust in the second task. 
Finally, with regards to individual differences, consistent with the findings of Studies 
3A and 3B, children‘s selective trust was not related to their verbal ability. Thus, it is not the 
case that children who were verbally more competent were better able to evaluate the 
different types of explanations. Further, consistent relations between children‘s selective trust 
and ToM were not found. In accordance with the conclusions of Studies 3A and 3B, there is 
little evidence for the stability and robustness of the link between children‘s selective trust 
and ToM. 
The findings of this study are informative in two ways. First, they suggest that the re-
introduction of familiarisation was effective in allowing children to evaluate the different 
types of explanations. Although children‘s preference for the functional informant in this 
study was not as systematic as that demonstrated in existing studies of children‘s selective 
trust in accurate labellers (Corriveau et al., 2009; Koenig & Harris, 2005) or informants who 
provide noncircular explanations (Kurkul & Corriveau, 2014), the findings suggest that the 
familiarisation trials, featuring objects well-known to children, was effective in helping them 
attend to the different types of explanations. This is evident when examining children‘s 
responses to the follow-up memory questions. In contrast to the null findings of the memory 
questions in Study 3B, the eight-year-olds in this study were generally better able to recall 
which informant provided explanations about the functions of body parts/artifacts and which 
informant provided explanations about the surface appearance of body parts/artifacts. 
It is not known whether the improved performance of children was merely due to the 
increased familiarity of the body parts, or because the functions of the body parts were 
described in terms of how they are used, rather than what they do. To address this question, a 
future study could present explanations for familiar body parts/organs in terms of what they 
do. Children could be familiarised with informants who provide explanations for familiar 
external parts of the body (e.g., skin, nails, hair, eyelashes), which are better described in 
terms of what they do rather than what they are used for. For instance, it is more appropriate 
to say that the skin ―protects the inside of your body‖ than to say that ―you use your skin to 
protect the inside of your body‖. Another way to approach this question would be to modify 
the familiarity of the body parts and describe them in terms of what they are used for. For 
example, children could be presented with familiar internal organs (e.g., heart, lungs, 
stomach, brain), which are described in terms of what they are used for (e.g., ―you use your 
brain for thinking‖). Because children are not as familiar with these organs as they are with 
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external body parts, they might attend to information which relates to their functions because 
they are perhaps more likely to hear others refer to these specific organs as performing 
certain functions. Further, they would already be able to verify the surface explanations from 
the pictures presented in the experiment, so the use of these internal organs may make 
explanatory depth a more salient cue. 
Another way in which the current study has improved over Studies 3A and 3B is 
reflected in children‘s responses to the follow-up questions. It is apparent that there were 
improvements in children‘s recall of which informant provided a particular type of informant, 
particularly in the artifacts paradigm, which will be discussed below. In addition, children‘s 
responses to the knowledge questions and the function vs. appearance question in this study 
were more systematic than those in Study 3B, and relations were found between children‘s 
responses to the follow-up questions and their selective trust. For instance, children who 
regarded the functional informant as knowledgeable more often preferred to learn novel 
labels from that informant. Further, whereas the eight-year-olds in Study 3B did not 
differentiate between the two options in the function vs. appearance question, the eight-year-
olds in this study systematically claimed that a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was 
smarter than a person who knew ―what something looks like‖, at least by the end of the 
second paradigm. Hence, it appears that the re-introduction of familiarisation trials, in some 
ways, facilitated children‘s sensitivity to the different types of explanations. 
Second, the results of Study 4 are important because they examine whether children‘s 
differentiation between functional and surface explanations differ across the biological and 
artifact domains. The findings of this study initially suggest that children show selective trust 
in the biological domain but not in the artifact domain. However, the order effect found does 
not lend support to a straightforward story. In the section below, I attempt to provide an 
explanation for such perplexing results. 
As discussed earlier in the Introduction, children‘s lack of selective trust in Studies 
3A and 3B may have two explanations: (1) failure to recall what each informant said and, 
hence, an inability to distinguish between the explanations, resulting in random selection of 
informants in the test trials; or (2) construal of both informants as credible and relevant and, 
hence, no demonstrated selective trust. In applying these previous explanations to the results 
of this study, it appears that the second reason is more plausible. In this study, children 
generally had no difficulty recalling what each informant had said. For example, in the 
follow-up questions of the artifacts paradigm, children responded systematically to the 
memory-surface questions and were above chance in their memory totals, regardless of 
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paradigm order. Moreover, when children were presented with the body parts paradigm first 
(i.e., when there was no preceding paradigm), they were at least able to systematically recall 
which informant provided functional explanations. Hence, children‘s performance was not 
likely due to an inability to recall what each informant had said. Further, the results suggest 
that there was a subset of children who were likely to demonstrate selective trust in the 
functional informant. These children tended to attribute more knowledge to the functional 
informant. On the other hand, children who attributed less knowledge to the functional 
informant were likely to have performed at chance when required to seek and endorse novel 
labels from one of the informants. Therefore, the lack of selective trust observed in this study 
is unlikely due to children being random and unsystematic. Instead, their selective trust 
emerges under particular conditions (e.g., if they believed the functional informant was 
knowledgeable). In summary, it is plausible that children‘s overall lack of selective trust 
stemmed from their construal of the explanations as both being equally credible and relevant. 
At the very least, it appears that some children carefully consider the explanations offered by 
the informants and do not simply respond randomly. 
An indication for why children may consider both explanations to be equally credible 
is apparent when closely inspecting the stimuli, especially for the artifacts paradigm. In 
general, both types of explanations appear to be elaborate and detailed. For the functional 
explanations, there is substantial information about how the artifacts are to be used. Similarly, 
for the surface explanations, there is a great deal of description, and some references to what 
materials the artifact is made out of as well as tactile aspects of the artifact (e.g., temperature, 
―bumpy to touch‖), which could be interpreted as being distinct from mere knowledge of 
obvious characteristics. In this study, the few children who did provide specific justifications 
for their selection of a particular informant made references to material and appearance to 
explain why they favoured the surface informant. In order to address this issue and ensure 
that children‘s lack of selective trust is not due to the possibility that the surface informant 
demonstrated some level of knowledge beyond obvious appearance, a future study could 
simplify the explanations and remove references to materials and tactile sensations in the 
surface explanations such that they refer only to that which can be externally observed. This 
possibility is further explored in the next chapter. 
With regards to the order effect found in this study, presentation of the artifacts 
paradigm first appears to benefit children‘s selective trust in the body parts paradigm 
presented second. While children did not differentiate between the explanations offered in the 
first artifact paradigm, the references to the distinction between function and appearance in 
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the follow-up questions to the first paradigm may have served as a prompt for the children 
who participated in the subsequent body parts paradigm. Indeed, children systematically 
favoured the functional informant in the test trials and the follow-up knowledge questions of 
the subsequent body parts paradigm. However, despite children‘s increased selective trust in 
this second paradigm, their responses to the memory questions were at chance. The 
combination of these two findings is puzzling. It does not make sense for children to be able 
to demonstrate selective trust but, at the same time, be unable to recall which informant 
provided a particular type of explanation, which is assumed to be the basis of their 
evaluations of trustworthiness.  
In further exploring children‘s responses to the memory questions, it was found that, 
in their second task, children who participated in the artifacts paradigm first more often 
responded incorrectly to the memory-surface question than children who participated in the 
body parts paradigm first. These effects were not observed when considering children‘s 
responses to the memory-functional questions in the first and second tasks, as well as to the 
memory-surface question in the first task. In other words, children who participated in the 
body parts paradigm after completing a preceding artifacts paradigm were answering 
incorrectly to the memory-surface question, which asked them to select which informant 
provided more information about what parts of the body look like. They were selecting the 
functional informant and stating that she knew more about what the parts of the body look 
like, despite not having offered that type of explanation in the familiarisation trials. Such a 
finding suggests that there was some level of transfer from the first paradigm they completed. 
It is possible that the prompting from the first set of follow-up questions led them to believe 
that they were expected to continually favour the functional informant in the second 
paradigm, even when it was evident that this informant had not provided information about 
the appearance of the body parts. Therefore, children‘s trust in the functional informant may 
be due to task demands, and the results of the second paradigm should be interpreted with 
caution. Further scrutiny of the data did not prove fruitful in clarifying how children‘s 
responses to the follow-up questions on the first task relate to their selective trust on their 
second task. It is not known what aspect of the first artifacts paradigm is driving the effects 
found in the subsequent body parts paradigm. Nevertheless, the results of this study suggest 
that some level of prompting may facilitate children‘s selective trust. In a future study, the 
experimenter could state at the start of the experiment that the informants are going to use the 
correct label for the objects, but that the children need to ―pay special attention to the other 
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things the girls says and try to find out what makes them different‖. Such prompting might 
lead children to give more attention to the differences between explanations. 
Another plausible explanation for children‘s lack of differentiation between the 
explanations relates to the type of test trials used. In this study, children were required to seek 
and endorse novel labels for unfamiliar organs/artifacts from informants who previously 
provided explanations about familiar body parts/artifacts. Therefore, when learning about 
novel labels, children may not have necessarily generalised their trust to the informant who 
had provided functional explanations. In other words, they did not consider an informant‘s 
ability to give a particular type of explanation to be indicative of their subsequent ability to 
provide labels for the unfamiliar organs/artifacts. As discussed earlier, both types of 
explanations could have been construed as equally plausible. It should be highlighted that the 
explanations featured in this study are different from the circular and noncircular 
explanations presented in Kurkul and Corriveau (2014). That is to say, while there are 
inherent logical flaws in the nature of circular explanations when compared to noncircular 
explanations, both informants in this study provided explanations which were accurate, 
relevant and coherent. For this reason, children may not have believed one informant would 
be more knowledgeable about labels than the other. In a future study, test trials could be 
modified such that they refer to novel explanations (as in Kurkul & Corriveau). Alternatively, 
children could be presented with a confederate who either wishes to learn about how a novel 
object works or wishes to learn about what it looks like, and then be asked to direct the 
confederate to the appropriate informant to learn from. Since the results of this study 
demonstrate that children were generally competent in recalling which informant provided a 
particular type of explanation in the memory questions, it is likely they would be capable of 
attributing knowledge based on the depth of the explanations. However, in the scope of this 
thesis, this option was not examined further for various reasons. First, it was necessary to 
explore the possibility that the lengthy explanations supplied by the informants might be 
interfering with children‘s ability to differentiate between the functional and surface 
explanations. Second, it was possible that children‘s trust in the informants might alter if the 
surface explanations were modified so that they had greater emphasis on observable 
characteristics, as discussed above. Finally, it would also be informative to adhere to the 
traditional paradigm to determine whether there are limits to children‘s tendency to generalise 
their trust between functions and labels. Of course, if it is shown that simplifying and 
shortening informants‘ explanations did not influence the readiness by which children 
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distinguish between the different types of explanations, the next logical step would be to 
attend to modifying the questions asked in the test trials. 
To conclude, the results of Study 4 suggest that the re-introduction of the 
familiarisation trials was effective in improving children‘s understanding because they were 
better able to recall which informant provided a particular type of explanation. At first glance, 
it appears that children were able to differentiate between explanations about body parts, but 
not between explanations about artifacts. However, the presence of an order effect, in which 
performance in the first paradigm interfered with performance in the second paradigm, 
suggests that the interpretation of such results warrant caution. Overall, if we consider only 
the findings of the unaffected first tasks, eight-year-olds did not differentially prefer 
functional explanations over surface explanations, unless they considered the informant who 
provided functional explanations to be knowledgeable. However, their general lack of 
selective trust is not likely due to their inability to comprehend the information provided by 
the informants or because they are responding randomly. Instead, they could recall that the 
two types of explanations focus on different aspects (i.e., function vs. appearance), but they 
perhaps did not consider functional explanations to be superior to surface explanations. 
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Chapter 9 
Study 5A and 5B 
 
The findings of Study 4 revealed that eight-year-olds did not prefer learning from 
informants who provided functional explanations over surface explanations, unless they 
considered the functional informant to be more knowledgeable. However, it was not the case 
that children were unable to differentiate between the informants; they were generally able to 
recall which informant had provided a particular type of explanation (i.e., whether the 
explanation focused on function or appearance). Hence, it was suggested that children might 
have considered both informants to be equally credible. Closer consideration of the stimuli 
suggests some reasons as to why children may have treated both informants in equivalent 
terms in Study 4. Both functional and surface explanations were lengthy and detailed; 
averaging 36 words per explanation and presenting multiple pieces of information. For 
example, in the functional explanations, there was substantial information about how body 
parts or artifacts could be used. Further, in the surface explanations, particularly with respect 
to the artifacts paradigm, objects were described in great detail and there were references to 
material and tactile properties of objects; characteristics which extend beyond immediately 
observable properties. For instance, when providing a surface explanation for a spoon, the 
informant stated that it was ―made of metal‖, ―very smooth‖, and ―cold to touch‖. As a result, 
children might have interpreted both informants to be informative and knowledgeable, even if 
the surface informant had only described perceptible characteristics. 
Study 5 thus addressed two issues raised by Study 4. First, to ensure that children‘s 
lack of selective trust was not due to the surface informant demonstrating knowledge beyond 
visible appearances, references to materials and tactile properties were removed, such that 
only properties which could be externally observed were stated. Second, the functional and 
surface explanations were simplified and shortened to ensure that children understood and 
could recall what each informant had said. In addition, because the explanations were briefer, 
it was anticipated that the distinctiveness of each informants‘ explanations would be clearer, 
thus leading children to favour the informant who provided functional information. Overall, 
this study examined whether children are capable of differentiating between informants who 
provide shorter functional or surface explanations, which appear conversational in nature, 
and, subsequently, whether they prefer learning from functional informants. Eight-year-olds 
were presented with either a body parts or an artifacts paradigm. Consistent with the 
predictions of Study 4, it was anticipated that children would show greater trust in the 
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functional informant over the surface informant. A between-subjects design was implemented 
in this study given the complications with interpretation that arose in the within-subjects 
design of Study 4. Five-year-olds were also included in the sample; these findings are 
outlined in Study 5B.  
 
Method – Study 5A 
Participants 
Participants were 32 eight-year-olds (25 girls). Children were allocated to receive 
either the body parts paradigm (M = 103.03, SD = 2.95, Range = 96-112) or the artifacts 
paradigm (M = 102.88, SD = 3.46, Range = 96-110). All children lived in a metropolitan area 
and spoke fluent English. Most children were Caucasian, although a range of ethnicities was 
represented. Children were recruited via parental invitation and tested individually in a quiet 
room in their school. Children participated in one session, lasting approximately 20 minutes, 
where they were presented with the selective trust paradigm and given verbal ability 
assessments. In contrast to Study 4, eight-year-olds‘ ToM was not assessed in this study 
given that their performance would likely be at ceiling levels. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Materials and procedure were identical to Study 4, with the exception of the amount 
of information provided in the familiarisation trials, which is detailed in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. 
 
Table 9.1 
Familiarisation Trials in the Body Parts Paradigm. 
Body Part Functional informant Surface informant 
Eye That‘s an eye. You use it when you need 
to see and look at things. 
That‘s an eye. It has a small black circle 
and an eyebrow on top. 
Foot That‘s a foot. You need it for standing 
and walking around. 
That‘s a foot. There are five toes and a 
nail on the end of each toe. 
Nose That‘s a nose. You use it when you need 
to breathe and smell things. 
That‘s a nose. It has two holes and is 
long and skinny at the top. 
Hand That‘s a hand. You need it for touching 
and picking things up. 
That‘s a hand. There are four fingers, a 
thumb, and it‘s part of your arm. 
 
151 
Table 9.2 
Familiarisation Trials in the Artifacts Paradigm. 
Familiar  
artifact 
Functional informant Surface informant 
Spoon That‘s a spoon. You use it when you 
need to eat runny or soft foods. 
That‘s a spoon. It‘s long and shiny, and 
has a round part at the top. 
Toothbrush That‘s a toothbrush. You use it when 
you need to clean your teeth. 
―That‘s a toothbrush. It‘s long and 
skinny, and has bumps in the middle. 
Shoe That‘s a shoe. You use it when you need 
to protect your feet. 
That‘s a shoe. It‘s blue, and is soft on top 
but hard underneath. 
Bottle 
 
―That‘s a bottle. You use it when you 
need to carry water with you. 
―That‘s a bottle. It‘s skinny at the top, 
wider at the bottom, and shiny. 
 
Results – Study 5A 
Results will be presented in three parts. First, children‘s selective trust and their 
responses to the follow-up questions as a function of paradigm are examined. Second, 
relations between children‘s responses to the follow-up questions and their selective trust are 
examined. Finally, children‘s performance on the verbal ability assessment and its relations 
with selective trust are presented.  
 
Children’s Selective Trust 
Scoring of children‘s responses was identical to Study 4. That is, children were given 
a point for favouring the functional informant in each ask, endorse, and explicit judgement 
question. Separate total scores were created by summing children‘s appropriate responses, 
resulting in a total score from 0-4 for ask questions, 0-4 for endorse questions, and 0-3 for 
explicit judgement questions. To equate the scores for the three children who correctly 
identified one of the novel objects, their ask and endorse totals were multiplied by 4/3. In 
addition, to allow meaningful comparison with ask and endorse totals, scores for the explicit 
judgement questions were linearly transformed (i.e., multiplied by 4/3). An overall total score 
was also eventually created by summing the endorse total and the (transformed) explicit 
judgement total, resulting in a total score from 0-12. Mean scores are presented in Table 9.3. 
To first assess whether there were differences by paradigm (body parts or artifacts) and 
question type (ask, endorse, and explicit judgement), a 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted 
with paradigm as the between-subjects variable and question type as the within-subjects 
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variable. Analyses revealed that there was a significant main effect for question type, F(2,60) 
= 4.39, p = .017, but not for paradigm, F(1,30) = 1.29, p = .265. To examine the differences 
between the question types, post-hoc LSD tests revealed that children were more likely to 
favour the functional informant on the explicit judgement questions than on the ask questions 
(p =.047) or on the endorse questions (p = .013), but there were no differences between ask 
and endorse questions (p = .684). Importantly, question type did not interact with type of 
paradigm, indicating that children responded consistently in both paradigms, F(2,60) = 0.15, 
p = .858. 
To examine whether children performed above chance on each of the question types 
in each paradigm, using related samples t-test, means for the ask, endorse and explicit 
judgement questions were compared to a chance expectation of 2, and means for the overall 
score were compared to a chance expectation of 6. Means for children‘s performance as a 
function of task and paradigm order are shown in Table 9.3. 
 
Table 9.3 
Mean Number (and SD) of Choices Directed at the Functional Informant by Paradigm. 
Question type Body parts paradigm Artifacts paradigm 
Ask questions (/4) 2.08 (0.59) 2.25 (0.93) 
Endorse questions (/4) 1.94 (0.65) 2.25 (1.18) 
Explicit judgements (/4) 2.50 (1.37)   2.92 (1.31)* 
Overall scores (/12) 6.52 (1.61)  7.42 (2.71)a 
Note. Asterisks denote response patterns that are different from chance. 
ap = .054, *p < .05 
 
Analyses revealed that children‘s selective trust in the body parts paradigm did not 
differ significantly from chance for any of the measures (ps > .05). Similarly, in the artifacts 
paradigm, children‘s selective trust did not differ from chance for the ask and endorse 
questions (ps > .05). However, children were above chance for the explicit judgement 
question, favouring the functional informant, t(15) = 2.80, p = .013. Finally, children‘s 
overall trust in the functional informant in the artifacts paradigm reached marginal 
significance, t(15) = 2.09, p  = .054. To sum, eight-year-olds did not systematically prefer 
informants providing functional explanations when learning about labels for unfamiliar 
objects (i.e., body parts or artifacts), but, when asked about which informant was ―very good‖ 
or ―better‖ at talking about the artifacts, children did favour the informant who had provided 
functional explanations. In contrast, children presented with the body parts paradigm were at 
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chance when deciding which informant was ―very good‖ or ―better‖ at talking about body 
parts. 
 
Performance on Follow-up Questions 
Immediately following the explicit judgment questions, children were asked a series 
of follow-up questions in which they had to justify why they decided that one of the 
informants was ―better‖ at providing explanations. For children who were presented with the 
body parts paradigm, 56.3% of children (n = 9) made specific references to the content of the 
informant‘s explanations. Of these nine children, 5 favoured the functional informant (e.g., 
―she told me what it is for‖, ―she wasn't describing it, she was saying what it does‖), and 4 
favoured the surface informant (e.g., ―she made a description of it‖, ―she told me what is on 
it‖). In contrast, 31.3% of children (n = 5) made general references to the accuracy or 
competence of the informant they selected as ―better‖ (e.g., ―she explained it better‖, ―most 
of the things she said gave me the right answer‖). For children who were presented with the 
artifacts paradigm, 62.5% of children (n = 10) made specific references to the content of the 
informant‘s explanations. Of these 10 children, 8 favoured the functional informant (e.g., 
―she wasn't describing it, she was saying what it does‖, ―she told you what you use them 
for‖), and two favoured the surface informant (e.g., ―she explained what it looked like and 
which parts were which‖, ―she described them, because if you wondered what one of them 
was, you‘d describe them‖). In contrast, 25% of children (n = 4) made general references to 
the accuracy or competence of the informant they selected as ―better‖. 
Scoring of children‘s responses to the remaining follow-up questions was identical to 
Study 4. That is, children were given a point for selecting the functional informant in each 
trial. Separate total scores were created by summing children‘s responses, resulting in a total 
score from 0-3 for each of the knowledge, memory-functional, and memory-surface 
questions, and a total score from 0-1 for the function vs. appearance question. To allow 
meaningful comparison with the other totals in this study, totals for the knowledge and the 
two types of memory questions were linearly transformed (i.e., multiplied by 4/3) such that 
all total scores now ranged from 0-4. In addition, an overall total memory score was created 
by summing the memory-functional and memory-surface totals, resulting in a total score 
from 0-8. These mean scores are presented in Table 9.4. 
To examine children‘s responses to the remaining follow-up questions, a 2 x 3 mixed 
ANOVA was conducted, with paradigm (body parts or artifacts) as the between-subjects 
variable, and follow-up question type (knowledge, memory-functional, memory-surface) as 
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the within-subjects variables. Analyses revealed that there was a significant main effect for 
follow-up question type, F(2,60) = 8.87, p < .001, but not for paradigm, F(1,30) = 0.57, p = 
.457, and the follow-up question type x paradigm interaction was not significant, F(2,60) = 
1.02, p = .367. To explore how children‘s responses differed between the follow-up 
questions, post-hoc LSD tests revealed that children performed worse on the knowledge 
questions than on the memory-functional questions (p = .001) and memory-surface questions 
(p = .015). No differences were found between the two types of memory questions (p = .116). 
To further examine children‘s responses to the follow-up questions as a function of paradigm 
type, related samples t-tests were conducted. Scores for the knowledge and memory questions 
were compared to a chance expectation of 2, and scores for the memory total were compared 
to a chance expectation of 4 (see Table 9.4). For the body parts paradigm, children‘s 
responses to the knowledge question did not differ significantly from chance, t(15) = 1.48, p 
= .159. However, their performance in the memory questions was significantly above chance: 
memory-functional, t(15) = 11.00, p = < .001; memory-surface, t(15) = 7.89, p = < .001; and 
memory total, t(15) = 9.94, p = < .001. In other words, children‘s were able to successfully 
recall what each informant had said in the body parts paradigm. For the artifacts paradigm, 
children‘s responses to all follow-up questions were above chance:  knowledge question, 
t(15) = 3.66, p = .002; memory-functional, t(15) = 16.10, p = <.001; memory-surface, t(15) = 
5.44, p = < .001; and memory total, t(15) = 9.94, p = < .001. To be specific, not only did 
children in the artifacts paradigm successfully recall what each informant had said, they also 
systematically credited greater knowledge to the functional informant. 
 
Table 9.4 
Mean Performance (and SD) on Follow-up Questions by Paradigm. 
Follow-up question Body parts paradigm Artifacts paradigm 
Knowledge (/4) 2.58 (1.58) 3.17 (1.28)** 
Memory-functional (/4) 3.83 (0.67)*** 3.83 (0.46)*** 
Memory-surface (/4) 3.58 (0.80)*** 3.58 (1.16)*** 
Memory total (/8) 7.42 (1.37)*** 7.42 (1.37)*** 
Note. Asterisks denote response patterns that are different from chance. 
** p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Children‘s responses to the final function vs. appearance question were also 
examined. For children presented with the body parts paradigm, all children claimed that a 
person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter than a person who knew ―what 
something looks like‖. In addition, for children presented with the artifacts paradigm, all 
children, except one, selected that a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter 
than a person who knew ―what something looks like‖. 
 
Relations Between Responses to Follow-up Questions and Selective Trust  
Given that children‘s overall performance did not vary significantly between the two 
paradigms, children‘s scores across the paradigms were combined, and bivariate correlations 
were carried out between children‘s performance on the follow-up questions (knowledge, 
memory-functional, memory-surface, memory total, function vs. appearance) and their 
responses to ask, endorse, and explicit judgement questions and total trust scores. These 
correlations are presented in Table 9.5. Consistent with the findings of Study 4, children who 
preferred the functional informant in the knowledge questions were more likely to favour the 
functional informant in the endorse questions (r = .352, N = 32, p = .048), explicit judgement 
questions (r = .742, N = 32, p < .001), and in the total trust scores (r = .645, N = 32, p < .001), 
but not in the ask questions (r = .161, N = 32, p = .378). In contrast to the findings of Study 4, 
children‘s performance on the memory questions was related to selective trust. Children who 
were better able to recall which informant provided the functional explanations were more 
likely to endorse the functional informant (r = .433, N = 32, p = .013) and demonstrate 
overall trust in that informant (r = .383, N = 32, p = .031). In addition, children with higher 
memory scores were more likely to endorse the functional informant (r = .400, N = 32, p = 
.023), and were more likely to have higher overall selective trust scores (r = .429, N = 32, p = 
.014). These results suggest that children‘s trust in the functional informant was related to 
their construal of that informant as knowledgeable as well as their ability to recall which 
informant provided a particular type of explanation. It appears that children who more often 
favoured the functional informant in the selective trust task were more likely to consider her 
to be knowledgeable and remember what she had said. 
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Table 9.5 
Correlations Between Children’s Selective Trust and Follow-up Questions. 
 Knowledge 
questions 
Memory- 
functional 
Memory- 
surface 
Total 
memory 
Function 
vs. appearance 
Ask questions 0.161 0.165 0.226 0.233 0.039 
Endorse questions .352* .433* 0.303 .400* 0.018 
Explicit judgements .742** 0.239 0.276 0.3 0.188 
Overall trust .645** .383* .371* .429* 0.133 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).  
 
To further examine the differences between children who favoured the functional 
informant or the surface informant in the knowledge questions, children were classified into 
two groups, depending on their knowledge scores: (1) children with higher knowledge (HK) 
scores of 4 (i.e. 3 out of 3 in terms of raw score on the knowledge questions), and (2) children 
with lower knowledge (LK) scores below 4. In comparing children‘s performance to chance, 
one-sample t-tests revealed that, while LK children selected the functional informant at 
chance levels for all test questions and overall trust scores (all ps > .05), HK children were 
significantly above chance in selecting the functional informant for the explicit judgement 
questions, t(16) = 9.60, p < .001, and for the total trust scores, t(16) = 4.75, p < .001. 
However, scores for ask questions, t(16) = 1.57, p = .136, and endorse questions, t(16) = 1.38, 
p = .188, were at chance for HK children. Hence, it appears that eight-year-olds who 
considered the functional informant to be more knowledgeable were more likely to show 
selective trust in her. However, children who considered the surface informant to be more 
knowledgeable did not systematically demonstrate selective trust in her. 
 
Relations between Verbal ability and Selective Trust 
Bivariate correlations between children‘s selective trust variables and verbal ability 
were conducted. There were no indications that children‘s selective trust was related to verbal 
ability, but there was one exception. Children who had higher verbal ability were better able 
to recall the informant who had provided functional explanations (r = .509, N = 32, p = .003). 
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Discussion 
The aim of Study 5A was to investigate whether shortening the functional and surface 
explanations, and making the difference between explanations more distinctive, would lead 
children to favour the functional informant. Results showed that, although eight-year-olds in 
both body parts and artifacts paradigms did not systematically seek and endorse labels for 
unfamiliar objects from either informant, children who were presented with the artifacts 
paradigm were more likely to judge that the functional informant as ―very good‖ or ―better‖. 
In contrast, children who were presented with the body parts paradigm did not systematically 
judge the functional informant to be ―very good‖ or ―better‖. It is surprising that children 
showed more selectivity when presented with artifacts but not with body parts. However, 
their general lack of selectivity cannot be attributed to their inability to recall what each 
informant had said. Children were able to remember which informant had talked about what 
the objects were ―for‖ or what they ―looked like‖. Further, consistent with the findings of 
Study 4, children‘s construal of the functional informant as more knowledgeable was 
associated with greater trust in the functional informant. That is, children who saw the 
functional informant as a more knowledgeable source of information were also inclined to 
learn labels for unfamiliar objects from her. On the other hand, children who considered the 
surface informant to be more knowledgeable did not systematically prefer learning labels for 
unfamiliar objects from her.  
Simplification of the explanations altered children‘s justifications in comparison to 
Study 4, in which only 6.3% of children in the body parts paradigm and 31.3% of children in 
the artifacts paradigm made specific references to the content of the informants‘ explanations. 
In this study, a larger percentage of children (56.3% in the body parts paradigm and 62.5% in 
the artifacts paradigm) justified their choices by stating that the informant had specifically 
talked about the functions or appearance of objects. In the artifacts paradigm, children‘s 
justifications largely favoured the functional informant. In the body parts paradigm, 
children‘s preferences for either informant in their justifications were equally distributed. 
Nevertheless, even though children were not selective in the body parts paradigm, children 
recognised how the two informants were distinct. 
While children performed similarly in both paradigms, it was perplexing that children 
more often favoured the functional informant in the explicit judgement and knowledge 
questions in the artifacts paradigm, but not in the body parts paradigm. One potential 
explanation for children‘s differential performance across the two paradigms could be due to 
the differences in the type of information the surface informants provided. In the body parts 
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paradigm, the surface informant‘s descriptions were focused on appearance, but they also 
referred to specific parts (e.g., eyebrow, toes, fingers). As a result, children may have 
construed the surface informant‘s ability to accurately label parts to be indicative of 
knowledge, even if she had not provided information about how those body parts were used. 
Therefore, children‘s lack of differentiation in the body parts paradigm suggests that they 
construed both informants to be equally competent. On the other hand, in the artifacts 
paradigm, the claims of the surface informant emphasised appearance, and no labels were 
given to any parts. This lack of labelling for parts represents a flaw in the design of this study 
that was inadvertently introduced when we attempted to simplify the explanations, remove 
references to material and tactile properties, and focus only on observable characteristics. As 
a result, in the artifacts paradigm, children might have considered the surface informant to be 
less capable than the functional informant because she had only described the objects in very 
loose terms. 
As discussed in the introduction, the surface explanations presented in Study 4 were 
modified in this study because it was thought that the over-emphasis on material and tactile 
properties were leading children to consider the surface informant to be knowledgeable about 
things which were beyond what could be externally observed. The findings of this study 
revealed that removing such references to material and tactile properties resulted in children 
more often dismissing the modified surface explanations in favour of the functional 
explanations. Hence, children might have construed the surface explanations to be providing 
superfluous information because the things she said were immediately obvious and could be 
easily confirmed with their own eyes. As a result, they were less inclined to favour the 
surface informant. According to this interpretation, children are quite sensitive to the 
difference between information that they can gather for themselves via inspection and 
information that calls for specialised knowledge or expertise that cannot be gained via direct 
inspection. This interpretation implies that if the surface explanations were altered in a 
subsequent study, either by providing labels for parts in the artifacts paradigm (e.g., sole of 
the shoe, bristles for the toothbrush), or by removing the labels for the parts in the body parts 
paradigm (e.g., by saying, for example, that ―there is a black dot inside a blue circle and there 
black lines at the top‖ for the eye), children would recognise these differences and a reversed 
pattern would be observed. In other words, in the body parts paradigm, children would prefer 
the functional informant over the surface informant whereas, in the artifacts paradigm, they 
would not show preferences for either informant. An important implication of this line of 
explanation is that children might adopt the same selective strategy when learning about body 
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parts or artifacts. Thus, the current findings raise the interesting possibility that children pick 
up on subtle differences; that they are sensitive to different types of explanations and, in some 
instances – notably those explanations that provide information unavailable to direct 
inspection – they regard some explanations to be superior to others. 
Despite children‘s ability to recall informants' explanations as well as their tendency 
to favour functional informants in the explicit judgement questions, at least in the artifacts 
paradigm, children did not show differential preferences in the ask and endorse questions in 
either paradigm. Consistent with the findings of Study 4, when required to select which 
informant to seek and endorse labels for unfamiliar body parts/artifacts from, children did not 
systematically prefer one informant over the other. It was initially expected that the 
simplification of the explanations would make the difference between the two types of 
explanation more salient and lead children to prefer learning from the functional informant. 
However, the results of this study show that simplification of the explanations had little 
impact on children's selective trust. It is likely that children construed both informants as 
equally knowledgeable and did not consider one informant to be a superior source for labels 
of unfamiliar body parts/artifacts because both types of explanations consisted of accurate 
and relevant information, delivered by informants who appeared genuine. 
Even though children were not selective in who they sought labels from, it is not the 
case that children treated both functional and surface explanations as completely equal in 
status. The findings showed that, when asked to decide which person would be smarter – a 
person who knows ―what something is for‖ or a person who knows ―what something looks 
like‖ – nearly all eight-year-olds chose the option, ―what something is for‖. Therefore, 
children by the age of eight recognise that knowing the functions of objects is better than 
simply knowing the appearance of objects, but this distinction does not extend to situations in 
which they have to decide who to learn labels from. 
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Study 5B 
 As found in Study 5A, children showed some signs of differentiation in response to 
the simplified explanations. Hence, it was possible to examine whether younger children 
would respond in a similar way. Like eight-year-olds, it was not expected that younger 
children would show selective trust, but it is plausible that they would still be able to 
successfully recall what each informant had said and decide that knowledge of functions is 
better than knowledge of appearance. Hence, five-year-olds were tested in Study 5B. Due to 
recruitment issues, only the results of the eight-year-olds presented with the body parts 
paradigm are outlined. 
 
Method – Study 5B 
Participants 
Participants were 16 five-year-olds (8 girls): M = 70.00, SD = 3.85, Range = 64-76. 
All children lived in a metropolitan area and spoke fluent English. Most children were 
Caucasian, although a range of ethnicities was represented. Children were recruited via 
parental invitation and tested individually in a quiet room in their school. Children 
participated in one session, lasting approximately 20 minutes, where they were presented 
with the selective trust paradigm and given verbal ability and ToM assessments. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 Materials and procedure were identical to Study 5A. In addition, five-year-olds‘ ToM 
was assessed using the same procedure in Study 4. 
 
Results – Study 5B 
Results will again be presented in three parts. First, children‘s selective trust and their 
responses to the follow-up questions as a function of paradigm are examined. Second, 
relations between children‘s responses to the follow-up questions and their selective trust are 
outlined. Finally, children‘s performance on the ToM tasks and verbal ability assessments, 
and its relations to selective trust are presented. The scoring system for children‘s responses 
was identical to Study 5A. 
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Children’s Selective Trust 
 To examine whether there were differences across the question types, a repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted with question type as the within-subjects variable. 
Children‘s responses did not significantly between the question types, F(2,30) = 1.64, p = 
.210. Related samples t-tests were then used to determine whether children performed above 
chance on the questions. Means for the ask, endorse, and explicit judgement questions were 
compared to a chance expectation of 2, and means for the overall trust scores were compared 
to a chance expectation of 6 (see Table 9.6). Analyses revealed that children‘s selective trust 
did not differ significantly from chance for any of the question types (all ps > .05). 
 
Table 9.6 
Mean Number (and SD) of Preference for Functional Informant. 
Question Type Body parts paradigm 
Ask questions (/4) 1.94 (0.57) 
Endorse questions (/4) 1.87 (1.09) 
Explicit judgements (/4) 2.42 (1.63) 
Overall scores (/12) 6.23 (2.72) 
 
Performance on Follow-up Questions 
In relation to children‘s justifications for selecting a particular informant as ―better‖, 
56.3% of children (n = 9) made general references to the accuracy or competence of the 
informant and the remaining children‘s responses were either ―don‘t know‖ or uncodable. No 
child made specific references to the content of the informants‘ explanations in terms of 
functional or surface information. 
To examine whether there were differences across the follow-up question types, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with follow-up question type (knowledge, 
memory-functional, memory-surface) as the within-subjects variable. Children‘s responses 
did not significantly vary across follow-up question types, F(2,30) = 0.13, p = .877. To assess 
whether children performed above chance on these follow-up questions, related samples t-
tests were conducted (see Table 9.7). Means for the knowledge, memory-functional, and 
memory-surface questions were compared to a chance expectation of 2, and means for the 
overall memory scores were compared to a chance expectation of 4. It was found that 
children‘s scores did not differ significantly from chance for the knowledge, memory-
functional, and memory-surface questions (all ps > .05). However, children‘s overall 
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memory-scores (M = 4.83, SD = 1.45) were significantly above chance, t(15) = 2.30, p = 
.036. In other words, five-year-olds showed indications of successfully recalling what 
informants had said. 
In terms of children‘s responses to the function vs. appearance question, 63% of 
children (n = 10) claimed that a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter than a 
person who knew ―what something looks like‖. However, a Binomial test revealed that 
children‘s responses to this question were at chance (p = .454). 
 
Table 9.7 
Mean Performance (and SD) on Follow-up Questions. 
Follow-up question Body parts paradigm 
Knowledge (/4) 2.33 (1.92) 
Memory-functional (/4) 2.58 (1.58) 
Memory-surface (/4) 2.25 (1.59) 
Memory total (/8) 4.83 (1.45)* 
Note. Asterisks denote response patterns that are different from chance. 
* p < .05 
 
Relations Between Responses to Follow-up Questions and Selective Trust  
Bivariate correlations were carried out between children‘s performance on the follow-
up questions (knowledge, memory-functional, memory-surface, memory total, function vs. 
appearance) and their responses to ask, endorse, and explicit judgement questions and total 
trust scores. These correlations are presented in Table 9.8. As found in Study 5A, children 
who preferred the functional informant in the knowledge questions were more likely to 
favour the functional informant in the endorse questions (r = .661, N = 16, p = .005), explicit 
judgement questions (r = .730, N = 16, p = .001), and in the total trust scores (r = .783, N = 
16, p < .001), but not in the ask questions (r = .384, N = 16, p = .142). Similarly, children 
who were better able to recall which informant provided the functional explanations were 
more likely to endorse the functional informant (r = .512, N = 16, p = .042). Surprisingly, 
children‘s performance on the memory-surface questions was negatively associated with 
children‘s selective trust. Specifically, children who more often favoured the functional 
informant in the endorse questions (r = -.647, N = 16, p = .007), explicit judgement questions 
(r = -.590, N = 16, p = .016), and overall trust scores (r = -.681, N = 16, p = .004) were less 
able to recall which informant provided the surface explanation. 
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Table 9.8 
Correlations Between Children’s Selective Trust and Follow-up Questions. 
 Knowledge 
questions 
Memory- 
functional 
Memory 
surface 
Total 
memory 
Function 
vs. appearance 
Ask questions 0.384 -0.104 -0.322 -0.467 -0.32 
Endorse questions .661** .512* -.647** -0.155 0.031 
Explicit judgements .730** 0.407 -.590* -0.207 0.095 
Overall trust .783** 0.427 -.681** -0.285 0.002 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).  
 
These results indicate that, like eight-year-olds, five-year-olds‘ endorsements of the 
functional informant were contingent on their construal of the functional informant as 
knowledgeable and their ability to remember what type of explanation that informant had 
provided. The negative association between five-year-olds‘ performance on the memory-
surface questions and their selective trust shows that they were responding to the memory-
surface questions by incorrectly stating that the functional informant had also provided 
surface information. 
To further examine the differences between children who favoured the functional 
informant or the surface informant in the knowledge questions, children were classified into 
two groups, depending on their knowledge scores: (1) children with higher knowledge (HK) 
scores of 4 (i.e., 3 out of 3 in terms of raw score on the knowledge questions), and (2) 
children with lower knowledge (LK) scores below 4. In comparing children‘s performance to 
chance, one-sample t-tests revealed that LK children selected the functional informant at 
chance levels for the ask questions, t(7) = 1.00, p = .351, the explicit judgement questions, 
t(7) = 0.78, p = .460, and the overall trust scores, t(7) = 1.71, p = .130. However, LK children 
were significantly below chance in selecting the functional informant in the endorse 
questions, t(7) = 2.39, p = .048. To be specific, children who more often attributed knowledge 
to the surface informant were more likely to endorse the labels she provided in the selective 
trust paradigm. In comparison, HK children were significantly above chance in selecting the 
functional informant for the explicit judgement questions, t(7) = 5.29, p = .001, and for the 
total trust scores, t(7) = 3.27, p = .014, although they were at chance for the ask questions, 
t(7) = 1.00, p = .351, and the endorse questions, t(7) = 1.53, p = .170. Hence, five-year-olds 
who considered the functional informant to be more knowledgeable were more likely to show 
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selective trust in her. However, in contrast to eight-year-olds, five-year-olds who considered 
the surface informant to be more knowledgeable more often endorsed the labels she provided. 
 
Relations between ToM, Verbal Ability and Selective Trust 
Five-year-olds scored a mean of 2.81 (SD = 1.33) on the first-order ToM reasoning 
tasks and a mean of 0.63 (SD = 0.72) on the second-order ToM reasoning tasks. Bivariate 
correlations between children‘s selective trust variables, ToM (first-order, second-order 
reasoning, and total scores) and verbal ability were carried out. There were no indications that 
children‘s selective trust was related to verbal ability or to ToM reasoning (all ps > .05). 
Hence, further analyses were not conducted. 
 
Comparison with Study 5A 
To examine age group differences between the five- and eight-year-olds presented 
with the body parts paradigm, a 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with question type (ask, 
endorse, explicit judgement) as the within-subjects variable and age group as the between-
subjects variable. A main effect for question type was found, F(2,60) = 3.17, p = .049, with 
post-hoc LSD tests revealing that children favoured the functional informant more often in 
the explicit judgement questions than in the endorse questions (p = .024). However, no main 
effect for age group was found, F(1,30) = 0.14, p = .715, and no question type x age group 
interaction was found, F(2,60) = 0.02, p = .983. To sum, it appears that children‘s responses 
in the selective trust paradigm were similar across ages. 
A 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA with follow-up question type (knowledge, memory-
functional, memory-surface) as the within-subjects variable and age group as the between-
subjects variable revealed that there was a significant main effect for age group, F(1,30) = 
15.11, p = .001. However, there was no main effect found for follow-up question type, 
F(2,60) = 1.94, p = .153, and the follow-up question type x age group interaction was also not 
significant, F(2,60) = 1.23, p = .299. Further exploration of age group differences was 
conducted using independent samples t-tests for each of the follow-up questions. Five- and 
eight-year-olds‘ responses to the knowledge questions did not significantly differ from each 
other, t(30) = 0.40, p = .690. In contrast, eight-year-olds performed significantly better on the 
memory-functional questions, t(30) = 2.92, p = .007, memory-surface questions, t(30) = 2.99, 
p = .006, and total memory scores, t(30) = 5.17, p < .001. In addition, eight-year-olds more 
often decided that a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter than a person who 
knew ―what something looks like‖, t(30) = 3.00, p = .005. 
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Discussion 
Study 5B examined whether five-year-olds could differentiate between informants 
who provided functional or surface explanations. Results showed that, like eight-year-olds, 
five-year-olds did not show selective trust when learning labels for unfamiliar body parts. 
However, while they showed some ability to remember what each informant had said, five-
year-olds‘ recall performance was not as robust as eight-year-olds‘. Responses to the other 
follow-up questions also indicated that five-year-olds did not make specific references to the 
content of an informant‘s explanation when justifying why they chose a particular informant 
to be ―better‖. Further, when asked to decide whether a person who knew ―what something is 
for‖ was smarter than a person who knew ―what something looks like‖, five-year-olds were 
not systematic in deciding that a person who knew ―what something is for‖ was smarter. 
Overall, five-year-olds did not appear to readily evaluate the quality of explanations in terms 
of whether they consist of functional or surface information. It appears that the ability to 
consider the adequacy of certain types of explanations does not emerge until later in 
development and likely coincides with more exposure to formal education. 
Consistent with the findings of Studies 4 and 5A, associations were found between 
children‘s responses to the endorse, knowledge and memory questions. Specifically, five-
year-olds who more often construed the functional informant as knowledgeable were more 
likely to have endorsed the labels she provided. On the other hand, five-year-olds who 
construed the surface informant as knowledgeable were more likely to have endorsed the 
labels she provided. In addition, children‘s tendency to endorse the labels provided by the 
functional informant was positively associated with their recall of what the functional 
informant had said. However, children who preferred the functional informant were poor at 
remembering which informant had provided surface information and incorrectly stated that 
the functional informant had also talked about ―what things looked like‖. In other words, 
five-year-olds tended to over-attribute knowledge to the functional informant they were 
endorsing, which suggests that they were less sensitive to the differences between the two 
types of explanations. Therefore, in contrast to the eight-year-olds in Study 5A, the less 
systematic performance of five-year-olds indicates that they are yet to fully appreciate the 
differences between the two informants‘ explanations. Instead, their performance appears to 
suggest a response bias, in which they continue to positively judge the informant who they 
had initially endorsed. For instance, children who decided to endorse the surface informant‘s 
labels were more likely to judge her favourably in the knowledge questions. In addition, 
children who decided to endorse the functional informant‘s labels were more likely to judge 
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her favourably in the knowledge questions, as well as incorrectly recall that she had talked 
about both ―what things are for‖ and ―what things look like‖.  
A limitation to this study was that, due to issues with recruitment, five-year-olds were 
not presented with the artifacts paradigm. In a future study, it would be necessary to present 
five-year-olds with the artifacts paradigm to determine whether they differentiate between the 
informants. Study 5A revealed that eight-year-olds judged an informant who provided 
functional explanations to be ―better‖ than an informant who provided surface explanations. 
It was discussed in Study 5A that eight-year-olds showed differential preferences because 
they might have considered the explanations offered by the surface informant to be 
superfluous and not demonstrating extensive knowledge of artifacts in the same way that the 
surface informant in the body parts paradigm provided accurate labels for parts of body parts. 
Hence, five-year-olds might also construe the functional informant as being a better source of 
information when presented with the artifacts paradigm. However, as evidenced by their 
performance in the follow-up questions in this study, particularly with respect to their 
justifications and responses to the function vs. appearance question, it is possible that they 
will not show sensitivity to the differences between the explanations. This remains, of course, 
an empirical question.  
 
General Discussion 
The aims of Studies 5A and 5B were to determine whether five- and eight-year-olds 
differentiate between informants who provide functional or surface explanations and, as a 
result, prefer learning new information from the informant who provided functional 
explanations. The results of these studies essentially replicate the findings of Study 4 in that 
eight-year-olds did not prefer seeking and endorsing labels for unfamiliar objects from the 
functional informant, despite their ability to successfully recall the type of explanation each 
informant had offered. In this study, the shortening and simplification of the explanations 
substantially improved children‘s recall, but had little impact on their selective trust. Such a 
finding lends support to the proposed explanations in Study 4, where it was suggested that 
children were not confused by the explanations but, rather, considered both informants to be 
equally competent. Since both informants provided explanations that were, in and of 
themselves, accurate, genuine, and relevant to the task of providing information, children 
likely construed both informants to be trustworthy sources from which to obtain information 
about labels for unfamiliar objects. The alternative (but not mutually exclusive) explanation 
presented in Study 4 was that children did not see the functional informant‘s knowledge of 
167 
object function as indicative of her knowledge of labels and, hence, did not distinguish 
between informants when learning labels for unfamiliar objects. 
Two particular findings of this study lend further support to this latter explanation. 
First, all eight-year-olds (except one), when asked to decide whether a person who knows 
―what something is for‖ or knows ―what something looks like‖ is smarter, chose ―what 
something is for‖. That is to say, despite explicitly stating that knowing how an object works 
is superior to knowing what an object looks like, eight-year-olds still did not favour the 
functional informant when asked to seek and endorse labels for unfamiliar objects. Second, 
children who were presented with the artifacts paradigm systematically preferred the 
functional informant when asked to judge which informant was ―very good‖ and ―better‖ at 
talking about the artifacts. However, even though they judged the functional informant in 
favourable terms, they did not preferentially seek and endorse labels from that informant. As 
discussed in Study 5A, the surface explanations may have appeared superfluous in that no 
labels for parts were provided and only references to obvious external characteristics were 
stated. In spite of the inferiority of the surface explanations, eight-year-olds still did not 
consider the differential adequacy of the explanations to be a suitable basis to dismiss the 
labels presented by the surface informant or favour the labels presented by the functional 
informant.  
Children‘s lack of selective trust in informants when learning labels suggests that the 
labelling test trials were not sufficient for tapping into children‘s sensitivity to explanatory 
depth. For instance, it is possible that we are conflating knowledge of object identity with 
knowledge of object labels when, in fact, these two aspects are not equivalent. To address this 
issue, a future study could modify the test trials such that children are asked, ―Who would be 
able to tell you what this is?‖ instead of being asked to decide who to learn the label for the 
object from. Further, to increase consistency in structure between familiarisation and test 
trials, the phrasing could be altered such that, when presented with an unfamiliar object (e.g., 
liver), one informant states, ―That‘s a slod. Your body uses it for making new blood‖ whereas 
the other informant states, ―That‘s a linz. There are red lobes and a blue tube at the top‖, and 
children are asked which informant they would endorse. The results of this study show that 
children are able to distinguish between functional and surface explanations. However, 
further empirical research is required to establish under what contexts children may come to 
privilege one type of explanation over another. 
While the findings do not show strong evidence for children‘s selective trust in 
informants who provide functional explanations over informants who provide surface 
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explanations, a developmental change was observed in which eight-year-olds showed better 
recall and ability to distinguish the informants than five-year-olds. That is, unlike eight-year-
olds, five-year-olds had difficulty remembering which informant had provided functional or 
surface explanations, justified their choice in informants in general terms, and did not 
systematically select a person who knew ―what something is for‖ as being smarter than a 
person who knew ―what something looks like.‖ The developmental shift cannot be attributed 
to maturity per se. As has been consistently found in Studies 3A, 3B and 4, stable or robust 
relationships were not found between children‘s selective trust and their ToM or verbal 
ability. The lack of evidence for such an association is important as it indicates that children‘s 
preferences for functional explanations are neither due to maturity nor the ability to construe 
what another person might know or think. In addition, another interesting developmental shift 
occurred by which five-year-olds, but not eight-year-olds, preferred learning new labels from 
the informant who provided surface explanations if they construed the surface informant to 
be knowledgeable. Eight-year-olds, on the other hand, did not prefer learning new labels from 
the surface informant even when they construed her to be knowledgeable. Such a finding 
suggests that children's evaluations of the competence of informants who provide surface 
explanations change between roughly five and eight years of age.  Further, it is possible that 
children‘s ability to differentiate between different types of explanations comes about due to 
exposure to formal education. That is, with more schooling, children are provided with more 
information about the world that goes beyond the description of external characteristics. 
Children receive information that involves notions of causality (e.g., underlying processes 
and mechanisms) and, as a result, might come to learn that certain explanations (i.e., 
functional) are more informative than others (i.e., surface).  
In conclusion, the findings of Studies 5A and 5B showed that presenting children with 
informants who provided simplified functional or surface explanations did not increase their 
selective trust in the informant who provided functional explanations. However, as also found 
in Study 4, children who regarded the functional informant to be more knowledgeable were 
more likely to endorse the labels she offered. While eight-year-olds‘ and, to some extent, 
five-year-olds, could accurately recall what each informant had said with the introduction of 
these shortened explanations, they did not systematically seek and endorse labels for 
unfamiliar objects from either informant. For eight-year-olds, they did not show a preference 
to learn from the functional informant even if they regarded explanations for how artifacts 
could be used to be more favourable than superfluous descriptions of observable 
characteristics of artifacts. Further, eight-year-olds did not prefer learning from the functional 
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informant even though they decided that knowing the functions of objects is better than 
knowing what objects look like. Overall, the results of this study suggest that children 
construed both informants to be equally competent and knowledgeable but they did not 
consider the informants‘ capacity to provide informative explanations to be indicative of their 
knowledge of object labels. 
In the subsequent chapter, I present a general discussion of the findings and outline 
their contribution to the selective trust literature. I provide a brief overview of the main 
findings in light of the aims of this thesis, and I also reflect on the original plans I had for this 
thesis; specifically, to examine how children simultaneously balance information gleaned 
from labelling (i.e., accuracy) with other forms of information (e.g., quality of explanation). 
In addition, the implications and limitations of this thesis are considered, in a global sense, 
and potential future directions are suggested to address such limitations. 
  
170 
Chapter 10 
General Discussion 
 
This thesis sought to extend the research on children‘s selective trust, which has 
established that children from about three years of age prefer learning from a previously 
accurate informant as compared to a previously inaccurate informant. Three major 
modifications to the typical selective trust paradigm were implemented. First, in going 
beyond the domain of artifacts, children were presented with familiar and unfamiliar parts of 
the body to determine whether they also demonstrate selective trust in the biological domain. 
Because children‘s understanding of the body burgeons between the ages of four and eight, 
and much of what they know about the body, especially about internal organs, is learnt 
through what they hear from others, it was expected that the biological domain would be a 
fertile one in which to further investigate how children evaluate the trustworthiness of 
informants. Second, children‘s trust in informants who provide new information was 
compared to their trust in informants who provide straightforwardly accurate or inaccurate 
information. It was predicted that informants providing novel labels for familiar body parts 
(i.e., new information) would appear more credible to children than informants providing 
inaccurate information about the body. It was also reasoned that informants providing novel 
information would more closely approximate what children often encounter in the real world. 
Finally, rather than focusing exclusively on informants who simply provide labels for objects 
– whether accurate, novel or inaccurate – children‘s sensitivity to informants‘ explanations, 
and notably the adequacy of their explanations was examined. Specifically, this thesis 
considered whether children‘s precocious capacity to discern accurate from inaccurate 
labellers extends to other verbal information that can, arguably, distinguish someone who is 
knowledgeable, and therefore epistemically trustworthy, from someone who is unlikely to be 
a good source of new information. Thus, in the presence of two informants who both 
provided accurate and relevant information, the question of interest was whether children 
would consider an informant who provided explanations for the functions of body parts to be 
more competent and trustworthy than an informant who merely provided descriptions of 
obvious characteristics of body parts. Based on the existing literature, which suggests that 
children show a preference for causal explanations in particular contexts, it was predicted that 
children would prefer learning from an informant who provided explanations for the 
functions of body parts rather than from an informant who provided descriptions of obvious 
171 
characteristics. However, it should be acknowledged that the extant literature does not present 
a straightforward basis for such a prediction. 
With respect to the first modification to the selective trust paradigm, which was to 
present children with body parts instead of common artifacts, it is evident that children 
demonstrate selective trust in the biological domain in the same way that they do in the 
artifact domain. The preliminary study presented in Chapter 5, in which children were asked 
about their general knowledge of objects from the human body, indicated that four- and five-
year-olds are quite knowledgeable about the body. Specifically, four- and five-year-olds 
knew more about external body parts (e.g., eye, hand) than internal organs. In addition, some 
internal organs (e.g., brain, heart) were better known to children than others (e.g., pancreas, 
liver), which is consistent with everyday experience. Children‘s understanding of the body 
also reveals the extent to which they depend on testimony from others to learn about the 
body, particularly in relation to things that they are unable to witness or personally verify for 
themselves (Harris, 2007). Despite lacking direct observation of the processes of internal 
organs, children demonstrated accurate knowledge of some of the processes, and they also 
provided responses that did not question the existence of those organs. As stated by Harris 
(2002), children‘s beliefs in the existence of certain types of entities depend on the type of 
discourse they have heard. Because children hear other people referring to internal organs and 
processes in ways that presuppose their existence, it likely follows that children also come to 
treat them as real entities.  
The results presented in Chapter 5 are also in line with independent research which 
shows that children‘s understanding of the body rapidly increases from about the age of four 
(Inagaki & Hatano, 2006; Jaakkola & Slaughter, 2002; Keil, 1992). Further, when asked 
about what the body parts or organs were ―for‖, children generally responded with core or 
peripheral functions (e.g., ―the brain is for thinking‖, ―the hand is for holding things‖). Such 
findings are consistent with the findings of Kelemen (2003), who showed that children are 
biased to conceive of objects as being designed to perform specific functions. A few of the 
four- and five-year-olds also referred to the function of organs as being necessary to sustain 
life, consistent with the findings of Slaughter and Lyons (2003). For example, children 
mentioned that the brain or the heart was ―to keep you alive‖. Overall, the findings show that 
children possess much knowledge about the body from the age of four. These results served 
as a basis on which to structure the subsequent studies, which implemented variations of the 
familiar selective trust paradigm. 
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In relation to the second modification to the selective trust paradigm, which was to 
investigate children‘s trust in informants who provide new labels for parts of the body, the 
results presented in Chapter 6 showed that three-, four-, and five-year-olds differ in the 
manner by which they construe the informant who provides new labels. Specifically, three-
year-olds‘ trust is consistent with an inaccuracy strategy (Corriveau et al., 2009), in which 
they are untrusting of inaccurate informants when such informants are contrasted with 
accurate informants. They are receptive to informants who provide new labels just as they are 
receptive to accurate labellers insofar as neither type of informant is inaccurate. In contrast, 
four- and five-year-olds begin to privilege accuracy, and they consider the accurate labeller to 
be more trustworthy than the informant who provides new or inaccurate labels. Finally, five-
year-olds, but not four-year-olds, consider the informant who provides new labels to be more 
trustworthy than the inaccurate labeller. However, five-year-olds remain appropriately 
cautious; they seek and endorse new information from informants who provide new labels, 
but they do not judge such informants to be a better source of information than inaccurate 
labellers. The findings of this study were important because they suggest that children from 
the age of five treat informants who provide new labels and informants who provide 
inaccurate labels differently. Further, the informant who provides new labels seems to better 
reflect situations that children reliably encounter in real life. Given that children‘s epistemic 
trust extends to the biological domain using the traditional paradigms, the subsequent studies 
in this thesis sought to establish the extent to which children‘s scepticism extends to 
explanations about parts of the human body. 
With regards to the third modification to the selective trust paradigm, children were 
presented with informants who both provided accurate and relevant information, but differed 
in the adequacy of the information they provided. To be specific, children were asked to 
decide whether an informant who provided explanations for the functions of body parts was 
more trustworthy than an informant who merely provided descriptions of obvious 
characteristics of body parts. The results presented in Chapter 7 showed that, when presented 
with informants who provided either functional or obvious information for unfamiliar organs, 
four- to eight-year-olds did not selectively trust one informant over the other. Because 
children did not know what the organs were, it was proposed that they were attending to both 
of the informants‘ explanations, but were unable to reliably distinguish between them. Hence, 
in Chapter 8, eight-year-olds were presented with informants who provided either functional 
or obvious information for body parts they were highly familiar with. In addition, to ensure 
that children‘s lack of selective trust could not be attributed to difficulties in understanding 
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objects from the biological domain, children were also presented with informants who 
provided functional or obvious information for common artifacts (e.g., bottle, spoon). Again, 
eight-year-olds generally did not selectively trust one informant over the other when learning 
about either unfamiliar organs or unfamiliar artifacts, although they showed some indications 
of being able to recall what the two informants had said and how the two informants were 
different. Nevertheless, it was not the case that children were choosing between the 
informants at random. Instead, children who construed informants who provided functional 
explanation to be more knowledgeable were more likely to prefer learning from such 
informants, whereas children who construed informants who provided surface information to 
be more knowledgeable were unsystematic in their preferences for learning from either 
informant. 
Given that children showed some ability in differentiating between the informants 
and, in some instances, selectively trusting the functional informant, it was proposed that 
making the difference between the functional and obvious explanations more distinct would 
lead children to more likely trust the functional informant. Therefore, in Chapter 9, the 
functional and obvious explanations were simplified such that they were shorter and sounded 
more conversational. Further, it was ensured that the surface explanations referred only to 
external and observable properties, rather than make references to material or tactile 
properties, an issue that was raised in Chapter 8. As a result of simplifying the information 
provided by the informants, eight-year-olds showed strong recall of what each informant had 
said. That is, they reliably remembered who had provided information about what objects 
―were for‖ or ―looked like‖. Further, they even explicitly stated that a person who ―knows 
what something is for‖ would be smarter than a person who ―knows what something looks 
like‖. However, when asked to seek and endorse labels for unfamiliar organs or artifacts, they 
did not prefer learning from one informant over the other. Interestingly, even though children 
stated that the informant who provided functional explanations for common artifacts was 
more competent than the informant who provided obvious descriptions for common artifacts, 
they still did not prefer learning labels from the functional informant. Five-year-olds were 
also tested using this procedure, and it was found that, while they showed some ability to 
remember what each informant had said, they were less systematic in their preferences for the 
informants than eight-year-olds. 
It was also surprising that eight-year-olds judged the functional informant in positive 
terms when she provided functional explanations for artifacts, but not when she provided 
functional explanations for body parts. I argued that the reason for domain-specific patterns 
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in children‘s responding was an unintended result of the simplified explanations. Specifically, 
since references to material and tactile properties were removed from the obvious 
descriptions for common artifacts, children perhaps construed the resultant obvious 
descriptions to be superfluous, providing information that could be easily confirmed with 
their own eyes. On the other hand, the obvious descriptions for parts of the body, while 
limited to properties that were externally observable, also happened to refer to parts of body 
parts (e.g., eyebrow, fingers). In fact, the obvious descriptions provided a number of 
occasions for the surface informant to make accurate statements. For instance, when 
considering the description of the hand, the surface informant provided labels for parts of the 
body parts (e.g., ―thumb‖), correctly counted the number of parts (e.g., ―there are four 
fingers‖), and classified the parts in relation to other parts (e.g., ―it‘s part of your arm‖). 
Further, there is a large body of literature on children‘s formation of categories based on 
labelling that indicates that children treat objects that receive the same label as possessing 
common and non-obvious properties (e.g., Gelman, 2009; Jaswal, 2004; Jaswal & Markman, 
2007). Hence, children may have found the obvious descriptions for body parts to be 
acceptable because the surface informant‘s accurate labelling of parts of the body parts 
implicitly conveyed information about her knowledge of non-obvious characteristics. As a 
result, children did not differentiate between the informants who provided functional or 
surface information for parts of the body because both informants were competent at 
providing information about the body parts. Under such an interpretation, it appears that 
children from the age of eight favour informants who provide information for things that are 
not immediately visible (e.g., functions, labels for parts, relational characteristics) over 
informants who provide information for properties that are clearly visible. 
Despite their ability to differentiate between the informants, however, eight-year-olds 
did not seek and endorse labels for unfamiliar objects from either informant. In contrast to the 
findings of other studies (Birch et al., 2008; Koenig & Harris, 2005) which show that children 
generalise their trust in accurate informants over inaccurate informants to related subject 
areas (e.g., object labels and functions), children did not consider the adequacy of informants‘ 
explanations for objects to be indicative of their knowledge of labels for those objects. As 
discussed, such findings suggest that the test questions were not adequate for assessing 
children‘s sensitivity to differences in the informants‘ explanatory adequacy. In light of the 
limitations of the test questions used in these studies, I proposed potential test questions that 
could be investigated in future studies. For instance, rather than ask children to decide who to 
seek and endorse labels from, children could be asked who would be able to tell them ―what 
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this [object] is‖. Alternatively, the informants could provide functional or surface information 
in addition to the novel labels for the unfamiliar objects. Overall, from the current results, it 
appears that, even though eight-year-olds are explicitly aware that informants who provide 
information about what objects are ―for‖ are superior to informants who provide information 
about what objects ―look like‖, they do not readily evaluate informants‘ explanations against 
such criteria. 
With such findings in mind, I wish to reflect on the original plan I had for this thesis. 
In the scheme of my overall thesis, I wanted to establish how children simultaneously balance 
information gleaned from labelling (i.e., accuracy) with other forms of information (e.g., 
quality of explanation, confidence, etc). A key question of interest was how children 
construed informants who provided accurate or new labels that were supplemented by either 
low- or high-quality explanations. In particular, I wanted to examine whether children would 
be more trusting of informants who provided new labels with high-quality explanations over 
informants who provided accurate labels with low-quality explanations. At the inception of 
this work, however, the literature suggested that there was a higher order problem that needed 
solving first; that is, whether children treat new labels and inaccurate labels differently. 
Indeed, as shown in Chapter 6, children treat such labels differently at about the age of five. 
Next, I turned my attention to the issue of how children evaluate informants on the basis of 
the quality of their explanations. One basis on which explanations may be qualitatively 
distinct is in whether such explanations refer to the functions of objects or to the appearance 
of objects. However, based on the results of Chapter 7 to 9, children are surprisingly poor at 
discerning the merits of these types of explanations. 
The findings of this thesis indicate that children trust informants who provide 
explanations that appear accurate and relevant, and they do not spontaneously evaluate the 
quality of the information in terms of whether the information is about functional or obvious 
properties. Against this interpretation, eight-year-olds, when prompted, decided that a person 
who knows ―what something is for‖ is smarter than a person who knows ―what something 
looks like‖, whereas five-year-olds did not distinguish between the two options. This 
developmental shift suggests that children slowly come to realise that they should privilege 
functional explanations over obvious ones. Hence, in future studies, it will be necessary to 
further explore how children learn that functional explanations are superior. For example, it is 
possible that at younger ages, children do not distinguish between such explanations so long 
as they appear relevant and genuine. This may seem counter-intuitive given findings in the 
research suggesting that children seek and prefer causal explanations (Bernard et al., 2012; 
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Chouinard, 2007; Kushnir et al., 2013). Nevertheless, a close reading of the extant literature 
shows that it is not yet clear if children fully grasp the privileged position of causal 
explanation (see Chapter 3). Indeed, it seems likely that with increasing exposure to formal 
education, which heavily emphasises the understanding of causal relations (e.g., functions, 
how things work, hidden processes, principles), children may come to decide that informants 
who provide explanations with causal elements are likely to be better sources of information 
(i.e., functional explanations) than, for instance, informants who merely describe externally 
visible properties. In line with the arguments put forward by Brewer et al. (1998), the ability 
of children and adults to evaluate explanations in scientific terms likely comes about only 
through formal instruction and training. 
The notion that children learn to privilege functional explanations via socio-cultural 
practices (i.e., formal education, books, etc) is also consistent with the findings of Luria 
(1976), who showed that exposure to formal education facilitated the emergence of particular 
modes of thought. Indeed, many professions in the Western world require a high level of 
specialised knowledge that only comes about through education. For instance, doctors have 
extensive knowledge of the body and its processes in order to successfully treat patients, and 
information technology specialists require in-depth knowledge of how computers work in 
order to successfully implement and maintain systems. In contrast, it is plausible that 
functional explanations are less privileged within certain pursuits or in non-Westernized (or 
industrialized) societies, where other modes of learning remain prominent and perhaps also 
privileged, such as demonstration. In these latter contexts, knowledge of surface properties 
may be even more important than knowledge of functional properties. For example, if we 
consider how our ancestors lived and some people continue to live in small pockets of the 
world, having extensive knowledge of the appearance of salient plants, places, or predators 
might be more valuable for survival than, for example, having knowledge of the biological 
mechanisms by which plants and animals grow.  
As was also discussed in Chapter 3, children‘s question asking appears to be fragile 
from the age of five, given that they still have a tendency to ask ineffective questions (Mills 
et al., 2010). Such findings suggest that children are yet to fully understand that certain types 
of questions elicit certain types of responses. Even though young children do ask many 
explanation-seeking questions in the form of ―why‖ and ―how‖ interrogatives (Chouinard, 
2007), they do not have to understand that they will receive an explanation in return; although 
they do appear more satisfied when receiving answers with an explanatory form (Frazier et 
al., 2009). Hence, children may not necessarily have the tools to distinguish between different 
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types of explanations until they are older and have been exposed to formal education, which 
emphasises cause and function as better explanations. Further evidence in support of this 
possibility can be gleaned from Kelemen (1999b), who showed that seven- to eight-year-olds 
favour teleological explanations over more scientifically appropriate physical-reductionistic 
explanations. It is only from the age of about ten that children begin to prefer the physical-
reductionistic explanations, indicating the possible role of classroom instruction in driving 
this shift. To sum, while further research is necessary, the results of this thesis suggest that it 
is not until later in development, and with more exposure to formal education, that children 
recognise the value of explanations that contain functional information. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis add to the existing literature in a number of ways. 
First, it is apparent that children‘s selective trust is not limited to the domain of artifacts. The 
domain of biological knowledge proves to be a fruitful one in which to explore how children 
evaluate the trustworthiness of others. As discussed in earlier chapters, it contains a wealth of 
information that children are not exposed to until formal education, and the complexity of 
body parts and organs allows for examining how children consider different types of 
explanations. Second, the findings of Chapter 6 show that children from the age of five 
construe informants who provide new information to be distinct from informants who provide 
inaccurate information. Hence, in the same way that studies have investigated how children 
evaluate informants who provide information that is neutral (Corriveau et al., 2009; Koenig 
& Jaswal, 2011), further studies can be conducted to explore how children trust informants 
who provide new information in different settings. Third, the findings of Chapter 7 to 9 show 
that children do not differentially prefer learning from informants who provide functional 
explanations over informants who provide obvious descriptions. It is surprising that despite 
what appears to be a preference for causal information, as evidenced by their tendency to ask 
explanation-seeking questions (Chouinard, 2007), children did not readily prefer information 
that contained causal properties. Nevertheless, there were some indications that children at 
about the age of eight begin to recognise the value of informants who know about hidden 
internal processes and functions of objects over informants who only provide information 
about clearly visible properties of objects. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis add to the existing literature by suggesting that 
children are initially more sensitive to other distinguishing characteristics of informants, such 
as their accuracy (Koenig & Harris, 2005), attributes (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; 
Reyes-Jaquez & Echols, 2013), and manner (Birch et al., 2010; Jaswal & Malone, 2007), than 
to qualitative aspects of particular types explanations. Further research can be conducted to 
178 
determine the process by which children realise that functional explanations should be 
privileged, as well as contexts in which children are more likely to differentiate between 
functional or obvious explanations. In the next section, limitations to this work and possible 
future directions are discussed. 
 
Limitations of this Work and Future Directions 
The perceived limitations of the experiments presented in this thesis have been 
addressed in the preceding chapters. In this section, I present some more global points for 
consideration. While this thesis contributes novel findings to the existing research on 
children‘s selective trust, there are a number of limitations to be noted. One global limitation 
that is apparent across the studies is the small sample size which has led to reduced power in 
analyses and various marginal or near-significant results. Of course, the clear solution would 
be to increase the sample size in future studies. Nevertheless, the existing results have 
highlighted that, in particular contexts, children do show systematic preferences for the 
functional informant over the surface informant. Hence, additional studies will assist in 
clarifying such findings. 
The studies in this thesis focused on presenting informants who provided information 
for body parts or internal organs with which children were either highly familiar (i.e., Chapter 
6, 8, and 9,) or highly unfamiliar (i.e., Chapter 7). However, this thesis was limited in that it 
did not examine how children construe informants who provide information for internal 
organs of which they have partial knowledge (e.g., brain, heart, stomach, and lungs). As 
discussed in Chapter 1, children are well-balanced in their credulity and scepticism. When 
children are unsure or have inadequate knowledge, they tend to readily accept other people‘s 
testimony (Jaswal, 2010). In contrast, when they receive testimony about things that they are 
familiar with, they evaluate testimony in light of their existing knowledge (Ma & Ganea, 
2010). However, there is little research that examines children‘s selective trust in informants 
who provide information about things for which their knowledge is burgeoning or fragile. 
As documented in Chapter 5, children‘s understanding of internal organs and their 
processes is increasing from the age of four or five, so they would perhaps be receptive to 
information that is not yet fully consolidated in their knowledge. Further, children rely 
heavily on testimony to learn about such organs and processes since, in comparison to 
external body parts (e.g., eye, hand), they have fewer direct opportunities to observe their 
functions. If, as argued by Keil and Wilson (2000), explanations satisfy some cognitive need, 
then it may be that when presented with information that addresses gaps in their knowledge, 
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children could be more sensitive to qualitative differences between explanations (e.g., 
preferring information that refers to non-visible processes over externally observable 
properties). In a future study, children can be presented with informants who provide 
functional or surface explanations for partially familiar internal organs (i.e., heart, brain, 
stomach) to determine whether they are able to detect differences in explanatory depth. By 
presenting partially familiar organs, it is anticipated that children might construe informants 
who provide information about non-visible causal processes and functions to be more 
knowledgeable than informants who simply provide information about clearly visible 
properties that children can easily determine for themselves. In addition to presenting other 
objects from the biological domain, the results of the current thesis also suggest that children 
demonstrate selective trust in domains other than artifacts. Hence, although this thesis 
focused almost exclusively on the biological domain, future studies can examine children‘s 
selective trust in a range of other domains, such as physics or psychology. These domains 
offer a wealth of new information and different types of explanations which would be fruitful 
for investigating how children evaluate the trustworthiness of informants based on their 
provision of novel information or explanations that vary in quality. 
As discussed in the earlier part of this chapter, the original aim of this thesis was to 
consider how children simultaneously evaluate informants‘ information gleaned from 
labelling (i.e., accurate or new labels) against explanations that vary in quality (e.g., whether 
they provided functional or obvious information). The results of this thesis showed that, 
while children from the age of five treated new labels as distinct from inaccurate labels, there 
was little evidence that young children reliably distinguished between functional explanations 
and obvious descriptions. As a result, these two approaches could not be combined as initially 
intended to determine how children simultaneously weigh accuracy of labelling with quality 
of explanation. However, children‘s lack of sensitivity to the difference between functional 
and obvious explanations does not preclude the possibility of conducting future studies which 
pair accurate and novel labels with other types of explanations that differ in quality. For 
example, recent evidence suggests children from about the age of five are able to evaluate the 
circularity of explanations (Kurkul & Corriveau, 2014; Mercier, Bernard, & Clément, in 
press), and that children treat circular explanations to be less adequate than non-circular 
explanations. Hence, a future study could present children with informants who pair accurate 
or novel labels with either a circular or non-circular explanation to determine whether 
children are more likely to privilege informants‘ accuracy, or informants‘ (non-accuracy-
dependent) competence. For instance, it is possible that children might consider an informant 
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who provides new information, accompanied by a more informative non-circular explanation, 
to be more knowledgeable than an informant who provides accurate information, 
accompanied by a less informative circular explanation. Of course, this remains an empirical 
question.  
Additional studies can also be undertaken on delineating the specific contexts in 
which children might demonstrate selective trust in informants who provide functional 
explanations over informants who provide obvious descriptions given the null findings of 
Studies 3, 4, and 5. In the present studies, the depth of the informants‘ explanations and 
references to obvious or non-obvious features were confounded. To separate out these aspects 
in a future study, children can be allocated to either an Obvious condition, where both 
informants provide functional or surface descriptions of obvious and visible parts of body 
parts, or to a Non-obvious condition, where both informants provide functional or surface 
descriptions of non-obvious and non-visible parts of body parts. Such a contrast would likely 
allow for children‘s sensitivity to explanations to come into sharper focus, and would 
contribute to the original goal of this thesis in examining how children simultaneously weigh 
the accuracy of informants‘ labelling against explanations that vary in quality. 
 
Conclusions 
The findings presented in this thesis add to the existing literature by demonstrating 
that children show selective trust in the biological domain, as well as in contexts which go 
beyond comparing accurate and inaccurate labellers, whether in the form of novel labels or 
with different types of explanations. Children are appropriately balanced in their evaluations 
of informants who provide new information, and they distinguish between informants who 
provide information that varies in explanatory adequacy. However, in the presence of 
informants providing functional and surface information (i.e., who both provide accurate and 
potentially relevant explanations), they do not necessarily consider one informant to be a 
more knowledgeable source for learning new labels. Such findings pave the way for further 
research to determine under what circumstances children might prefer informants who 
provide new information and informants who provide functional or surface information, as 
well as how children come to decide that certain kinds of explanation should be privileged. 
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Appendix D – Children’s Responses to What Body Parts/Organs are “For” in Study 1 
 
Four- and five-year-olds’ explanations of each body part/organ 
Body Part/Organ Four-year-olds Five-year-olds 
Arm S1001: ―...‖| S1002: ―move your fingers‖| S1003: ―does nothing‖| 
S1004: ―helps you wave and make music‖| S1005: ―grab stuff / 
for your muscles‖| S1008: ―bending / on your hand, you can pick 
up something, like boxes‖| S1009: ―stretching‖| S1010: 
―waving‖| S1013: ―bending, swimming, reaching‖| S1015: ―...‖| 
S1016: ―help for moving, holding‖| S1017: ―stretching‖| S1019: 
―for walking and punching, kicking‖| S1022: ―there's bones 
inside it, stretch it, move your bones / the bones inside have 
blood on it and stick to bones‖  
S1006: ―waving‖| S1007: ―holding / and this bit is for doing this 
(bends elbow); and to look at your elbow; fingers‖| S1011: ―so 
you can move your arm / use your fingers for picking stuff up 
and eating, use hands for holding knives and spoons for different 
foods‖| S1012: ―put them up, down, swing them around, clap 
when spinning around / sometimes arms can move, stretch, like 
exercise‖| S1014: ―helps you run really fast in a running race, 
helps you move food to your mouth / tattoos‖| S1018: ―hold 
hands‖| S1020: ―(crosses over arms) for holding / I have a 
stamp‖| S1021: ―you can move it‖| S1023: ―holding fork; arms 
hold your hands up; food for touching your hands / put nail 
polish on fingers‖| S1024: ―for moving‖| S1025: ―cutting your 
hair‖| S1026: ―play, leave it‖| S1027: ―brushing, colouring|‖ 
Ear S1001: ―...‖| S1002: ―hear something‖| S1003: ―for listening‖| 
S1004: ―helps you hear‖| S1005: ―hearing‖| S1008: ―listening / 
things go in your ear and put your finger to let it out, there is a 
big and a little one [points to holes]‖| S1009: ―so you can hear, 
tell someone and hear what they are saying‖| S1010: ―listening‖| 
S1013: ―for listening‖| S1015: ―...‖| S1016: ―helps you hear‖| 
S1017: ―listening‖| S1019: ―for wiggling / (blocks ears) sounds 
like the ocean‖| S1022: ―listening, hearing‖|  
S1006: ―hearing‖| S1007: ―helps you hear / inside the holes are 
two straws and that's where what you hear goes inside‖| S1011: 
―listen to it with your ear, hear inside your ear to hear everything 
/ when it's loud, you can hear all the things‖| S1012: ―hearing / 
some people can't hear‖| S1014: ―helps you hear‖| S1018: 
―hearing‖| S1020: ―put the medicine and your mouth‖| S1021: 
―listening‖| S1023: ―you hear with your ears; listen‖| S1024: ―for 
hearing‖| S1025: ―to hear‖| S1026: ―hearing people talk‖| S1027: 
―hearing, earrings‖| 
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Body Part/Organ Four-year-olds Five-year-olds 
Eye S1001: ―Close one eye; and another is open; blink; closing your 
eyes to sleep / eyebrows‖| S1002: ―moving your eye / two‖| 
S1003: ―look and blink‖| S1004: ―blinking / that's the colour of 
the eye‖| S1005: ―looking‖| S1008: ―looking / watching out 
where you step, looking out for bad people‖| S1009: ―seeing, see 
where you're going‖| S1010: ―blinking‖| S1013: ―for looking / 
not blue like mine‖| S1015: ―for looking‖| S1016: ―helps to see‖| 
S1017: ―look / eyelashes on it‖| S1019: ―blinking faster‖| S1022: 
―it sees in the dark when you eat carrots; look in the eye, it looks 
green, brown, blue, black / eyelashes‖|  
S1006: ―blinking, looking / close like this, sleeping‖| S1007: 
―sleeping / close your eyes and opening; circle bits are round, 
there is blood inside your eyes, people have different colours‖| 
S1011: ―looking at stuff, you can look at the eye and own eye in 
the mirror‖| S1012: ―seeing, you can move your eye, can move 
left to right / some people can't see very well so they need 
glasses‖| S1014: ―helps you see. I think it helps you know where 
you're going / helps you go everywhere‖| S1018: ―looking, 
seeing‖| S1020: ―to blink your eye and (pulls skin under eyes 
downwards)‖| S1021: ―looking‖| S1023: ―you see with your eyes, 
look for stuff / have a big and a little ball in eye; different 
colours; have eyelashes‖| S1024: ―helps you see‖| S1025: ―see, 
you can‘t see if you‘re blind‖| S1026: ―looking at the sky, 
looking at trees‖| S1027: ―looking, seeing‖| 
Foot S1001: ―Wiggle your toes / Nail polish‖| S1002: ―walk, move 
your toes‖| S1003: ―kick, walk, run, jump, star jumping‖| S1004: 
―helps you walk and sit down‖| S1005: ―for walk / shoes‖| 
S1008: ―stepping and have to look out in the jungle for snakes / 
football and roads‖| S1009: ―walking, putting socks on, running, 
exercising‖| S1010: ―running, walking / wiggle your toes‖| 
S1013: ―walking, crawling‖| S1015: ―using‖| S1016: ―walking, 
moving‖| S1017: ―twitching your toes‖| S1019: ―running, sitting 
down, walking, backflips, jumping, meatball‖| S1022: ―helps you 
walk, when you flip over you need to push it along / there's little 
bits inside the foot, blood inside the nails‖|  
S1006: ―walking‖| S1007: ―that's a bit of your bone sticking up; 
walking / the skin is not that colour inside, in case you fall over 
and break your skin‖| S1011: ―walking / put nail polish on‖| 
S1012: ―kicking, spinning around on a bike‖| S1014: ―it helps 
you move your toes and it helps you walk. I think it helps you 
run, skip, hop‖| S1018: ―to walk‖| S1020: ― / nail polish‖| S1021: 
―you can walk with them‖| S1023: ―have toes and feet are very 
smelly, put nail polish on, walking‖| S1024: ―walking‖| S1025: 
―sit, keep germs away‖| S1026: ―wearing things, putting nail 
polish on‖| S1027: ―walking‖| 
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Body Part/Organ Four-year-olds Five-year-olds 
Hand S1001: ―Shake your hands off in the sink when you wash your 
hand / [Does an emu action], twinkle twinkle little star‖| S1002: 
―move your hand‖| S1003: ―they just move‖| S1004: ―wave, 
opening and shutting‖| S1005: ―touching‖| S1008: ―pick up 
things, tickle, building blocks / it can move‖| S1009: ―to pick up, 
pick some toys up, to pack away your room‖| S1010: ―clap, eat‖| 
S1013: ―can bend it, gets sandy, holding, making noise louder‖| 
S1015: ―for holding stuff‖| S1016: ―helps you move‖| S1017: 
―reaching, holding hands‖| S1019: ―grabbing things, doing 
backflips, exercises‖| S1022: ―little parts inside it, if there are 
holes in the side of your finger, bones might come out; pick 
things up‖|  
S1006: ―clapping, pick up things, flicking, waving / I have 
tattoos on my hand‖| S1007: ―for thinking (points at head)‖| 
S1011: ―eating stuff, holding forks, hold spoons to eat different 
stuff‖| S1012: ―doing stars, jump jump star‖| S1014: ―helps you 
eat, when you don't have a hand you can't do anything, and it 
will be sore and it will bleed‖| S1018: ―waving, saying 
goodbye‖| S1020: ―eating stuff, holding forks, hold spoons to eat 
different stuff / (counts number of fingers) "five"‖| S1021: 
―touching and grabbing‖| S1023: ―have little bumps on your 
hand and you plant with your hands, hold little seeds; hold many 
things with your hands‖| S1024: ―picking things up, for eating‖| 
S1025: ―touching‖| S1026: ―holding things‖| S1027: ―touching‖| 
Leg S1001: ―Walk, kicking, clap feet, starfish with arms and legs at 
the beach, jump / knee‖| S1002: ―helps you walk, sit down / 
knee‖| S1003: ―kick, run, star jump‖| S1004: ―makes you run‖| 
S1005: ―walking‖| S1008: ―stepping, watch for where you're 
stepping, bending / knee‖| S1009: ―walking, put some shoes on‖| 
S1010: ―jumping‖| S1013: ―use it to walk, run, tiptoe‖| S1015: 
―walking‖| S1016: ―helps you to walk, moving‖| S1017: ―they 
are very straight, walking, standing up‖| S1019: ―walking / feet‖| 
S1022: ―makes your foot walk‖| 
S1006: ―walking‖| S1007: ―walking, hopping‖| S1011: 
―walking‖| S1012: ―sitting down, dancing, ballet / put shoes on 
and (points to her hellokitty plush) she has a heart on her foot‖| 
S1014: ―helps you run, walk, skip & hop; helps you move your 
knee, foot, toes‖| S1018: ―you walk with it‖| S1020: ―walk, 
jump, crawl, in the jumping castle, park / foot‖| S1021: ―you can 
bend it‖| S1023: ―is very long, knees are very strong and never 
break; but if you cut it, it will break; holding your foot‖| S1024: 
―walk with it, put shoes on your leg, bend‖| S1025: ―walk, run, 
swim‖| S1026: ―walking, running‖| S1027: ―walking‖| 
Mouth S1001: ―...‖| S1002: ―...‖| S1003: ―eat, kiss, and move and make 
people talk‖| S1004: ―make music‖| S1005: ―talking‖| S1008: 
―saying, stick on / putting stuff on and putting it on tongue‖| 
S1009: ―licking, eating‖| S1010: ―moving, talking‖| S1013: 
―talking, counting, breathing, spitting out‖| S1015: ―...‖| S1016: 
―helps you talk‖| S1017: ―kissing, smiling‖| S1019: ― / lipstick‖| 
S1022: ―eats food, tastes food and it licks food, lick icecream‖|  
S1006: ―licking, kissing, chewing / they are beautiful, my teeth 
wobbled and it fell out‖| S1007: ―lick, and go down the hole and 
goes to your tongue, and makes your tongue‖| S1011: ―your lips 
help you eat / for lipstick‖| S1012: ―talking, there is teeth inside, 
sucking their thumb / hello kitty's lip is behind her fur‖| S1014: 
―cooking, putting your food in / i think it helps you speak‖| 
S1018: ―kissing‖| S1020: ―for putting lipstick‖| S1021: ―you can 
put lipstick on there, you can lick them‖| S1023: ―talking / can 
have lipstick sometimes‖| S1024: ―for talking‖| S1025: ―to talk, 
be fresh‖| S1026: ―eating lollies‖| S1027: ―moving your lips‖| 
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Body Part/Organ Four-year-olds Five-year-olds 
Nose S1001: ―wiggle your nose, wiggle your body at the same time‖| 
S1002: ―breathe‖| S1003: ―sniffs‖| S1004: ―smells‖| S1005: 
―smelling‖| S1008: ―sniffing‖| S1009: ―smelling, smelling what 
your mum cook today‖| S1010: ―smelling / i got a blocked 
nose‖| S1013: ―sniffing‖| S1015: ――| S1016: ―helps you smell‖| 
S1017: ―sniffing‖| S1019: ―blowing air out‖| S1022: ―it smells 
stuff‖|  
S1006: ―smelling‖| S1007: ―smelling / there is a hole in your 
nose‖| S1011: ―sniffing, smell / when i go to bed and mum & 
dad cook dinner, i can smell it and hear lots of noise‖| S1012: 
―smelling / wobble it around like this‖| S1014: ―it helps you 
smell, breathe‖| S1018: ―sniffing‖| S1020: ―you bump your nose 
at the car and it hurts‖| S1021: ―you can breathe with it, you can 
wiggle it‖| S1023: ―smells lots of things with your nose, you 
blow your nose like what I just did‖| S1024: ―smelling‖| S1025: 
―smelling‖| S1026: ―smelling things‖| S1027: ―smelling‖| 
Teeth S1001: ―Chew; eating; brush your teeth / Crunch‖| S1002: 
―chew on meat, chicken, beef, rice, beans, bite on bone‖| S1003: 
―eat, chomp chomp chomp‖| S1004: ―helps you chew food and 
make music and helps you eat good‖| S1005: ―for crunch, eat, 
hungry / it fell out and wobbly‖| S1008: ―snapping and licking, 
tasting / dinosaurs have teeth‖| S1009: ―biting, eating‖| S1010: 
―eating / licking‖| S1013: ―breaking up food‖| S1015: ―eating‖| 
S1016: ―talking, brushing your teeth‖| S1017: ―mouth is for 
eating / they fall out‖| S1019: ―biting‖| S1022: ―chew food up, it 
yells, talks, screams really loud‖|  
S1006: ―chewing, talking / I lost my tooth because I was getting 
older‖| S1007: ―eating, breaking up the food / the red bits near 
the teeth are things the little kids think are blood, called nodules; 
help keep your teeth in; the middle red bit [points to tonsil] in 
the middle is where your food goes in and where you swallow 
your food‖| S1011: ―for eating, helps you grow big teeth‖| 
S1012: ―eating, swallowing‖| S1014: ―helps you bite, swallow‖| 
S1018: ―eating‖| S1020: ―brush your teeth, and make your teeth 
sore / i lost one teeth‖| S1021: ―you can chew with them‖| 
S1023: ―grow lots of times; when one comes out and your teeth 
grows (talks about tooth fairy); eating‖| S1024: ―for chewing, 
washing‖| S1025: ―make it shiny, for talking‖| S1026: ―falls 
down, eating, wiggles‖| S1027: ―eating, drinking‖| 
Brain S1001: ―have an eyebrow wiggle / through your body‖| S1002: 
―vomit‖| S1003: ―move around‖| S1004: ―...‖| S1005: ―...‖| 
S1008: ―like an ‗o‘‖| S1009: ―to keep alive‖| S1010: ―...‖| S1013: 
―talking, remembering, thinking‖| S1015: ―...‖| S1016: ―for 
thinking and for dreaming‖| S1017: ―being quiet / very squishy, 
soft‖| S1019: ―for the head and you wobble it and it shakes‖| 
S1022: ―thinking, there's a little black thing (forehead) and it 
clicks to your brain‖|  
S1006: ―...‖| S1007: ―thinking / you have holes and they are 
different colours; the blue is full of stuff that makes you think‖| 
S1011: ―blood goes through your brain ―| S1012: ―makes you 
hear with your ear / you can do this (covers ears) if it's too loud, 
cover with your hands‖| S1014: ―keeps you alive, helping your 
blood / helps you have dreams‖| S1018: ―...‖| S1020: ― / head, 
body, eyes‖| S1021: ―you think with it ―| S1023: ―you think with 
lots of stuff in your brain, this is called a brain ―| S1024: 
―looking, concentrating ―| S1025: ―makes you smart, for 
reading‖| S1026: ―...‖| S1027: ―to think‖| 
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Body Part/Organ Four-year-olds Five-year-olds 
Gall Bladder S1001: ―...‖| S1002: ―...‖| S1003: ―...‖| S1004: ―...‖| S1005: ―...‖| 
S1008: ―...‖| S1009: ―...‖| S1010: ―...‖| S1013: ―...‖| S1015: ―...‖| 
S1016: ―...‖| S1017: ―...‖| S1019: ―for water‖| S1022: ―pumps up 
all the blood; it goes in your tummy and the blood gets on it‖|  
S1006: ―...‖| S1007: ―...‖| S1011: ―...‖| S1012: ―...‖| S1014: ―...‖| 
S1018: ―...‖| S1020: ―makes your body feel well‖| S1021: ―...‖| 
S1023: ―...‖| S1024: ―...‖| S1025: ―swallowing‖| S1026: ―...‖| 
S1027: ―...‖| 
Heart S1001: ―...‖| S1002: ―...‖| S1003: ―...‖| S1004: ―keeps birds 
warm‖| S1005: ―...‖| S1008: ―...‖| S1009: ―pumping the blood to 
keep you alive‖| S1010: ―beat‖| S1013: ―...‖| S1015: ―...‖| S1016: 
―helps you do this; pump‖| S1017: ―...‖| S1019: ―the bones, it 
beats‖| S1022: ―it beats and makes noise‖|  
S1006: ―it beats / I can't feel my heart, I think I'm dead‖| S1007: 
―helps you pump the blood / these bits are the pumping bits‖| 
S1011: ―helps you move‖| S1012: ―pumps blood around your 
body‖| S1014: ―putting your body good‖| S1018: ―...‖| S1020: 
―checks your body‖| S1021: ―...‖| S1023: ―for breathing and 
talking; if your heart stops, you'll die‖| S1024: ―...‖| S1025‖: ―to 
stay, to walk‖| S1026: ―...‖| S1027: ―breathing‖| 
Kidney S1001: ―cook‖| S1002: ―...‖| S1003: ―...‖| S1004: ―...‖| S1005: 
―...‖| S1008: ―...‖| S1009: ―...‖| S1010: ―...‖| S1013: ―...‖| S1015: 
―...‖| S1016: ―for doing wees‖| S1017: ―...‖| S1019: ―jump 
around‖| S1022: ―it makes poo come out / there's blue and red 
bones together and a little pink line‖|  
S1006: ―...‖| S1007: ―...‖| S1011: ―...‖| S1012: ―...‖| S1014: ―...‖| 
S1018: ―...‖| S1020: ― / it's a circle, two circles‖| S1021: ―...‖| 
S1023: ―kidney stones hurt a lot and you have to go to hospital; 
my mum had them and she vomited and it was painful and she 
had to call my dad‖| S1024: ―helps you hear‖| S1025: ―it can 
come out‖| S1026: ―...‖| S1027: ―...‖| 
Larynx S1001: ―Curl your hair, ears / Ankles with your bone‖| S1002: 
―Move your body‖| S1003: ―...‖| S1004: ―...‖| S1005: ―...‖| 
S1008: ―...‖| S1009: ―...‖| S1010: ―...‖| S1013: ―...‖| S1015: ―...‖| 
S1016: ―talk, move‖| S1017: ―...‖| S1019: ―can see some white 
bones, putting your belly back‖| S1022: ―there's a little food and 
the food goes down and it softens food, it opens and closes / 
there's yellow bones and sometimes food gets stuck on it‖|  
S1006: ―...‖| S1007: ―...‖| S1011: ―...‖| S1012: ―...‖| S1014: ―...‖| 
S1018: ―...‖| S1020: ―...‖| S1021: ―...‖| S1023: ―...‖| S1024: ―put 
food in it‖| S1025: ―body inside‖| S1026: ―...‖| S1027: ―...‖ 
 
Liver S1001: ―...‖| S1002: ―lick‖| S1003: ―...‖| S1004: ―...‖| S1005: 
―...‖| S1008: ―...‖| S1009: ―...‖| S1010: ―...‖| S1013: ―...‖| S1015: 
―...‖| S1016: ―...‖| S1017: ―...‖| S1019: ―to swallow food‖| 
S1022: ―its got blood on it and sometimes gets food on the blood 
/ blood goes in the blue thing‖|  
S1006: ―...‖| S1007: ―pumping‖| S1011: ―...‖| S1012: ―...‖| 
S1014: ―helps you walk, it moves your feet‖| S1018: ―...‖| 
S1020: ―...‖| S1021: ―...‖| S1023: ―...‖| S1024: ―...‖| S1025: ―stay 
with you all day‖| S1026: ―...‖| S1027: ―...‖| 
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Body Part/Organ Four-year-olds Five-year-olds 
Lungs S1001: ―Scratch your ears / Like a butterfly‖| S1002: ―...‖| 
S1003: ―...‖| S1004: ―helps you breathe‖| S1005: ―...‖| S1008: 
―breathing‖| S1009: ―...‖| S1010: ―eating‖| S1013: ―breathing‖| 
S1015: ―...‖| S1016: ―breathing‖| S1017: ―...‖| S1019: ―...‖| 
S1022: ―...‖|  
S1006: ―breathe‖| S1007: ―pumping / feel my bones here‖| 
S1011: ―...‖| S1012: ―...‖| S1014: ―helps you go one way to your 
poo and the good part where you keep your food‖| S1018: ―...‖| 
S1020: ―...‖| S1021: ―...‖| S1023: ―breathing section, for 
breathing, neck holds lungs together; when you breathe, they 
come in and come out‖| S1024: ―...‖| S1025: ―stay for a long 
day‖| S1026: ―hearing‖| S1027: ―...‖| 
Pancreas S1001: ― / Music comes out of holes and you put whistle through 
it‖| S1002: ―move‖| S1003: ―...‖| S1004: ―makes you talk‖| 
S1005: ―...‖| S1008: ―...‖| S1009: ―...‖| S1010: ―...‖| S1013: ―...‖| 
S1015: ―...‖| S1016: ―...‖| S1017: ―...‖| S1019: ―crack your 
bones‖| S1022: ―food goes down in it / there's bones in it, there's 
yellow stuff in it, it crushes up all the food inside‖|  
S1006: ―...‖| S1007: ―[points to tube] that's where your poo 
comes out; food goes in and poo goes out‖| S1011: ―...‖| S1012: 
―...‖| S1014: ―...‖| S1018: ―...‖| S1020: ―...‖| S1021: ―...‖| S1023: 
―...‖| S1024: ―...‖| S1025: ―for your hair, vomit comes down‖| 
S1026: ―...‖| S1027: ―...‖| 
Stomach S1001: ―wiggle your hair‖| S1002: ―blow‖| S1003: ―nothing‖| 
S1004: ―makes music, helps‖| S1005: ―to eat, use mouth to eat‖| 
S1008: ―air out of your mouth‖| S1009: ―...‖| S1010: ―breathe‖| 
S1013: ―...‖| S1015: ―for eating‖| S1016: ―...‖| S1017: ―to 
breathe‖| S1019: ―breathing air out of your mouth‖| S1022: ―...‖| 
S1006: ―eating‖| S1007: ―breathing‖| S1011: ―when you eat, it 
goes down there (points)‖| S1012: ―...‖| S1014: ―putting your 
food in, keeping your sugar up‖| S1018: ―...‖| S1020: ―...‖| 
S1021: ―...‖| S1023: ―sometimes you call it tummy, your tummy 
rumbles and nothing else‖| S1024: ―...‖| S1025: ―helps you 
walk‖| S1026: ―eating‖| S1027: ―...‖| 
Note. S represents individual participants‘ responses. 
‗ / ‘ denotes a prompt by the experimenter, ―Can you tell Johnny/Jenny anything else about X?‖ 
―...‖ denotes a ―don‘t know‖ response by children. 
[ ] denotes any gestural actions performed by children. 
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Appendix E – Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks 
 
E.1 Script 
 
 
Subject:       Date: 
Location:        
___________________________________________________________________________ 
☐ FALSE BELIEF: Unexpected Contents 
 
Picture ONE 
 
Here is a box of Pringles [pointing].  What do you think is inside the box?  
 
Response: _____________________________________ 
 
Let’s have a look inside the box?  
[children are invited to lift the flap with the Pringles to reveal crayons].  
 
Can you tell me what is really inside the box?  
 
Response: ______________________________________ 
 
That’s right! There are crayons inside the box.  
Now, put the lid back on so the box is closed.  
 
Here’s Lily [lift flap]. Lily has never seen inside this box of Pringles before.  
 
[Target question] 
 
What does Lily think is inside the box?  
 
Response: _____________________________________ 
 
(if the child does not answer spontaneously open the last flap and ask: [pointing]  
 Does she think there are Pringles or crayons?) (Circle child‘s response) 
 
[Reality question] 
 
Okay, what’s really inside the box?  
 
Response: _________________________________ 
 
(if the child does not answer spontaneously then ask [pointing]:  
 Are there Pringles or crayons?) (Circle child‘s response) 
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☐ FALSE BELIEF: Unexpected Transfer  
 
[pointing on the FIRST sheet] 
This is Luke. Luke has a ball and a pink box.  
 
[show the child the SECOND sheet] 
Luke puts his ball into the pink box to keep it safe  
and then he goes to play. 
 
[show the child the THIRD sheet] 
While Luke is outside playing, Sean decides to surprise him.  
Sean takes the ball out of the pink box and puts it inside the blue box.  
Then he goes outside to play.  
 
[show the child the FOURTH sheet, pointing Luke but NOT the boxes] 
Luke comes back because he wants to play with his ball. 
 
[Target question: false belief base action] 
 
Where will Luke look for his ball? 
 
Response:  ________________________________ 
 
(if the child does not answer spontaneously then ask [pointing]:  
inside the pink box or inside the blue box? (circle child‘s response) 
 
[Target question] 
 
Okay, where does Luke think his ball is before looking for it? 
 
Response: ___________________ 
 
(if the child does not answer spontaneously then ask [pointing]:  
 In the pink box or in the blue box?) (circle child‘s response) 
 
[Reality question] 
 
Okay, where is the ball really? 
 
Response: ________________________________ 
 
(if the child does not answer spontaneously then ask [pointing]:  
In the pink box or in the blue box?) (circle child‘s response) 
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☐ Second order false belief – task 1 
Picture 1: Tomorrow is Joe‘s birthday and his mum is surprising him with a bike. She‘s 
hidden the bike in the garage. Joe says ―mum, I really hope you get me a bike for my 
birthday!‘. Because Joe‘s mum wants to surprise him she says ―sorry Joe, I got you a toy 
instead‘.  
Control 1/ToM1 Question 1: What does Joe think he‘s getting for his birthday? 
 
Control Question 2: What is he really getting?  
 
Must pass both of these questions to continue 
 
Picture 2: Later Joe goes to the garage to look for a ball to play with. In the garage Joe sees a 
brand new bike with ribbons wrapped around it. Joe‘s mum doesn‘t see him go into the 
garage and find the bike.  
 
In the evening, Joe‘s dad asks his mum ‗does Joe know what you really got him for his 
birthday?‘ 
2
nd
 Order Ignorance Question 3: What does Joe‘s mum say? 
 
Justification Question 4: Why does she say that? 
 
 
Then Joe‘s dad says ‗What does Joe think you got him for his birthday?‘ 
 
2
nd
 Order False-Belief Question 5: What does mum say? 
 
Justification Question 6: Why does she say that?  
 
Reality Control Question 7: What does Joe really know he is getting for his birthday? 
 
Memory Control Question 8: What did Joe‘s mum pretend he was getting first of all? 
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☐ Second order false belief – task 2 
 
Picture 1: Dad has given Mary and Simon some chocolate to share, ―Go and put it in the 
fridge now,‖ says Dad, ―you can have some after dinner‖.  
 
Picture 2: They put the chocolate in the fridge and then go out to play. 
 
Picture 3: A little later, Simon comes in for a drink. He goes to the fridge and he sees the 
chocolate. He wants to keep the chocolate all for himself, so he takes it out of the fridge and 
puts it in his bag.  
 
 
 
Picture 4: Oh look! Mary is playing by the window; she can see everything that Simon is 
doing! She sees him put the chocolate in his bag! Simon is so busy hiding the chocolate that 
he doesn‘t see Mary watching him! 
 
After dinner Dad says they can have some of the chocolate. So, Simon and Mary run into the 
kitchen.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Control/ToM1 Question 1: Where does Mary think the chocolate is?  
 
 
Control Question 2: Where has Simon really put the chocolate?  
 
 
Must pass both of these questions to continue  
ToM2Test Question 3: Where does Simon think Mary will look for the chocolate?  
 
 
Justification Question 4: Why does Simon think that?  
 
 
Reality Control Question 5: Where is the chocolate really?  
 
 
Memory Control Question 6: Where was the chocolate first of all?  
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E.2 Pictures for False Belief: Unexpected Contents 
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E.3 Pictures for False Belief: Unexpected Transfer 
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E.4 Pictures for Second order false belief – Task 1 
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E.5 Pictures for Second order false belief – Task 2 
 
